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How Do We Measure the Success of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes?

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Abstract

Over the past 20 years, DDR programmes have been introduced in more than 30 countries and are frequently mandated by UN Security Council Resolution’s (Clark, 2014:1). Each programme is driven by a wide range of actors and donors with diverse assumptions, expectations and mandates (Herbert et al, 2013:16) and is often plagued by diverse challenges including ‘cultural insensitivity, excessive force, poor coordination, half-baked approaches and discriminatory and localized perspectives’ (Wepundi, 2011:59). While many evaluative studies have been carried out, existing literature on the subject suggests that the track record of DDR programmes is difficult to assess (Humphrey & Weinstein, 2005:3). As a result the extent to which DDR has been an effective tool to achieve peace, security and development in post conflict societies remains unclear and there is no uniform idea of how success or failure should be defined. Traditionally, the success of DDR is measured crudely by how many ex-combatants have participated and how many guns collected. This paper argues that since DDR programmes do not exist in isolation, but are often introduced as part of broader peace-building efforts in post conflict societies, success could better be measured, qualitatively as well, in military (security), political, and economic terms by assessing on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which each specific programme contributes to providing security, not only for the ‘state’ but for individuals and their communities as well, building legitimate political institutions, and reviving the economy thus creating an enabling environment for peace, security, stability and long term development.

Key Words: DDR, Post-Conflict Societies, Security, Peace building, Development

Introduction

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a process that is designed to contribute to, and support, wider national and international post-conflict peace-building efforts aimed at restoring stability, security, development and peace in post-conflict societies (UN, 2014:2). This process technically involves disarmament which is the collection, documentation and control/disposal of weapons from ex-combatants and, sometimes, the civilian population; demobilization which focuses on the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces/groups; and reintegration which is focused on helping ex-combatants return to their communities, acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income (UN, 2014:4). Being able to measure success is significant as it can help identify areas of the programme that need improvement while at the same time determining whether or not the programme is achieving its goals. DDR is a compound process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions (UNDP, 2005:11). This paper agrees that there is no comprehensive pattern
of DDR practice that can be ‘superimposed on post-conflict scenarios around the world’ (UN/OSAA, 2007:4) given the different dynamics of post-conflict societies. Difficulties abound in any evaluative effort but one of the ways to evaluate the success or failure of any programme is by looking at its aims and objectives in the first instance. The main objectives of DDR according to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are:

1. To contribute to security and stability by facilitating reintegration and providing the enabling environment for rehabilitation and recovery
2. To restore trust through confidence-building among factions and the community
3. To prevent or limit future violent conflict
4. To contribute to national reconciliation, and
5. To free up human and financial resources for reconstruction and development (UNDP, 2005:11)

It is clear from these stated objectives that while the focus is primarily on ex-combatants, the main beneficiaries are the wider community (UNDP, 2005:11) and it is for this reason that measuring success must include the wider community as they also suffer the consequences of these programmes when they go wrong. From this perspective one can evaluate measurable indicators of success. This paper looks at three areas, military/security, political and economic success.

**Measuring Military (Security) Success:**

Post-conflict peace building takes place in the context of deepening humanitarian and economic crisis in post conflict societies, exasperated by violence and widespread human rights violations (Herbert et al, 2013:1). DDR is often introduced in this context and is aimed at creating an enabling environment for peace processes by dealing with security problems that arise when ex-combatants are trying to adjust to normalcy during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development (Miliken & Krause, 2002). The task is to remove arms from circulation, from the ex-combatants and the civilian population after the end of conflict, disassemble military structures to avoid escalating rates of crime and violence in the communities (Faltas et al, 2001:1). A measurable indicator of DDR success, therefore, is security. Security is a highly contested concept (Cox, 1981) but here we refer to it as a dual concept involving both human and state security (Kerr, 2013:105). Defending territory and state through various means including military force is often seen as the object of security but the protection of individuals and communities from violence and insecurity is of primary importance, as well, for post-conflict peace building (Kerr, 2013:104). The objective here is, as Alkiri (2004:360) argues, to ‘protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human freedoms and fulfillment’. Security-building after war is about a comprehensive reversal of war conditions to peace amongst belligerents in a way that brings about peaceful conditions and improvement of security through transforming the role and posture of armed combatants and making war and violence no longer attractive to them as a means to an end (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:2). However, the urgency with which guns are removed from circulation may suggest some level of success but recent cases like Central African Republic (CAR) have shown that this could breed a security dilemma especially where the state is a party in the conflict (Herbert et al, 2013). On face value it may
seem that disarmament and demobilization directly increase security hence the narrow desire to depend on quantitative measures based on number of guns collected or number of soldiers demobilized. But as McEvoy & Murray (2008:11) rightly argue, there are ‘security risks attached to ad hoc, short-term disarmament campaigns’. In their study on Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North District, they show that almost 80% of respondents said that small arms made them feel safer and more than 60% said disarmament would decrease security in their village (McEvoy & Murray, 2002:14). The provision of security needs to go beyond ensuring that all hostilities cease between the former conflict parties but also that no other forms of violence persist or emerge (Wolff, 2010:165) that cause insecurity in the community. Success in this area should be about how the people feel not just what those implementing the programmes think. This suggests a bottom-up type of evaluation that takes the feelings of the communities, community security and community centered violence reduction, into account and measures security from the perspective of the people. In addition, not all DDR programmes are introduced in ideal or genuine ceasefire situations and simply assuming that demobilization and disarmament processes directly lead to security is misleading and wrongly based on the assumption that all parties are willing to disarm (Herbert et al, 2013). It is important to note that once a society is heavily armed, control and elimination of personal weapons might make disarmed individuals especially vulnerable to those who may not disarm as Barash & Webel (2014:290) rightly point out. For instance, in Sierra Leone while 22,000 combatants disarmed between May and October 2001, other hardcore rebels refused to disarm and most of the weapons handed over were not in working condition (Oxfam International, 2007:1). Measuring success therefore only in quantitative terms by considering the number of guns collected and the number of soldiers demobilized is praiseworthy but allows for criticisms that DDR does not effectively assist in achieving peace in insecure environment as it does not give an accurate picture of the degree of security achieved. Cases differ and these quantitative measures alone tend to assume similarity in all cases, which is misleading (Khakee & Florquin, 2003). Kosovo was different from Albania where weapons had flooded the society after the collapse of state institutions in 1997. Albanians recognized, as a community, the threat these weapons posed to their communities and they were more willing to surrender their weapons, about 200,000 while in Kosovo only 155 weapons were collected (UNDP, 2003). While the breakdown of command, control and capacity in the warring factions is something that can be measured to indicate security success (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:7) it is also important to measure how safe people feel. Unless the ultimate purpose of security is about the security of people and their communities, then the whole relevance of DDR is questionable.

**Measuring Political Success:**

Beyond security success, the next important area to consider is political success. As Wolff (2010:163) succinctly observes, an essential aim of post-conflict reconstruction is to create a set of political structures in accordance with an agreed conflict settlement that allows the conduct of a non-violent, just and democratic political process where incentives for peaceful political strategies outweigh any potential benefits to be gained from a relapse to violence. The idea of DDR leading to a politically stable domestic environment is developed out of the process of modern state formation, which revolves as Miliken & Krause (2002) rightly posit, from its central functions of providing security, welfare and, most importantly representation (Schwarz,
Peace agreements aim to establish democratic forms of governance and/or to improve existing political systems with a deliberate view towards greater stability, representation and inclusiveness (Wolff, 2010:163). The major task here is two-fold: first, how to encourage elites of conflict groups to give up violence as a means of pursuing political power and relying instead on exclusively democratic means (including, elections); and secondly, how to deal with the wider legacy of a conflict in terms of its effects on political culture, the structures of civil society (or lack thereof) and these tasks entail breaking up existing patterns of politics and forcing a reconstruction of social and political relationships into non-violent or non-coercive mode (Miliken & Krause, 2002). Often DDR programmes include a timetable for elections and a successful election is seen as an indicator of success. But as some scholars rightly argue, elections alone are not enough to guarantee political integration of armed groups (Wolff, 2010:166). Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Ireland suggests that political liberalization early in post conflict situations are unlikely to achieve an inclusive and stable political process due to unwillingness of elites to cooperate, lack of trust and fear of domination (Wolff, 2010:174). This is because, in the long run, sustainable success in DDR-led post-conflict peace-building depends primarily, as Paris (2004) rightly argues, on building stable and effective institutions before liberalizing political competition and economic activity. Therefore, beyond elections, an important indicator of success that should be measured is the presence of effective institutions and the full political engagement of all legitimate parties concerned. The difficulty here though is being able to discern between politically and criminally motivated conflict parties given that not all local actors involved in the process are politically legitimate representatives of their communities (Wolff, 2010:165). Furthermore, the process of creating democratic domestic order often involves a great deal of violent struggle against predatory elites, contemporary warlords, repressive leaders and authoritarian rulers (Miliken & Krause, 2002). At the same time these warlords and leaders could be central to restoring the desired order in post conflict societies. As Wolff (2010:167) explains, while this is a difficult and challenging situation, leaders of armed groups can make a transition from leading their community during conflict to leading them in peacetime. For instance, Gerry Adams gradually moved Sinn Fein from a political support base of IRA terrorism to a professional political party after he became president in 1983 moving the group from the margin of politics to center stage (McGarry et al, 2004:31). Although there are challenges, getting former combatants to accept non-violence and democratic politics as the only way to achieve their ultimate goals is significant for the overall success of a peace process. Another measurable indicator is how the programme manages political expectations of ex-combatants, especially spoilers, those leaders among them who feel their power is threatened by any peace emerging from negotiated settlements and can destroy negotiated agreements if they are not adequately engaged in a proper way as Stedman (1997:5) rightly explains. Care has to be taken not to put power back in the hands of those individuals and groups who were instrumental to the conflict in the first place. Creating local capacity is one way to limit the impact of spoilers whose activities try to destroy the fragile peace and wear out external commitment to reshape the terrain of power and insecurity (Wolff, 2010:162). In all, therefore, political success lies in the extent to which armed groups chains of command have been dismantled regardless of the number of arms collected, the political transformation of armed groups and the willingness of elites to cooperate within new democratic structures. These are all indicators that can and should be measured.
Measuring Economic Success:

The whole idea of DDR is anchored on the need to transform post conflict societies into peaceful ones. The task here is one of transforming a conflict-driven economy into a robust peace economy with sustainable levels of growth. This includes the reintegration of former combatants and refugees into the economic process. DDR efforts are aimed at supporting ex-combatants to become active participants in the peace process through removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and integrating combatants socially and economically into society (Dwyer, 2012:278). The economic success of DDR involves all three components but is closely tied to the component of reintegration. The concept of reintegration is highly contested and although it is one of the most measurable aspects of DDR it is also the most difficult aspect of DDR to measure (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:7). As Colletta et al (1996:24) rightly observe, there is a negative label associated with reintegration that ex-combatants reject and that limits their participation; one that sees them as violent thugs and criminals with sexually transmitted diseases who need reintegration. Another problem is the degree of social cohesiveness, trust and the social capital of the receiving community (Colletta et al, 1996:24). Scholars like Torjesen (2013:2) rightly argue that reintegration is a ‘process not a programme’ and so when we measure the success of post-conflict reintegration by the number of programmes initiated and number of ex-combatants that participated, it tends to remove attention from larger social, political and economic processes that are linked to ex-combatants exiting from armed groups. Reintegration packages and training programmes have benefits as they help leaders deliver concrete benefits to combatants at the end of conflict and provide a mechanism to legitimize the warring factions (or exclude them) and engage the leadership of the armed groups in programme design and implementation (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:7). However, the programming part of these programmes are just one part of the process (Colletta et al, 1996:24) and a more accurate measure of success would be the inclusivity of the programmes and how the ex-combatants themselves, including women and children, individually participate (if they do) and how they respond to and deal with the social, political and economic challenges they face (Torjesen, 2013:2). Another indicator of success is the extent to which communities hosting ex-combatants receive support rather than a narrow focus on ex-combatants alone. Critics of DDR programmes often argue that DDR benefits war criminals and this could be because the programmes are not community driven and the emphasis is on monetary incentives for ex-combatants. For instance, in Kindu, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, a Victims Association complained that DDR activities reward those who have committed war crimes (Wolff, 2010:176). While financial incentives are a crucial part of these programmes, they can easily become an integral element of war and post-war economies in which soldiers, politicians and organized criminals benefit the most (Kaldor, 1999). Involving the community could reduce the problem of being seen to reward those who have committed war crimes (Oxfam International, 2007:3). In this sense therefore, the extent to which programmes are community –driven is a measurable indicator of economic success. Furthermore, the dismantling of the war economy (Kaldor, 1999) is a measurable indicator and one that is crucial for economic success. Many scholars argue that the experience of social and economic reintegration facilitated by DDR programmes has the ability to transform the cost-benefit calculus of previous participants in the war economy, thus transforming their economic activities and helping to breakdown the other
incentives that create and sustain war-time economies (Oryema, 2013:3). Conflicts create conditions in which large parts of the population become increasingly dependent on cooperation with transnational criminal networks for their own survival and this has important consequences for how they respond to efforts aimed at post-conflict peacebuilding. An example is Afghanistan, where a large part of the population has its source of income in the growing and processing of poppies for the production of heroin (Goodhand, 2004). While it is difficult to measure when and how a war economy has been reformed or transformed, the extent to which DDR offers local populations alternatives to sustain themselves and their families is a measurable indicator. This is extremely connected to weakening the influence of local warlords and crime lords and extending the control of the central government to some of the most remote regions of the country (Goodhand, 2004). If people feel that they were better off during the war, they may not see the need to support any form of change. Hence the extent to which DDR programmes transform and rebuild an economy in a way that makes it suitable for peacetime and less dependent on violence and crime is an important indication of success.

Conclusion

DDR programmes are an important element in a peace process that can be used to support a peace-building framework and they play a crucial role in peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction (Muggah, 2005:276). DDR programmes are vital to post-conflict recovery, but it is only one part of effective post-conflict recovery that needs clear leadership and coordination of peace agreements (Oxfam International, 2007:4) because armed groups cannot be asked to disarm, demobilize and disengage their military forces when no legitimate institutions exist to enforce peace agreements (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:6). Furthermore, for a society that has experienced the devastating effects of war, the failure to reintegrate thousands of ex-combatants may present a threat to continued stability (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2005:4). While the approach to DDR needs to be tailored to the specific needs of a country or region to make assessment plausible, it should not at the same time be seen as a solution to every problem (Pouligny, 2004:7) because initiatives that do not take into account the context of conflict are destined to have lower rates of success during disarmament and demobilization (Small Arms Survey, 2002:291). DDR can be successful in one aspect and not be very successful in the other (Miliken & Krause, 2002). We should not expect DDR to accomplish too much given that it is only a small part of a peace-building process. Success should be measured in terms of the extent to which it has produced security, political and economic success stories from the perspective of individual ex-combatants, communities and visible transformation. On its own DDR cannot be said to prevent further conflict and restore stability since it works with other initiatives and reforms ((UNDP, 2005:11). There should be wider collaboration and cohesion among all the institutions involved in post conflict peace building activities to avoid negative overlaps in one area and a total neglect of other areas in order to achieve overall success. For instance closely linked to DDR programmes is the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) introduced by development donors (Brzoska, 2003). DDR is innately political and as such integrated SSR/DDR roles permit a holistic view of the ties between DDR, political/SSR issues such as military and police rightsizing and the parallel military integration (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012:32). Though with its own practical problems (Paris, 2004), SSR is also charged with the provision of security, transformation of armed forces
as well as the prosecution of illegally armed non-state players in order to re-establish a state monopoly on the use of justifiable force (N’Diaye, 2009). Correct security reforms on their part will potentially make the work of DDR easier to achieve. In all, these challenges can be tackled by linking DDR to wider recovery efforts focusing on employment opportunities, sustainable natural resource management and a focus on women and children (UN, 2014:16). Finally, while providing security, building legitimate political institutions, and reviving the economy are important success indicators, it will be misleading to ignore the deeper physical and emotional damages that are caused by conflicts which prevent reconciliation afterwards and contribute to continued tensions between former combatants and their communities despite negotiated deals and peace settlements. The need for a robust and holistic approach to building peace in post-conflict societies with greater cohesion among all institutions that have a part to play cannot be overemphasized.

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A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEACHERS’ OPINIONS ON THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT VARIABLES IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This study investigated teachers’ opinions on the dynamic manifestations of conflict communication, conflict incidence, conflict tactics and conflict level in public secondary schools in Adamawa State, Nigeria. A survey research design was adopted and a multistage sampling technique was used to select 1,528 teachers from 5 educational zones in the state. A self-structured questionnaire entitled “School Conflict Variables Questionnaire” (SCVQ) was used to elicit information from secondary school teachers. Frequency counts, standard deviation and charts were used to analyze and interpret data collected. Findings revealed that communication is the nucleus of conflict trigger as well as a potent tool for conflict prevention and management in schools. Conflict incidence and conflict level vary from one secondary school to another, depending on how conflict tactics were employed to immediately respond to emerging conflicts. The implication of the study on teachers’ productivity was explored and a number of policy options were suggested for school personnel and educational planners.

Introduction
Conflict is an ever-present phenomenon in schools. The manifestation dynamics of conflict depend on its graduating propensity. Apart from this, the graduating behaviour of conflict has altered its description from a mere exhibition of incompatibility to a demonstration of aggressive behaviour and the enthronement of violent crisis. For instance, Wilmot and Hocker (2011) averred that conflict is a felt struggle between two or more independent individuals over perceived incompatible differences in beliefs, values, and goals or differences in desires for esteem, control and connectedness. Schmidt and Kochan (1972) viewed conflict as an overt behaviour arising out of a process in which one party seeks advantage of its own interests in its relationship with others. Adesanya (2005) enlarged the description to mean an expression of animosity, arguments, disputes, confrontations, unrests, war, chaos or venting of other forms of hostilities over irreconcilable differences. These descriptions showcased the fact that conflict as a process, incubates the capacity to slowly or speedily graduate into a complex phenomenon when wrongly handled. The perceptions and attitudes of parties in a conflict are crucial elements that can influence a conflict to manifest functionally or dysfunctionally in organisations, especially in a school setting. Although, perception plays a cardinal role in conflict evolution, the outcome of a particular conflict scenario can equally be underscored by the conflict orientations of the parties, the conflict form and the management approaches adopted by the parties. When conflict is constructively managed, it encourages cooperation and increases productivity. According to Cetin and Hacifazlioglu, (2004) a well managed conflict will stimulate people towards greater work efforts, cooperation and creativity. Also, a poorly managed conflict will produce outcomes inimical to the progress, growth and development of organisations, including schools. This is
based on the idea that conflicts ineffectively handled will divert energy from the real task; destroys morale; polarizes individuals and groups; deepens differences; obstructs cooperative action; produces irresponsible behaviour; creates suspicion and distrust; and decreases productivity (Lippitt, 1982).

Schools where conflicts have not been properly managed will demonstrate ineffectiveness and inefficiency, as not only personnel and students will be affected dysfunctionally but also the system in general. That is, negative conflicts have the capacity, if unchecked, to snowball into perpetual decline in the productivity of school personnel and consequently low quality of education in a country. Van der Bank (1995) posited that if educators in a school are willing to disagree but fight too much without resolutions, objectives may not be met and the school’s performance will diminish thus contributing to the collapse of the school. Similarly, Paulson and Rappleye (2007) reported that in 2002, UNICEF did succeed in re-starting a scattered educational system that had virtually ceased to function due to internal fighting. Conflict can cause unimaginable havoc when ignored or allowed to escalate unabated in a school. Conflict has the capacity to destabilize any organisation, if the mechanisms for containment are ineffective. Conflict manifestations can be influenced by the way certain variables interact. The interaction can be informed by development within or outside the school. These variables, however, are numerous but in this study, conflict communication, conflict level, conflict incidence and conflict tactics were explored in relations to public secondary schools. The changing patterns of the variables will determine the manner in which conflict will gather momentum to manifest in a school. For instance, the demonstrations of violent behaviour or warmth behaviour can be influenced by a number of factors, but the ways communication processes are patterned and the nature of conflict tactics employed at the instance, are certainly factors that cannot be neglected in a school. The point is that communication is a fundamental issue in conflict initiation, progression and settlement. Communication is the process by which information is exchanged and delivered between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs and behaviours, including both verbal and non verbal means as well as direct and indirect forms of communication (Hidasi, 2005; and Inon, 2007). The ways in which messages are framed and employed influence the nature of responses that will be elicited. Where harsh words or foul talks dominate the course of interaction, if left unchecked, the consequences will be hostile reactions and conflict will invariably emerge.

Communication, therefore, becomes a central issue in conflict generation, escalation and de-escalation. Mckenna (1997) posited that talking may trigger conflict, and it is also the only means of resolving conflict. When communication process generates conflict, a laudable way to describe it is conflict communication. Conflict communication is a pattern of communication that induces conflict. It is caused by a total breakdown in the process of communication. During communication process, the ways those involved will perceive their responses will vary based on a combination of factors which are subsumed in their personality, status, philosophy, nature of occupation and conflict management skills. These factors can influence the communication process positively or negatively. The adjustment of the factors in the process of communication in a school, will determine the flow pattern of responses, which ultimately will affect the outcome of the interaction. Therefore, since communication is central in the teaching and learning process, if the gravity of the interplay of these factors in the school is high, this will obviously account for
the manner in which communication will breakdown. Where constant breakdown in communication is witnessed, conflict will occur frequently in a school. The rampant occurrences of conflicts is termed conflict incidence. Conflict incidence is the frequency or rate at which conflict occurs in an organization. The school system harbours a high tendency for frequent experiences of conflict, due to variations in the backgrounds, views, aspirations and goals of its stakeholders. This argument is validated by a study conducted by Hill (1993) in Vermont School, in which it was discovered that conflict can occur almost daily within a school setting. Fleetwood (1987) equally noted that secondary school principals and assistant principals are expected to deal with conflict situations not only on a daily basis, but frequently on an hourly basis.

This perhaps, is the reason the school is adjudged as a conflict ridden arena. The frequent occurrence of conflict in schools will definitely manifest in different conflict levels. The resultant conflict level at any point is consequent upon how conflict is perceived and the tactics employed by the parties to react to it. Conflict level is the intensity of conflict readily seen as existing in an organization. This explains the dynamic nature of conflict as a process. Conflict Barometer (2008) classified conflict intensities into low, medium and high. Peretomode and Peretomode (2008) postulated that when the level of conflict is too high, dissatisfaction, lack of teamwork, turnover, chaos and disruption may follow. This in turn will lead to low level organizational performance sometimes, even endanger the organization’s chances of survival (Peretomode and Peretomode, 2008). At very low or very high intensities, dysfunctional conflict or destructive conflict occurs (Cetin and Hacifazlioglu, 2004). However, an optimal or appropriate level of conflict may energize people in constructive directions and lead to maximum organisational performance (Peretomode and Peretomode, 2008). Conflict level is a complex issue that has the potential to determine the future development or otherwise of an organization. At a moderate or appropriate conflict level, people will be empowered to maintain maximum productive capacities, which will lead to optimum organizational performance. The existing conflict level serves as a yardstick for determining the conduciveness of a school, which is also a reflection of the nature of interpersonal relationship that exists among the staff. One way to influence conflict intensity is based on the conflict tactics utilised at the inception of a conflict. Conflict tactics is the immediate response to a conflict situation. Spicer (1989) defined conflict tactics as overt actions a person takes when he or she has a conflict of interest with another person. The response can be verbal attacks, physical assaults, discussion; verbal reasoning etc. These tactics vary in degree of coerciveness ranging from the use of verbal reasoning and discussion to gestures and the threats to actual physical contact (Straus, 1989). Francesco and Gold (1997) differentiated between verbal and non-verbal conflict tactics. According to them the verbal conflict tactics are: promise, threat, recommendation, warning, reward, punishment, normative appeal, commitment, self-disclosure, question, and command. They identified non-verbal conflict tactics to include: silence, conversational overlaps, facial glazing, and touching.

The immediate response to a conflict at the early stage will determine its flow pattern. Conflict tactics, when wrongly deployed, can jeopardize teachers’ job performance, make classroom interaction uneasy and hinder goal accomplishment of a school. Johnson (2003) posited that intense and tenacious enemies often emerge as an aftermath of this response (i.e conflict tactics). The use of aggressive words and derogatory remarks to respond to issues often breed conflict, which can deteriorate into the formation of “enemy image” among workers
whether in schools or in other organizations. A system that is characterized by such 'image' will reflect dissension, hostility, mistrust, uncaring attitude, apathy, and violent behaviour. These negative attitudes will produce despair and failure in organizations, most especially in an educational system. In Adamawa State, conflict manifests in various forms in secondary schools. Findings have revealed the causative factors to be: rumour mongering, domineering attitudes of principals, communication breakdown, resources problem and lack of opportunities for promotion (Opeloye, 2006). Fabunmi and Alimba (2010) identified poor management behaviour of principals, religious fanaticism, misunderstanding, communication breakdown, violation of school rules and regulations, unclear definition of responsibilities, and gossiping as conflict triggers in secondary schools in Adamawa State. These causes suggest the prospect for the operations of the variables under investigation in secondary schools in Adamawa State. In view of the foregoing preliminary, the under listed research questions will serve as guide in determining the manifestations of the variables in secondary schools in Adamawa State.

(i) What is the conflict communication pattern of teachers in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

(ii) What is the nature of conflict incidence that often manifest in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

(iii) What are the conflict tactics often employed by teachers to respond immediately to the occurrence of conflict in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

(iv) What is the conflict level existing in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

Methodology

The study adopted a survey research design to enable the researcher produce answers to the various research questions raised, by thoroughly investigating the behaviours of the conflict variables under consideration in secondary schools in Adamawa State. The study population comprised of the entire teachers in public secondary school in Adamawa state. Out of a total of six thousand, three hundred and eighty five (6,385) teachers, one thousand five hundred and twenty eight (1528) were selected through a multistage sampling technique. A questionnaire entitled “School Conflict Variables Questionnaire”(SCVQ) was used to gather data for the study. The data collected were analyzed and interpreted by frequent counts, standard deviation and charts.

Results

The explanations that underlie the tables and figures represent the results and its interpretations.

Research Question 1: What is the conflict communication pattern of teachers in secondary schools in Adamawa State?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Conflict Communication Pattern of Teachers in Secondary School</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 showed the conflict communication patterns of teachers in secondary schools in Adamawa State. The respondents that agreed that the pattern of communication of teachers can affect their behaviours positively in the school had a mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.20$). The respondents that agreed that communication pattern of teachers are highly essential in determining their performance level in the school recorded a mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.19$). The mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.00$) represented the opinions of respondents that agreed that the pattern of communication of teachers can cause conflict in their schools. The respondents that agreed that the pattern of communication of teachers can negatively affect their work attitudes in the school had a mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.01$). The respondents that agreed that the pattern of communication of teachers can ease tension, making teachers to be more productive on their jobs recorded a mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.07$). A mean score of ($\bar{X} = 3.03$) was recorded for the respondents that agreed that the productivity of teachers can be adversely affected by breakdown in communication in the school.

**Research Question 2**

What is the nature of conflict incidence that often manifest in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

**Figure 1: Conflict Incidence in Secondary Schools**

![Figure 1: Conflict Incidence in Secondary Schools](image)

Figure 1 is a bar chart illustrating the conflict incidence in secondary schools in Adamawa state. The mean score of respondents that indicated that conflict *frequently occurs* (F.O) in secondary schools was ($\bar{X} = 2.27$). The respondents that agreed that conflict *often occurs* (O.O) in secondary school recorded a mean score of ($\bar{X} = 2.69$). The mean ($\bar{X} = 2.05$) represented the
score of the respondents that agreed that conflict *occasionally occurs* (O. Oc) in secondary schools. The respondents that indicated that conflict *rarely occurs* (R.O) in secondary schools had a mean score of (\(X = 2.23\)).

**Research Question 3**
What are the conflict tactics often employed by teachers to respond immediately to the occurrence of conflict in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

**Table 2: Conflict Tactics of Teachers in Secondary Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\bar{X})</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I respond to conflict through retaliation.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I respond to conflict by insulting the other party.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I respond to conflict by threatening to fight the other party.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I respond to conflict by trying to calm down the other party to discuss the issue.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>I respond to conflict by arguing with the other party.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I respond to conflict by bullying the other party.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I respond by not talking to the other party.</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 revealed the conflict tactics often employed by teachers to respond immediately to emerging conflicts in secondary schools. The major conflict tactics often employed by teachers in conflict situation is by *trying to calm down the other party to discuss the issue* (\(X = 3.08\)), this is followed by the tactics of responding to conflict *through retaliation* (\(X = 2.33\)). The next conflict tactics normally employed by teachers is responding to conflict by *arguing with the other party* (\(X = 2.29\)). Responding to conflict by *not talking to the other party* (\(X = 2.25\)) is the fourth method often used by teachers. The next tactics to this is responding to conflict by *threatening to fight the other party* (\(X = 2.16\)). Another conflict tactics that teachers can use to response to conflict is *bullying the other party* (\(X = 2.15\)), and the least conflict tactics that teachers can employ is *insulting the other party* (\(X = 2.11\)).
Research Question 4

What is the conflict level existing in secondary schools in Adamawa state?

Figure 2: Conflict Level in Secondary Schools

Figure 2 is a multiple bar chart showing the existing conflict level in secondary schools in Adamawa State. Whereas 79% of the respondents agreed that the conflict level in schools is low, 21% of the respondents disagreed that the conflict level in schools is low. 61% of the respondents agreed that the conflict level in their schools is operating at a moderate level, while 39% of the respondents disagreed with this fact. 62% of the respondents disagreed that the conflict level in their schools is high, while 38% of the respondents agreed that the level at which conflict is operating in their schools is high.

Discussion of Findings

The findings were discussed in line with each of the variables considered in the study.

(i) Conflict Communication

The study discovered the imperativeness of communication in determining the nature of social relationship that exists among teachers to enhance their productivity in their work places. This finding is validated by the works of O’Hair, Friedrich, Wiemann and Wiemann (1995) and Murphy (1994). O’Hair, Friedrich, Wiemann and Wiemann (1995) posited that the exact distribution of control in interpersonal relationship is communicatively worked out by the way people talk with each other, how they structure their conversations as well as the content of such conversations. Murphy (1994) stated that ongoing and open communication lead to increased mutual respect, resulting in stronger work relations. Communication was also discovered in the study as a cardinal factor in conflict prevention and management among teachers in secondary schools. This finding is consistent with the positions of Hener (2010) and Mckenna (1997). Hener (2010) posited that communication can prevent conflicts, help in conflict management and resolution of activities. Mckenna (1997) indicated that talking may trigger conflict, and it is also
the only means of resolving conflict. Added to these findings is the idea that the study found that communication is a factor that can easily provoke conflict among teachers in secondary schools. This finding confirmed the positions of Robbins (2005). Robbins (2005) indicated that communication is one of the main sources of conflict. He stated further that most of the conflicts are due to communication problems.

(ii) Conflict Incidence

Conflict incidence in secondary schools was discovered to vary from one school to another. Therefore, conflict frequently occurs in some schools, occasionally in some schools, often occurs in some schools and rarely occurs in some schools. However, the study discovered that conflicts frequently and occasionally occur in secondary schools. These findings are succinctly in line with the positions of Johnson and Johnson (2006) and Tye (1972). Johnson and Johnson (1996) asserted that “the frequency and severity of conflicts (in schools) seem to be increasing. Fighting, violence and gangs tied with lack of discipline are the biggest problems in public schools”. Similarly, Tye (1972) stated that conflict most often arises in school climate because of differences in values, philosophies, or perceptions. The variation in the manifestations of conflict incidence can be attributed to the nature of conflict tactics employed immediately by teachers to respond to emerging conflicts in their respective schools.

(iii) Conflict Tactics

The study discovered that various conflict tactics were employed by teachers in public secondary schools in Adamawa State. However, most employed tactics by teachers are “to respond to conflict by trying to calm down the other party to discuss the issue”; others are “to respond to conflict through retaliation” and “to respond to conflict by arguing with the other party”. Teachers using the conflict tactics of “calming down the other party to discuss” will easily prevent the occurrence or escalation of conflict and promote peace and harmony in the system. In such a situation constructive management of conflicts will prevail in the long run, which will result in the building of conducive atmosphere in schools for better performance of teachers. The use of the other conflict tactics will provoke conflict and cause pending ones to escalate into violent conflicts. Schools where their social climate is characterized by such tactics are liable to experience low performance level among their teachers. These findings are confirmed by Hagel and Brown (2005) and Johnson (2003). When teachers adopt positive conflict tactics, it will help them to recognize legitimate difference within the organisation or profession and serves as a powerful motivator to improve performance and satisfaction (Hagel and Brown, 2005). Johnson (2003) posited that tactics such as attacking others’ ideas and beliefs, offering derogatory remarks and demanding concessions from others can lead to the formation of intense and tenacious enemies. An extreme situation as this will be dangerous for the effective performance of school staff.

(iv) Conflict Level

The study discovered that conflict levels vary from one secondary school to another. This implies that conflict was operating at high, moderate or low levels in secondary schools in Adamawa
State. Secondary schools where conflict is high can be linked to the use of conflict tactics that ranged from “retaliation”; “insulting the other party”; “threatening to fight the other party” to “arguing with the other party”. With a high conflict level, the productivity of school personnel, most especially teachers will be greatly impaired, adversely affecting the academic performance students and setting back the goal accomplishment of the system. Schools having moderate conflict level will enjoy a favourable atmosphere that stimulates effectiveness and efficiency on the part of their personnel, while low conflict level will enthrone poor school climate inimical to innovation and creativity among their staff.

These findings are in congruence with the submissions of Booker (1990); Schermerhorn (2001); Rahim (1986) and Robbins and Judge (2007). Booker (1990) submitted that high level of interpersonal conflict has been found to be negatively related to the organizational commitment of teachers. Similarly, Schermerhorn (2001) posited that too much (i.e high) conflict is distracting and interferes with other more task-relevant activities. Secondary schools where the conflict level is low will experience low levels of innovation and creativity, which will equally endanger teachers’ performance. Rahim (1986) noted that little or no conflict in organizations may lead to stagnation, poor decisions and ineffectiveness. On the other hand, secondary schools where the conflict level is moderate will record optimum productivity. The innovation and creativity capabilities of such schools will rise, giving room for effectiveness and efficiency in delivery of services. Robbins and Judge (2007) asserted that at optimal (i.e moderate) level there is enough conflict to prevent stagnation, stimulate creativity, allow tensions to be released and initiate the seeds for change, yet not so much as to be disruptive or to deter coordination of activities (Robbins and Judge, 2007). The point is that conflict level has the potential to either positively (i.e at moderate conflict level) or negatively (i.e at a low or high conflict level) affect the operations and performance of the educational system.

Conclusion
Education plays a significant role in the development of any nation. Secondary education lies at the middle of primary education and the transition to the attainment of tertiary education. Conflict is a major element that can distort and thwart the achievement of the goals of secondary education. This study has showcased the fact that the interplay of conflict communication and conflict tactics will determine the behavioural trend of conflicts in terms of their incidence and levels in secondary schools. This is the reason why the variables discussed in the study manifest differently in secondary schools across the state. Teachers are at the epi-centre of conflict exposure in schools. Their immediate responses to emerging conflicts will determine the dimension of its flow pattern. Confronting conflict positively through the use of constructive conflict tactics will go a long way in minimizing the rate at which conflict occurs in the system. This development will positively influence the productivity of teachers, while the existence of uncontrolled conflict will sap the time, energy and resources of teachers, thus reducing their work dedication and efficiency. Therefore, how conflicts are addressed will determine their behavioural trends and manifestations in schools in the country.
Implications on Teachers’ productivity

Teachers are indispensable actors in the educational system. Their quantities, qualities and efficiencies have direct bearing on the survival and development of the educational industry in any country. Fwangle and Dimka (1997) submitted that teacher is the hub of any educational system. This implied that the quality of education is directly linked to the productivity of teachers. Teachers’ productivity is what teachers control and actually do in the classroom such as teaching effectiveness and classroom performance (Akiri and Ugborugbo, 2008). Alabi (2000) posited that teachers’ productivity is providing meaningful teaching and learning activities necessary to accomplish the goals of the schools. To achieve school goals, improving teachers’ productivity is highly imperative. However, conflict is a major social force that can improve or impair teachers’ productivity. Therefore, secondary schools where conflict is operating abnormally will be unstable and unconducive for teachers to effectively and efficiently discharge their duties. The frequent occurrence of conflict in a school will divert the time, energy and resources of teachers from adequately discharging their daily responsibilities. This development will endanger teachers’ productivity. Apart from this, when conflict level in schools is high, due to the adoption of ineffective and poor conflict tactics, teachers’ productivity will be jeopardized. However, when emerging conflicts are constructively managed, innovation, creativity, peace and harmony will be enthroned, thereby enhancing the job performance of teachers at all levels of education. Conflict is seemingly a two-edged sword, capable of destroying teachers’ performance as well as enhancing it, depending on how it is perceived and managed at any particular time.

Policy Options

The findings of the study have implications for policy. It is imperative for educational stakeholders at federal, state and local levels to take cognizance of the fact that:

- School personnel, especially administrators and teachers, should be trained in conflict dynamics and its management approaches, so that school conflict can be constructively managed to create conducive atmosphere for them to operate effectively and efficiently for the growth and development of education in the country.
- School staff should understand that frequent occurrence of conflicts is normal and should not be misconstrued as a conflict is a bad omen. This will allow emerging conflicts to be constructively perceived and handled to enhance productivity in schools.
- Early warning mechanism should be built in schools. This will make emerging conflicts to be noticed early enough to nip them in the bud, before they deteriorate and become destructive to the system.
- Conflict resolution education should be included as a compulsory course in the in-service training or on the job training manuals for school administrators and teachers so that their knowledge and skills on how to resolve conflicts can be improved.
- No senior teacher should be elevated to the position of school administrator without formally undergoing trainings in conflict management.
References


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DEMOCRATIZATION AND STATE BUILDING: A CONUNDRUM IN KRYGYZSTAN

Subrat Biswal

Abstract
The unprepared independent Kyrgyz republic faced much political turmoil since independence. In order to bring stability the reformist president Akayev adopted enormous provisions but unluckily all seemed short before the threat to the state. Opposition primarily came from his own party in the parliament who were opposed to the reforms of Akayev. They wanted to embed with soviet policies. Being a small, land locked and mountainous state faced economic fall out in 1994. But the president was chained helplessly in his hand. And by and large the economic condition was also demolished by the president himself. After independence he followed the language policy which made compulsory the learning of Kyrgyz language. So there was huge migration of Russians, Kazakhs, Jews, Turks, and Uzbeks to their own state. Importantly they were contributing to the development of state being resided in urban areas. Ethnic conflict predominantly contributed for the upheaval of the state.

Keyword: - (Kyrgyz Republic, Political Turmoil, Representative, Liberal Democracy, Decentralization).

Introduction
Democracy has been a common place contemporary conventional wisdom from a political philosopher to journalist, mainly after the dissolution of communist regime of the eastern bloc, it rules supreme and unquestionable in the pantheon of political values. The language of democracy is too deeply embedded in contemporary political discourses and it has become itself the inevitable and inescapable battleground for the contemporary political debate. Democracy is a worldwide phenomenon. It is nothing but just a form of government. It is quiet conspicuous that hails its authority from the people, exercised by the people and work for interests of the people. And Representative is nothing but just presents the view on behalf of the people and works for the benefit for them (Becker, 2008). They are also held accountable for their each act to the state. This word has been defined by many political scientists but the most appropriated definition was given by the former President of U.S. Abraham Lincoln as “democracy is of the people, by the people and for the people”.

Theories of democracy
The term democracy can be traced back to the 6th century which was found in Athens’s (a city of Greek state). The full credit for the invention of the honorific connotation goes to the people of Greek. But ironically Plato a Greek philosopher denounced this as a worst form of government. Deprivation of the minority from the privileges was his reason for the discontentment over this government. Then Aristotle, even the father of political science placed democracy in the perverted form of government of his six fold classification of government.

There are various theories of government. Liberal democracy holds the first position as it is adopted by the western countries such as U.S, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany etc. Normally Individual receives more priority since he is the fulcrum of this government. There has
been restricted of government interference in individual freedom. The government is only allowed to that extent where the citizen needs for its assistance. The prominent exponents of this theory are John Locke and Jeremy Bentham. Locke in his “Two treaties (1690)” argued that the government responsibility is to escort the rights of the citizens. Those rights are right to life, liberty and property. Similarly French philosopher Jean Jacque Rousseau in his “Social contract (1762)”, added some new ideas with Locke’s view and suggested for the distinction of religion and state and right of resistance against oppressor. Bentham also defends this government from the utilitarian ground. He expressed his allegiance with Locke. He believed that liberal democracy should be based on equal franchise, i.e., one-man one vote principle, regular elections, secret ballot, and competition between parties and leaders, majority rule, etc.

The second form of government is Marxist-Leninist democracy. It depends on the principle of dictatorship of proletariat and creates a socialistic society. Economic right of the individual finds more important than the political right. A typical example of such type of democracy is the erstwhile Soviet Union. There is another form of democracy which has been prevailed in third world countries such as Asia, Africa and Latin America. After being independent from their colonial power they have adopted a new type of democracy. The executive power is vested on the military head or on the authoritarian president relegating the political institutions like judiciary or parliament. This type of government is commonly found in Pakistan, Nepal, North Korea, Central Asian republic, Myanmar and many others in Africa and Latin America.

So far as consolidation of state is concerned it only takes place in a democratic state. By and large the state hails its authority from people and it is the sole responsibility of the state to be custodian of the life, liberty and property of people. If it fails to discharge its duty then draws upheaval among citizens. This fury is induced detrimental to both the state and the citizens. However, in order to prove democracy successful, it requires the state to be built in a systematic and well to do manner. State building is a measure, aims at subside the violence and conciliate the resented people, develop the capacity at all levels to strengthen the conflict measurement lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a process helps to enhance the capacity, institution and legitimacy of the state. So regarding to all these, it can be said, the intensity of democracy leads to state consolidation.

Democracy and state building processes in Kyrgyzstan
It is a long day’s endeavor by the Kyrgyz people to set up a well functioned constitutional system through an organized political mechanism. Prior to the political culture in their democratic process it is needed to understand the historical scenario of Central Asia. Let’s have a brief look on it which has a great impact on present day’s democracy and state building processes. These are:

• The Arab invasion and conquest of the Central Asia and spread of Islam in the eighth century
• The Mongol-Tatar invasion and conquest of Central Asia in the twelfth century and subsequent assimilation and Islamization
• The rise and fall of Timurid empire
• The Russian conquest of the region in the nineteenth century
• The October revolution of 1917 and the secularization of central Asian region (Badan, 2010:91).
Historical development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan

Historically, the Kyrgyz republic was nomads strongly centered on large kinship systems. In the middle Ages, the Kyrgyz were inhabitants of southern Siberia along the upper shore of the great river Yenisei (Engvall, 2011: 12). At times, various Kyrgyz tribes made advances to southwards. For example, in 840, the Kyrgyz advanced into central Mongolia, destroying the Uighur kingdom in the process. In the 13th century, still remaining in Siberia, they were incorporated into the expanding Mongol empire. It was not until the 16th century that the Kyrgyz came to make their presence permanently felt in Central Asia, mainly on the territory of what is present day Kyrgyzstan (Ibid: 13).

However the Kyrgyz were not a unified group. They were divided into different clans, with the family representing the lowest and most immediate level of organization within these organizations. Each nomadic tribe had its tribal chief to regulate judicial and territorial claims with rivaling tribes and settling disputes among his tribesmen. As of the seventeenth century, Kyrgyz tribes were of roughly equal size, and since no one tribe could decisively defeat others and centralize authority, a decentralized balance ensued. As some tribes grew stronger, irregular efforts were made to politically unite the Kyrgyz. The most prominent example is the attempt by the nineteenth century ManapOrmon, of the SaryBagys h tribe in northern Kyrgyzstan, to set himself up as the leader of a confederacy of tribes (Engvall, 2011: 13).

Political System prior to the Tsarist Period

Prior to Russian conquest of Central Asia in the last third of the nineteenth century, the culture and political life of the region did not change much widely from other parts of the Muslim world (Badan, 2001: 22). The earliest people of the region are believed to be a mixed community of Mongol, Turkic, and Kypchak descent (Vaidanath, 1967: 16). The Kyrgyz society was nomadic and tribal in nature. In this period the people lead a migratory life, and food gathering and hunting were their main occupations (Christian, 1998: 48). Due to land locked and infertile country, it was largely separate from outside influence (Ploshikh, 1998: 1). In the early thirteenth century the Kyrgyz people flew towards the south which was captured and ruled by the Mongolian Empire. Diverse Kyrgyz tribes inhabited the area in fifteenth-sixteenth centuries extended from western Mongolia to the eastern Turkestan. However, the Central Tien-Shan, the Chui valley and the south-eastern part of Fergana region, i.e. the territory closely connected with the present day borders of the Kyrgyz republic, formed the heart of Kyrgyz nation's territory. Thus, upto1685 the Turkic people ruled this region (Rahul, 1979: 2).

In the 15th-16th centuries, the Kyrgyz people started to settle in present day Kyrgyzstan. In the beginning of 19th century the southern part of the area became under the jurisdiction of the Khanate of Kokand. After the medieval age mainly Central Asia broke down into three native Khanates, i.e. the Khanate of Kokand, Khanate of Khiva and Emirate of Bukara (Badan, 2001: 98). The Khanates were ruled by a group of elite known as Khans and Emirs (Shams-ud-Din, 1992: 22). They were very brutal in nature and used to penalize the native people if they disobey their order. Moreover, they exploited the poor people of the region in making them do inexhaustible work for them. In the Khanate period, the women were the worst victims. The women had neither liberty nor aware to participate in the political process of the society. They were even not permitted to come out of their homes and were impelled to remain in Burka. There were also restrictions on the extent of their social interactions.
The political powers in Khanates were mainly originated and concentrated in few hands of the provincial government known as beks (Badan, 2001: 39). The government was authoritarian and exploitative. The common people had no play in decision-making processes. During this period the clergy was very powerful particularly in the sedentary region. The clergy was the sole interpreter of the Islamic laws for their self-interests and enjoyed high position and respect in the society. During this era the system of administration, taxation and land revenue was completely established on the Perso-Arab system of Transoxiania with heavy levies and punishment including the death penalty (Badan, 2001: 22).

The judicial procedures were divided into two types of courts: 1. courts for the settled population, and 2. courts for the nomadic population. The Kazi was considered the representative of god and main source of all laws and justice for the settled population. Initially the Kazis were appointed for life but with the passage of time the Kaziship acquired a hereditary character (William, 1966: 37). All social, economic or religious disputes were settled by him. Hence Kazis enjoyed a high stature in society and economic privileges. Like the rulers, the Kazis were dictatorial and biased in delivering the justice and their verdicts were normally in favour of the rich and powerful persons of the society. Other religious elite was the Mufti who used to be the exponent of Islamic laws (Sharia). They were the legal and the spiritual heads of the Khanates.

The second type of court was for nomadic people. It was primarily based on the unwritten conventional laws passed on orally from generations to generations. Disputes were settled before a group of esteemed elders called beys (Pierce, 1960: 76-77). All the disputes and offences including murder were settled by paying Kun, a system of payment for release of criminal (Williams, 1966: 12). If a dispute could not be settled or the decision was considered unsatisfactory then it could be put before another group. Unlike in modern society, the punishment was severe. Torture, cutting of hands and feet, burning eyes and ears, and various more or less cruel forms of death penalty were executed (Pierce, 1960: 76).

Thus we can say that the political system in pre-Tsarist Kyrgyzstan was exploitative and deprived in nature. People had no possession of civil liberty and political rights. They could not participate in the political activities of their country and even the government was not subject to criticized. However during the nineteenth century the region came under the Russian empire. The main focus behind the expansion of Russians towards Central Asia were to fulfil their desire of economic interests, to establish new market for their trade, it aspire to conquer India and to resist British expansion towards Central Asia (Pierce, 1960: 1-2). To satisfy all these objectives and to grab Central Asia, the Russians in 1839 started annexation process of the region (Vaidyanath, 1967: 30). In 1865 gradually Tashkent was captured and declared part of Tsarist Russia and Governorship of Turkestan was established. By 1873 the Khanates of Bukara and Khive were consolidated in Tsarist Empire and by 1876 Khanate of Kokand was captured. By 1884 when Merv was captured by the Russian military, the whole region of Central Asia came under the Tsarist Empire (Vaidyanath, 1967: 30).

The educational pattern in the Kyrgyz region during the period was based on traditional Islamic law. Education was hinged on the old religious system and imparted through institutions known as Madrassahsand Maktabs, which were directly affiliated to the mosques. The teaching and instructions in these institutions were religious preaches and the literacy rate was very low approximately 2.4 percent (Shams-ud-Din, 1992: 23).
Political System during Tsarist Period

In the early 19th century Khanates were absolutely powerless and the Russian forces conquered the region (Silverstein, 2002: 96). In order to dominate the area Russian Government pursued a policy of forced resettlement of ethnic Russians. The Russians treated this region more like their colony and less like the territory of Russian Empire. The Russian administration was of military in nature and was run by the Ministry of War (Pierce, 1960: 65). It was headed by Governor General who was responsible to Ministry of War (Badan, 2001: 80).

The Governor-General owed his authority through an office staff consisting of number of secretaries and clerks. The Russian army officers ran the administration and exploited the local people for their own interest (Sharma, 1979: 5). The local people had no inclusive role in the administration and they had no right to criticize the policies of the Tsarist administrators in the region (Ploshikh, 1998: 21). However, at the local level the administration was comprehensively depended on native administrators who were liable over criminal and civil cases.

The Tsarist Government maintained the same types of courts as was prevailed prior to tsarist period. But ironically in this period the powers of Kazi in judicial sphere were constrained. Similarly, the second types of courts were for nomadic people. The system was based on the customary and unwritten laws where disputes were settled before beys as earlier. They had legitimacy over all criminal cases. But during this period the Tsarist Government regenerated the traditional courts and reproduced election system of the judges (Pierce, 1960: 77). Accordingly both Kazis and Beys were elected for three years and received salaries from local tax funds. The main motto of all these rectification was to tighten their hold on this region and smooth run of their administration.

Moreover, in order to lure them, they established a new type of education pattern based on Russian model. It was primarily based on three types of school system. First of all, there were schools for teaching Russian language to the local people. In the second types of schools the Russian administrators taught Russian culture to the local people, so that they could suppress native religion and tightened their hold on local people and thirdly, there were schools for the native Russians who were serving in the region. The Tsarist regime developed the region as their colony (Wheeler, 1964: 69). The main purpose of Russians was its economic and military exploitation to fulfil the basic requirements of the industries of Russia.

The policy of economic exploitation changed the nature and structure of the Central Asian society in totally and the Kyrgyz republic categorically (Vaidyanath, 1967: 50). But some of the striking changes were the outgrowth of native intellectual class, particularly Dijadidists intellectuals, the establishment of modern means of communication like posts and telegraphs, the creation of new class of industrial workers and moneyed aristocracy etc. However administrative reforms have brought a slight improvement in the women condition and they were not impelled to follow the Islamic rule. The native people literally, did not appreciate these relaxations and approaches.

During the Tsarist period the Kyrgyz native people felt very insecure. Primarily the educational institutions like pre-tsarist era were slanted in favour of Arabic, Turkish and Persian, theology and the laws of Shariat (Sharma, 1979: 20). The Russian administrators even initiated certain modernization process i.e. judicial system, construction of roads and railways, etc. And above all the Russian administration had equalized the burden of taxation.
Political System after October Revolution

Prior to the October Revolution in 1916, the situation in Turkestan and the Steppe Region was conducive to enrich the power of the Bolshevik Red Army to dethrone the Tsarist regime. The inconsistent policies towards Central Asia after the death of Kaufman in 1882 and the unprecedented increase in Russian and Ukrainians settlements in Muslim lands had generated widespread discontentment against Russian rule, which culminated in 1916 revolt (Gheeler, 1964: 97). This revolt in Central Asia was a breakthrough in the history of Kyrgyzstan. Following the turmoil and the help of the Bolshevik, Kyrgyzstan got rid of the autocratic Tsarist reign.

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the Soviet Union was portrayed on the world scenario. Its new Constitution adopted the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a socialist state and all powers belonged to the Soviets authority. Additionally small-scale enterprise was permissible in the initial Soviet Constitution and rights of inheritance were 'protected by law'. Moreover, the Soviet Union was completely depended on one party state. The Communist Party was the sole political organization which was allowed in the country and all decisions of the government were taken by the Communist party. In 1924 after the delimitation of the Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan identified Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast, as a central part of the Soviet Federation. In 1926 it was again acknowledged as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic in the domain of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). The final Constitution of USSR in 1936 the oblast recognized as the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic with the equal status to other union republics of the Soviet Union (Ploshikh, 1998: 3).

Kyrgyz life was dramatically changed being a part of the largest country of the world. During the Soviet period Bolsheviks tried many times to convert Islam from Central Asia but they could not succeed. Soviet Government formulated many significant step to reform the central Asian states to seem akin as Russia like in 1917 she declared the equality of men and women, and in 1921 declared polygamy and the kalym (bride price) to be illegal (Ploshikh, 1998: 97). During the Soviet period mosques and prayer houses were demolished. In the 1920s Kyrgyzstan walked over the developmental path of cultural, educational, and social life. Literacy rate greatly improved, and a standard literary language was introduced in the region. Economic and social development also was noticeable.

After disapprove Islam indirectly the soviet government started a direct assault. Authorities prohibited zakat (giving of alms) and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and began closing mosques. During Stalin era the government mercilessly dictated the execution of Muslims who had possessed a copy of the gospel of Koran. In order to subdue Islam, the Soviet authorities attempted major enhancement in the academic pattern in Muslim parts of the country. The Soviet leaders were also convinced that improved education would pave many Muslims to recognize the superiority of Marxism over Islam (Sharma, 1979: 18).

Notwithstanding, the oppression of Islam by the Soviet Government the people did not debar from the practice of the Islam. Though it was not done publicly but they practised clandestinely. Salat (daily prayers) could be performed once a day instead of five times. Similarly, the hajj to Mecca was unimaginable and that was replaced by pilgrimages to many local holy places within the Soviet Union. In this period citizens had possessed very minimize political rights. The Communist ideology of political freedom was absolutely separate from the Western perception. Hence, freedom was merely granted under the supervision of Communist Party. In the Constitution the citizens were provided all the fundamental rights like the right to speech, and freedom to street processions and demonstrations (Munro, 1959: 659). The
reformation of Soviet Constitution in 1977 which was almost same as 1936 Soviet Constitution acknowledged for universal suffrage, right to be elected to the public offices and to participate in political party but at the same time posed restriction on the citizens from organising or joining a political party other than Communist Party. Overall the Kyrgyz people were given the freedom to associate under the superintendence of Communist Party.

There was a provision in the soviet period that no person can be arbitrarily arrested and put in jail. Thus, no person shall be arrested except by decision of courts. The Kyrgyz people were also given the right to vote equally as other part of the Soviet Union. In addition to elect Soviets the people were not allowed to take part in nationwide discussion on important issues. Moreover, the Kyrgyz people could take part, as citizens of the Soviet Union, in referendum, which might be held on important national issues. Unlike tsarist period, the Kyrgyz people were given the rights to criticize the policies of the government and various state organs in the Soviet period. To the extent the Communist party approved and permitted it. The condition of women has progressed widely in the entire soviet period and for the first time in the history of central Asian states that the women have secured the privileged to participate in the political processes of the state. According to Soviet census the number of women in higher education as a percentage of the total has risen from 28 percent in 1927, to 43 percent in 1960, to 49 percent in 1970. There were unprecedented improvements in pre-school care for children - in 1960 there were 500,000 places but by 1971 this had risen to over five million (Sajoo, 2002: 154).

During this period the Kyrgyz society was popularly an orthodox and nomadic society. The society was mainly hinged on the agricultural productivity. The Soviet government introduced new techniques and machines of agriculture such as modern irrigation system and fertilizers to increase the production of cotton. They treated this region more as colony than as their republic. Like the other colonies, the Kyrgyz republic was the main source of primary goods. The Russian masters encouraged the primary sector and Central Asia became the source of the raw materials to the metropolis, such as tobacco, cotton, wheat, vegetables (potatoes, sugar beets, beans), fruits (apples, apricots, peaches, grapes, berries), sheep, goats, cattle, wool, etc. (Sharma, 1979:152).

In March 1985 Gorbachev the liberal communist leader became the General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev introduced many radical economic and political reforms after coming to power. At the twenty seventh party congress in 1986 Gorbachev declared that economic reform was “the key to all our problems, Immediate and long term, economic and social, political and ideological, domestic and foreign”(Anan, 1990: 24). The adoption of victorious step Perestroika and Glasnost influenced the political, social, cultural and economic life of the people of Soviet Union (Hill, 1999: 188). This historic introduction of reforms in Kyrgyzstan led to land slide emergence of new political parties, groups and the media and the end of prolonged monopoly of the Communist party. It was seen simultaneously that the Communist party became weak and lost its old aura and potency.

In 1990 after the independence of republic the leadership was shifted to Asker Akaev after the bloody ethnic riots of Osh in Southern Kyrgyzstan. This new government immediately adopted a policy of economic and political reforms. The disintegration of the Soviet Union further gave a boost to the process of democratization in the Kyrgyz republic.
Conclusion

Determined to liberalization of economy and politics, Kyrgyz republic gained independence in 1991. Since independence the state runs in flexible with democratic fuel the pro-western leader Aksar Akayev. But due to intra party rivalry regarding the reforms in state, there was a large chasm between the president and his party men. Being failed to convince them, the democratic card house demolished with the dissolve of the house by the president. This study looks into the trajectory of democratic state to an authoritarian reign. In 1995 constitutional referendum the president augmented his power discriminately. He also justified the authoritarian system is more viable in a multi ethnic and multi lingual society. Similarly he could manage to grab the throne in 2000. But the scenario has dramatically changed in 2005 due to high corruption, family clan politics, land policy and language provisions etc. After dethrone his handpicked successor was Bakiyev. He also followed the same path guided by his predecessor. This condition brought resentment and fury across the state. But by and large the free media, civil society and local governance played a propounding role to bring and maintain stability in the nation.

In the end, it can be said that democratic process in the country has partially flunked to exercise the independent agenda. It has become a model for all the Central Asian states for a certain period of time. Particularly in 1994, when the president raised his power through referendum by breaching the constitution had led to defunct of all the government machineries. It was the real defeat of democracy in a state. Several reforming policies regarding language, land revenue have been adopted which has proved as a loophole in the reform process. Thus, it is a huge setback to the democratic and state-building process in the republic. In view of the above analysis, it can be generalized that the democratic process in Kyrgyzstan needs to be effectively boosted up for escorting the stability of the nation and prosperity of the community. All shades of institution and sector should come under the developmental process. The election commission, political parties, media (print and electronic) and judiciary should function efficiently according to the enshrinement of the constitution. All attempts should work for the privilege and opportunities of the citizens, irrespective of sex. Thus, protecting the overall development and fulfilling the wish of all people should be the real target of a democratic state.

References

BYSTANDER EFFECT AND RELIGIOUS GROUP AFFILIATION: TERRORISM AND THE DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY

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Abstract
The collective nature of group affiliation may inhibit an individual from exhibiting prosocial behavior regarding acts of religiously-motivated terror. This study’s purpose was to investigate the nature of bystander intervention as it relates to religious group affiliation. Darley and Latane’s bystander effect theory provided the theoretical framework for this study. The research questions examined the impact of religious group affiliation and group size on the dependent variables of civic moral disengagement (CMD) and commitment to the war on terror (CWT). Three validated survey instruments were administered to a random participant pool of 206 respondents. An ANCOVA and Spearman’s rho correlation were employed to address the research questions. Findings revealed that neither religious group affiliation nor group size significantly predicts either CWT or CMD after controlling for the degree of religious commitment. Further research should test alternative theories associated with leadership and group dynamics. Positive social change is advanced by acknowledging that bystanders to acts of terrorism may not be influenced by factors such as group affiliation or size of religious group affiliations. These findings underscore the complexity of the relationship between behavior and religious affiliation. Policy makers and future researchers may benefit by redirecting their focus for prevention and intervention toward influences such as the motivational dynamic between religious leaders and their followers.

Keywords: Bystander Effect, Bystander Intervention, Terrorism, Religious Conflict

Introduction
Human conflict is composed of a variety of interrelated components generally set within an environment of competition for resources or power. In terms of religiously motivated conflict, these dynamic forces take a global stage, incorporate the collective experiences and passions of generations, and pressure millions of bystanders to take notice and engage the conflict. Religious terrorism is both the most prevalent and deadly form of terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013). Terrorism remains a tactic that generates fear and elicits a response from bystanders. Therefore, the role of the bystander is not simply an important element but instead it holds an integral position within the dynamics of terrorism itself. The role of the bystander and their degree of participation remain determining factors in the trajectory of future action (Staub, 2013a). The choice to take an active or passive stance in the face of terrorism may either mitigate or perpetuate the violence associated with religious conflict (Staub, 2013a). This study investigated the relationship between religious group affiliation and the variables associated with civic moral disengagement and perceptions regarding the war on terror.

Active and passive bystandership, or the degree of passivity that an observer exhibits, can be seen in human behavior during times of large scale human conflict (Staub, 2013b). Staub
(2013b) has shown that this phenomenon exists in global as well as domestic conflicts. Staub stated that an individual might demonstrate a diversion of responsibility, which would diffuse the individual’s perceived role in preventing or mitigating the conflict. This diversion could be projected onto the perpetrator themselves or other bystanders that witness these acts. When bystanders choose to not act, the perpetrators of these actions become emboldened, and their power over the event is reaffirmed (Staub, 2013b). Therefore, the inaction of bystanders may in fact be an active component of the perpetuation of this conflict. The bystander effect theory presents the concept that as the number of bystanders increases the intensity of responsibility, diversion also increases (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970).

Acts of terrorism place all the nations of the world and the people they govern under the umbrella of a knowledgeable bystander. Humans routinely see large nations and groups of people standing idly by during atrocious violence such as genocide and religiously motivated terrorism. Investigation into the dynamics of religious group affiliation and the degree of bystander intervention may provide opportunities for public policy design. Religious groups and their followers are powerful collective forces that can be channeled to mitigate acts of religiously motivated terrorism. The cultural and historical aspects of religious conflict span generations, and it is these religious followers who have the ability to alter the future trajectory of these relationships. Public policy must recognize the role of the religious followers and their collective responsibility. This could be through direct engagement with religious leaders, who have the ability to mobilize their followers. The religious bystanders of these conflicts have the power to confront, mobilize, engage, or disengage from overt acts of terrorism that spawn from the ideology of their group affiliation. A richer understanding of this dynamic will assist in the development of effective policy that capitalizes on the collective power of religious group affiliation and advances positive social change.

The following components of this chapter provide a comprehensive introduction to this study. The extreme violence associated with religiously motivated terror demands that research seek out not only reactions to, but also mitigating forces associated with the dynamics of terrorism. The problem statement and purpose of this study contain this essential aspect of conflict resolution. As a theoretical construct, the bystander effect theory was utilized in an attempt to understand the psychology associated with the role of the bystander in these global events. The survey instruments and the research questions were selected to triangulate the elements of religious commitment, moral responsibility, and investment in the war on terror.

Background
The murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964 spawned great interest into the aspect of bystander intervention and eventually led to the development of the bystander effect theory (Fischer et al., 2011). In the aftermath of this crime, there were allegations that 38 people had observed a violent murder and none of them intervened to prevent this woman’s death. Media exposure fueled public outrage and concern for the decay of society. Social scientists began to examine the psychological aspects of either active or passive intervention. Bystander effect theory developed with the assumption that people who have observed critical incidents were able to diffuse their own responsibility by placing communal blame on all bystanders (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970). This early research also examined a variety of elements associated with group
dynamics and the influence this plays on the bystanders’ degree of situational intervention. These elements included such things as severity of the incident, sex of victim and bystander, and size of bystander group, among several other factors (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970). Staub (2013b) expanded this research by further incorporating the concepts of active and passive bystandership. This expanded the theory by discussing the degree of active or passive participation within the role of bystander.

The events of September 11, 2001 encouraged extensive research into the field of terrorism. The abundance of empirical research that is now available provides insight into the nature and complexity of the terrorist phenomenon. However, this robust body of literature does not adequately address the nature and role of the bystander in the perpetuation of conflict. This gap provides an opportunity for future research into religious group affiliation as a mitigating force within the violent struggles of religious ideology. This study investigated the nature of religious group affiliation and its relationship to bystander intervention. It is at this intersection where opportunities to mitigate the cyclical forces of religious violence may be found.

### Research Questions and Hypothesis

The central research questions this research addressed are provided below along with their corresponding null and alternative hypothesis.

1. Does religious group affiliation impact civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment?

   - **Null Hypothesis** ($H_{01}$): Religious group affiliation does not significantly impact civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment.
   - **Alternative Hypothesis** ($H_{11}$): Religious group affiliation does significantly impact civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment.

   Religious affiliation was used as the independent variable. This was a non-dichotomous variable that measured the participants’ religious affiliations as being Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Other Religious Faith, or Atheist. The Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (Caprara et al., 2009b) was used to assess the mitigation of moral consequences of harmful actions. This scale encompasses the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement, the totality of which was used as a dependent variable. These eight mechanisms include moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, attribution of blame, and dehumanization. The Civic Moral Disengagement Scale utilizes a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The Religious Commitment Inventory (Worthington et al., 2003) was used to determine the degree of adherence to religious beliefs and values. This survey utilizes a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The level of religious commitment was used as a covariate. The association tested was between the specific religious affiliation and the level of civic moral disengagement.

2. Does religious group affiliation impact commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious commitment?

   - **Null Hypothesis** ($H_{02}$): Religious group affiliation does not significantly impact commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious commitment.

   The level of religious commitment was used as a covariate. The association tested was between the specific religious affiliation and the level of civic moral disengagement.
Alternative Hypothesis ($H_1$): Religious group affiliation does significantly impact commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious commitment.

Religious affiliation was used as the independent variable. This was a nondichotomous variable that measured the participant’s religious affiliations as being Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Other Religious Faith, or Atheist. The war on terror investment model (Agnew et al., 2007b) was used to measure support for the war on terror. This scale encompasses four elements, the totality of which was used as a dependent variable. These elements include satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and commitment to the war on terror. The war on terror investment model scale utilizes a 1 to 9 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The Religious Commitment Inventory – 10 (Worthington et al., 2003) was used to determine the degree of adherence to religious beliefs and values. This survey employs a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*.

3. Is there a relationship between group size of religious affiliation and civic moral disengagement?

Null Hypothesis ($H_0$): Group size of religious affiliation is not significantly related to civic moral disengagement. Alternative Hypothesis ($H_1$): Group size of religious affiliation is significantly related to civic moral disengagement.

Group size of religious affiliation was used as the independent variable. This was a variable that measured the size of the participant’s religious group affiliation. The bracketing of this group membership was as follows: 0, >100,100-499, 500-999, 1000-1999, 2000-9999, 10000+. The Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (Caprara et al., 2009b) was used to assess the mitigation of moral consequences of harmful actions. This scale encompassed the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement, the totality of which was used as a dependent variable. These eight mechanisms include moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, attribution of blame, and dehumanization. The Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (CMDs) employs a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The Religious Commitment Inventory – 10 (Worthington et al., 2003) was used to determine the degree of adherence to religious beliefs and values. This survey utilizes a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The association tested was between the group size of the participants’ religious affiliation and the level of civic moral disengagement.

4. Is there a relationship between group size of religious affiliation and commitment to the war on terror?

Null Hypothesis ($H_0$): Group size of religious affiliation is not significantly related to commitment to the war on terror. Alternative Hypothesis ($H_1$): Group size of religious affiliation is significantly related to commitment to the war on terror.

Group size of religious affiliation was used as the independent variable. This was a variable that measured the size of the participant’s religious group affiliation. The bracketing of this group membership was as follows: 0, >100,100-499, 500-999, 1000-1999, 2000-9999, 10000+. The war on terror investment model (Agnew et al., 2007b) was used to measure investment in the war on terror, which was a dependent variable in this study.
measured the four elements of satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and commitment to the war on terror. The war on terror investment model scale employs a 1 to 9 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The Religious Commitment Inventory – 10 (Worthington et al., 2003) was used to determine the degree of adherence to religious beliefs and values. This survey uses a 1 to 5 Likert scaling that ranges from *do not at all agree* to *completely agree*. The association tested was between the group size of the participants’ religious affiliation and the participant’s support for the war on terror.

**Theoretical Framework**

The bystander effect theory (Latane & Darley, 1970) was incorporated into this study as the theoretical framework. This theory examines the psychosocial aspects of bystander intervention in situations where people need help (Latane & Darley, 1970). The theory postulates that when people are in smaller bystander groups, they have more of a tendency to intervene in a conflict situation than when they are part of a larger bystander group (Latane & Darley, 1970). Increases in group size may have the ability to magnify the individual tendency toward passive bystandership. This is believed to be the result of a diffusion of responsibility as the individual diverts this role toward the larger group (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970). Further explanation of bystander effect theory and its origins are discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. This study investigated bystander intervention in relation to terrorism mediation through the environment of religious group affiliation.

This research was an exploratory investigation into the interaction of the individual within a larger group affiliation. Voluntary participants were used in order to ascertain whether or not a relationship exists between the degree of bystander intervention and the size of the religious organization to which they belong. Data were collected specifically regarding the participants’ level of civic moral disengagement and perceptions regarding the war on terror.

The bystander effect theory was tested by comparing the individual’s perception of their level of responsibility and the size of the religious organizations that they affiliate with. A parallel test was conducted to investigate the religious faith itself and the individuals’ perception of their level of responsibility. It was the aim of this research to identify potential relationships between an individual’s perception of responsibility in relation to the terrorist phenomenon and the religious group environments that they associate with. The identification of elements that contribute to prosocial intervention could aid in the mitigation of religiously motivated conflict.

Staub (2013b) defined the degree of bystandership as the actions of a bystander in a conflict situation where a reasonable person would believe that intervention is necessary. Terrorism is a global issue that permeates nationalistic boundaries but often adheres to pre-established religious traditions. The identification of motivating factors to encourage prosocial behaviors has a potential to lessen the prevalence of future conflicts.

**Nature of the Study**

The plan for this study was to conduct analytical research utilizing a quantitative method. The study investigated the relationship between religious group affiliation and the variables associated with civic moral disengagement and perceptions regarding the war on terror. A demographics questionnaire identified the participants’ gender, age bracket, religious affiliation, and size of
religious group affiliation. This research used three validated survey instruments: the Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI-10; Worthington et al., 2003), the Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (Caprara et al., 2009b), and the war on terror investment model (Agnew et al., 2007b). These instruments measured the participants’ level of religious commitment, level of civic moral disengagement, and perceptions regarding the war on terror. The data collected from the demographics questionnaire and the three survey instruments were coded and statistically evaluated to determine if a significant relationship exists between these variables.

The independent variables of religious affiliation and group size of religious affiliation were tested with the two dependent variables associated with moral disengagement and investment in the war on terror. The level of religious commitment was used as a covariate. Civic moral disengagement was used in this study as a dependent variable. The eight mechanisms of moral disengagement were each measured. These mechanisms include moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, attribution of blame, and dehumanization (Caprara et al., 2009a). The dependent variable of investment in the war on terror was also used. The elements that comprise the investment to the war on terror include satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and commitment to the war on terror. The demographics of gender and age were used as intervening variables.

Scope and Delimitations
The delimitations of this study primarily centered on the thought that in one way or another; the majority of the world’s populations are bystanders to global acts of religious based terrorism. The scope of this study could not account for all of the religious affiliations and numerous conflicts that occur throughout the world. The Abrahamic religions hold a near monopoly on religiously motivated terrorism (Ward & Sherlock, 2013). For this reason, the demographics survey used these three religions and provided “other” for all other religions. This provided perspectives from inside the Abrahamic traditions as well as external perspectives. The complexity of terrorism and the political manipulation of terminology related to terrorism create a confusing landscape. Individuals may support a group labeled as a terrorist while holding that others are criminals. The sampling for this study was conducted from the position of a western democratic society. This excluded some of the most passionate individuals engaged in these conflicts. It is these individuals who have the most to gain or lose as a result of the perpetuation of these conflict situations. At the same time, this included some of the most influential bystanders in the war on terror. The nature of a democratic system of government provides a mechanism for citizen participation. As a result or democratic processes, the actions of a nation are a reflection of the collective will of its citizenry. For those who choose not to participate in the democratic system, they instead assume a passive stance as seen in the concept of passive bystandership. The results of this study may be generalizable to a western democratic society but not necessarily on a society where freedoms are constrained.

Data Collection
The initial data collection began on May 21, 2014 when the survey instruments were placed on the Walden Participant Pool. Data collection using this service concluded on June 26th 2014.
After the initial 2 weeks of data collection, less than 10% of the needed surveys were completed. Due to the slow response rate, a modification to the original data collection plan was made. On June 6th, 2014, a request for change in procedures was sent to Walden University’s IRB. On June 20th, approval was secured by IRB to use the services of the company Survey Monkey to distribute 190 surveys. On June 24th, 2014, the surveys were distributed by Survey Monkey, and on June 26th, 2014, the data collection using this survey concluded.

The use of the Survey Monkey service provided a similar population to the originally anticipated population of Walden University’s Participant Pool. The demographics of Survey Monkey’s distribution pool are reflective of the population of the United States (Survey Monkey, 2014). According to Survey Monkey (2014), this reflection of the United States population is based on criteria such as age and gender distribution. This organization has the ability to further target more selective groups but aims at maintaining a pool of participants that is based off of the population of the United States (Survey Monkey, 2014). One factor of the demographics of these participants that needs to be acknowledged is their access to the Internet. According to Survey Monkey (2014), the respondents’ access to the Internet inherently skew the population toward the higher education and income levels of people within the United States. This may or may not be true. The distribution and accessibility to computer technology in the United States extends through all economic levels. This alleged skew from the overall population of the United States is similar to what would have been expected by solely using Walden University’s Participant Pool.

The population that is used by Survey Monkey can be narrowed depending on the needs of the study. The parameters for this study were set to accept only participants that were at least 18 years of age. Other than this criterion, there were no other targeting criteria used. All of these participants voluntarily took this survey and were not directly compensated for their time (Survey Monkey, 2014). There is a built in incentive structure, which provides a $.50 contribution to a charity of their choice (Survey Monkey, 2014). This cost was absorbed as a portion of the fee paid by the researcher to use this service.

At the completion of data collection, a total of 18 surveys were collected from the Walden Participant Pool and 200 from Survey Monkey for a total of 218 completed surveys. The data were cleaned through removal of 12 surveys that were found to have multiple answers chosen for the same question.

Results of the Study
The first two researched questions were tested using the statistical test analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). There are six assumptions when using ANCOVA as analysis. These assumptions include outliers, normality of dependent variables, homogeneity of variance, multicollinearity, and sensitivity to missing data (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). All of these assumptions were met in this study. The second two research questions use Spearman’s Rho, which has two assumptions. These are that the two variables used are ordinal, interval, or ratio and that these variables have a monotonic relationship (Field, 2013). Both of these assumptions have been met in this study.

The data analyzed included a total of 206 surveys from 88 males and 118 females. The age bracket of this sample included 50 between 18 and 29 years of age, 30 between 30 and 39
years of age, 47 between 40 and 49 years of age, 46 between 50 and 59 years of age, 17 between 60 and 69 years of age, and 16 who were 70+ years of age (see Figure 1).

There was an overrepresentation of Christian participants (69.9%) and an underrepresentation of both Jewish (.009%) and Muslims (.02%) The participants included five Muslims, 144 Christians, two Jewish, 33 Other, and 22 Atheists.

The size of religious group membership was well dispersed. This included 80 (group size of 0), 31 (group size <100), 29 (group size 100-499), 6 (group size 500-999), 6 (group size 1,000-1,999), 11 (group size 2,000-9,999), and 43 (group size 10,000+). Figure 3 displays the distribution by religious group size.

The age distribution of the survey participants was distributed relatively similar to the United States adult population. This country’s adult population consists of approximately 21.9% between the ages of 18 to 29, 25.8% between the ages of 30 to 34, 29.1% between the ages of 45 to 60, and 23.2% above age 60 (Survey Monkey, 2014). The religious group affiliation was also fairly representative of the United States where it is estimated that 77% identify themselves as Christian, 1.7% Jewish, and .6% Muslim (Newport, 2014). The results of group size are more subjective as they represent a perception from the survey participant themselves.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for age bracket and group size. The age bracket variable had a range from 1 to 6 with a mean of 2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.543. The group size variable had a range from 1 to 7 with a mean of 3.13 and a standard deviation of 2.382.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age bracket</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this study are provided below. These results are organized by each of the four research questions. Tables detailing the results of these tests are provided.

**Research Question 1**

For Research Question 1 (Q1) the statistical test of ANCOVA was used. The independent variable of religious group affiliation (IV) was tested with the dependent variable of civic moral disengagement (DV). The relationship between these variables may be influenced by the degree of religious commitment that the participants have. Therefore, the degree of religious commitment was controlled during this test.

As shown in Table 2, the Levene’s test was not significant ($p$>.05). This means that the variances in the different experimental groups are not significantly different.
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>df1</th>
<th>df2</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.652</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>.163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Dependent variable: civic moral disengagement. Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. Design: Intercept + Total Sum RCI + Group Affiliation

ANOVA results indicate a non-significant main effect for religious group affiliation, $F(4,199)=.892, \ p=.470$, partial $\eta^2=.018$. The covariate of religious commitment did significantly influence the dependent variable, group affiliation, $F(1,199)=8.411, \ p=.004$, partial $\eta^2=.041$. The amount of variation accounted for by the model or SS_M was calculated at 5919.960. The unexplained variance or SS_R was 108800.362. The effect size was calculated using the Partial $\eta^2$ value of .052. Therefore, the null hypothesis $H_0$ cannot be rejected. These results are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Mean</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Partial $\eta^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected model</td>
<td>1183.992</td>
<td>2.166</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>62606.680</td>
<td>114.510</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious commitmt</td>
<td>4598.778</td>
<td>8.411</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Affiliation</td>
<td>487.469</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>546.735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected total</td>
<td>114720.322</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. a. $R^2 = .052$ (Adjusted $R^2 = .028$).

Research Question 2

For Research Question 2 (Q2), the statistical test of ANCOVA was used. The independent variable of religious group affiliation (IV) was tested with the dependent variable of investment in the war on terror (DV). The relationship between these variables may be influenced by the degree of religious commitment that the participants have. Therefore, the degree of religious commitment was controlled during this test.

As shown in the Table 4, the Levene’s test was not significant ($p=.05$). This means that the variances in the different experimental groups are not significantly different.
Table 4
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>df1</th>
<th>df2</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.257</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Dependent variable: Investment in the War on Terror
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

1. Design: Intercept + TotalSumRCI + GroupAffiliation

ANCOVA results indicate a non significant main effect for religious group affiliation, $F(4,200)=.810, p=.810$, partial $\eta^2=.008$. The covariate of religious commitment did significantly influence the dependent variable, investment in the War on Terror, $F(1,200)=21.887, p=000$, partial $\eta^2=.099$. The amount of variation accounted for by the model or $SS_m$ was calculated at $14992.634^4$. The unexplained variance or $SS_R$ was $116952.279$. The effect size was calculated using the Partial $\eta^2$ value of .114. Therefore, the null hypothesis $H_02$ cannot be rejected. These results are displayed in Table 5.

Table 5
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent variable: TotalSumWOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III df</th>
<th>Mean squares</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Partial $\eta^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected model</td>
<td>14992.634</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.128</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>46952.507</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80.293</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious commitment</td>
<td>12798.620</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.887</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GroupAffiliation</td>
<td>931.207</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>116952.279</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>584.761</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1154266.00</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected total</td>
<td>131944.913</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. a. $R^2$ squared = .114 (Adjusted $R^2$ squared = .091).

Research Question 3
A correlation was conducted for research question 3 (Q3) using the statistical test of Spearman’s rho ($\rho$). The independent variable, group size of religious affiliation (IV) was tested with civic moral disengagement (DV). This test was not significant ($p=.491$). The null hypothesis ($H_03$) cannot be rejected. These results are displayed in Table 6.
Research Question 4
A correlation was conducted for research question 4 (Q4) using the statistical test of Spearman’s rho ($\rho$). The independent variable, group size of religious affiliation (IV) was tested with, dependent variable of commitment to the war on terror (DV). This test was not significant ($p=.268$). The null hypothesis ($H_0$) cannot be rejected. These results are displayed in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A correlation was conducted for research question 4 (Q4) using the statistical test of Spearman’s rho ($\rho$). The independent variable, group size of religious affiliation (IV) was tested with, dependent variable of commitment to the war on terror (DV). This test was not significant ($p=.268$). The null hypothesis ($H_0$) cannot be rejected. These results are displayed in Table 7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary
The purpose of this study was is to investigate the nature of bystander intervention as it relates to religious group affiliation within the context of terrorism. This was done by examining the relationship between religious group affiliation, civic moral disengagement, and commitment to the war on terror. Religiously motivated terrorism transcends national boundaries and often aligns itself within the boundaries of religious ideological traditions. Although the current trend in addressing terrorist acts is through political mechanisms, the role of the organized religions themselves are not as eagerly approached. The deep religious content for which these events pull inspiration and motivation may also be where the effective diffusion mechanisms exist.

The bystander effect theory makes observations that individuals may in fact diffuse their own responsibility onto the larger organization that they are affiliated with (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970). The mobilization of religious followers can have large scale impacts on how these events are confronted. Ward and Sherlock (2013) presented substantial evidence that supports the relationship between religious group affiliation and the phenomenon of terrorism. However, this evidence focuses on the acts of violence itself and not the diffusion of
violence by bystanders associated with these religious groups. Al Ramiah and Hewstone (2013) supported the strategy of increasing intergroup contact as a way in which to reduce conflict. Further understanding of individual behavior within groups can offer a foundation for which to build strategies that support peace. This knowledge can also be leveraged to nurture environments that repel tendencies toward intergroup conflict. The identification of elements associated with bystander intervention as they find themselves in religious group affiliation may present opportunities for conflict mitigation and response. This more holistic approach to understanding can be used to seek out more peaceful resolution of religiously motivated conflict.

This was an analytical research study that used a quantitative method. The study investigated the relationship between religious group affiliation and the variables associated with civic moral disengagement and perceptions regarding the war on terror. A demographics questionnaire was used to identify the participants’ gender, age bracket, religious affiliation, and size of religious group affiliation. This research also used three validated survey instruments: the Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI-10; Worthington et al., 2003), the Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (Caprara et al., 2009b), and the war on terror investment model (Agnew et al., 2007b). A detailed summary of these survey instruments was presented in Chapter 3. These instruments measured the participants’ level of religious commitment, level of civic moral disengagement, and perceptions regarding the war on terror. The data collected from the demographics questionnaire and the three survey instruments were coded and statistically evaluated to determine if a significant relationship existed between these variables.

The independent variables of religious affiliation and group size of religious affiliation were tested with the two dependent variables associated with moral disengagement and investment in the war on terror. The level of religious commitment was used as a covariate. Civic moral disengagement was used in this study as a dependent variable. The dependent variable of investment in the war on terror was also used. The elements that comprise the investment to the war on terror include satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and commitment to the war on terror. The demographics of gender and age were both used as intervening variables.

This research asked four distinctly different questions. The first question asked if religious group affiliation impacted civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment. The answer to this question was that there was no significant impact. The second research question asked if religious group affiliation impacted commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious commitment. The answer to this question was also that there was no significant impact. The third question asked if a relationship exists between group size of religious affiliation and civic moral disengagement. This study found that no relationship exists between these variables. The final question asked if a relationship exists between group size of religious affiliation and commitment to the war on terror. For this question the answer was also that no relationship was found between these variables.

Four questions were asked in this study. After analyzing the data corresponding to the collected surveys, the following conclusions were made: Religious group affiliation does not significantly impact civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment; religious group affiliation does not significantly impact commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious commitment; group size of religious affiliation
is not significantly related to civic moral disengagement; and group size of religious affiliation is not significantly related to commitment to the war on terror.

These results have to be taken within the context of the study itself. The survey participants were nearly all, if not all, from the United States. There was also an overrepresentation of Christians, while Muslims and Jews were underrepresented in the sample population. Therefore, these results are heavily skewed toward a pool of western Christian culture. This element regarding Christian influence of western societies has been a point of contention between many terrorist groups such as al Qaeda (Charron, 2011) and al-Shabaab (Holseth, 2012). This narrow pool is not insignificant given the influence of Christianity within the United States. The boundaries of this study focused on religious group affiliation as an inhibitor of bystander intervention. The results of this study suggest that bystander effect does not play a significant role regarding religious group affiliation as it relates to terrorism. This conclusion tends to support the idea that religious group affiliation does not have any impact on bystander intervention within a western society such as the United States. This is significant in that religious affiliation remains a fulcrum where individuals can individually or collectively effect positive social change. Therefore, the individual should not be expected to independently mobilize in support of conflict mitigation. This mobilization would need the influence and guidance of the moral leadership within these religious groups.

This study began with the understanding that there would be limitations related to direct and indirect exposure to terrorist incidents. This would include such aspects as knowing people who were wounded or perished in an attack or being the target of discriminatory acts following a terrorist incident. A clear limitation was the inability to readily survey individuals who would be considered to live within the various war zones or in distant places throughout the world.

After reviewing the returned surveys, additional limitations became clear. The most obvious issue was the lack of diversity among the religious group representation. The vast majority of participants were of Christian (69.9%) faith with a very low representation of the Muslim (.02%) and Jewish (.009%) faiths. Another limitation that surfaced was the perception of group size. This can be seen as not adequately representing the population who is engaged in religious conflict associated with terrorism. Modern religiously motivated terrorism often involves struggles between the Muslim faith and western societies. Both the Muslim and Jewish faiths are not adequately represented in this study and therefore skew the results.

This study tested the bystander effect theory (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970) on the variables of civic moral disengagement and commitment to the war on terror. The results of this study determined that religious group affiliation and group size of religious affiliation have no impact on these two variables. Further research should test alternative theories associated with group dynamics. The theory of groupthink (Janis, 1972) may be an avenue to explore. This theory centers on the decision making process of groups whereby poor decisions are collectively made in an effort to support the group itself (Janis, 1972). Pervasive arguments theory (Pruitt, 1971) also offers potential in understanding the decision making process within groups. This theory investigates the presentation of arguments to support group goals in an extreme way (Pruitt, 1971). The extremity of the arguments is used in a way to generate support from group members for their positions (Pruitt, 1971).
This study used preexisting validated survey instruments. Further research would benefit by the creation of a refined survey targeted specifically at a conflict situation whereby terrorist acts are likely. For instance, a survey could be designed that is specific to the Syrian conflict-taking place between Bashar al-Assad’s progovernment forces and the Syrian opposition. This investigation narrowed the scope of terrorism to religiously motivated terror, but further refinement could provide a richer understanding of the interaction of group dynamics and the phenomenon of terror.

Public policy is a mechanism that can be leveraged to address the issue of terrorism. However, the available literature supports the unwavering relationship between the faiths of the Abrahamic religions and the violent tactics used by terrorists. The doctrines of these religious traditions transcend the geographic boundaries of nation states and reach to all areas of the world. Therefore, public policy must be developed in a way that acknowledges and incorporates this reality. This would include the development of partnerships between governmental organizations and religious institutions. Public policy must more effectively engage religious leadership in order to address religious conflict such as terrorism. These two organizational types cannot effectively confront the challenges in isolation of one another. The bystander effect theory and potential connections to religious faith were tested in this study. It was determined that bystander effect does not play a significant role regarding religious group affiliation as it relates to terrorism. This supports the idea that religious affiliation does not impact bystander intervention.

The implications of this study center on the development of public policy in a way that effects positive social change. Cultivating an awareness of the complexity of bystander social dynamics can leverage positive social change. There is no easy way to stratify potential reactions based upon religious affiliation. The factors that influence the reactions of the individual regarding acts of terror thrive in a highly complex environment. It is likely that a host of factors play a role in the manifestation of individual response, both independently of one another as well as in aggregation. This is true even when the center of focus is placed on factors associated with the individual’s narrowly defined religious affiliation. It is difficult to place potential individual responses into status groups.

Conclusions

Human ideological conflict manifests itself within opposing groups of individuals during competition for land, power, and resources. The individual can gain strength, guidance, and material support through group affiliation. Religious doctrine adds to this dynamic and creates additional complexity. Human history shows that as these conflicts escalate the phenomenon of terrorism arises. Scholars of public policy must examine these dynamic forces that influence the emergence and responses to acts of terrorism. By researching these elements and how they relate to one another, policy makers can articulate their goals and capitalize on strategies that encourage reductions in conflict and the inevitable emergence of terrorist acts.

This study focused on bystander effect theory as a potential component of the conflict cycle of religiously motivated terrorism. As a result of this study, four determinations were made. Religious group affiliation does not significantly impact civic moral disengagement after controlling for the degree of religious commitment. Religious group affiliation does not significantly impact commitment to the war on terror after controlling for the degree of religious
commitment. Group size of religious affiliation is not significantly related to civic moral disengagement. Group size of religious affiliation is not significantly related to commitment to the war on terror. This does not demonstrate an exhaustive look into the potential relationship of bystander effect and religious group affiliation but does provide indication that there is no significant influence present. The lack of influence suggests that religious group affiliation may not be an inhibiting factor in regards to bystander intervention.

These findings can be of particular interest to policy makers by raising awareness of the complexities in attempting to stratify the potential reaction of the individual bystander. The individuals’ reactions may be influenced by numerous factors working independently and in conjunction with one another. This presents a highly dynamic environment that complicates the researchers’ ability to categorize potential responses.

References


Appendix A: Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for Research Q1
Table 3. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects for Research Q1
Table 4. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for Research Q2
Table 5. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for Research Q2
Table 6. Spearman's rho Correlation for Research Q3
Table 7. Spearman's rho Correlation for Research Q4
OBSERVANCE OF THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR WOMEN IN ARMED CONFLICTS: A TERRIBLE BEAUTY?

Ibrahim Abdullahi (FRHD) LLB, BL, LLM, PH.D
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ABSTRACT
Modern armed conflicts are employed in a wide array of operations that range from peacetime riot control to outright international armed conflicts. Women fall among the vulnerable group in the society especially during period of armed conflicts. This paper focuses its attention on women and ex-rays the observance of the legal protection for women in armed conflicts, steps taken towards undertaking the protection, measures of the protection in terms of both international and non-international armed conflicts, its observance as well as the consequences of lack of observance. The paper similarly assesses the state of knowledge and violations and notes that although there have been many developments in the legal parlance, the issue is not always moving in the right direction in terms of observance and thence a terrible beauty.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
War and or armed conflict do not spare women. Mortar bombs fall from the sky, bullets rip through houses, water and provisions are cut off. Trying to protect women in such situation is a formidable task. In recent years, the attention paid to violations against women in armed conflicts has reached unprecedented levels. Barely a week goes by without a story in the news media or a report of a non-governmental organization documenting the problems. The subject has also pervaded all areas of the United Nations, from the works of the Security Council to the Special Representatives of the Secretary General and from the World Health Organization to the Adhoc-International Criminal Tribunals.

Legal efforts to protect women in wartime or during period of armed conflicts have been under way since the beginning of the century. In recent decades, government and institutions have produced declarations, conventions and other legal texts which would ensure the primacy of women’s right in even the worst of circumstances. The law of armed conflict for instance grants women general protection as civilian persons and requires that women members of the armed forces shall in all cases benefit from treatment as favorable as that granted to men. Besides this basic protection, women are similarly granted specific protection including, protection against outrages upon personal dignity and in particular against rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault, the protection against expectant mothers, maternity cases and mother of infants, and the rule that women deprived of liberty i.e. civilian internees or prisoners of war, must be confined in separate quarters from male internees and must be under the immediate suppression of women.¹

Notwithstanding the declarations, conventions and other legal texts which were churned out to ensure the primacy of women’s right in armed conflicts, there are considerable

discrepancies between those detailed provisions worked by experts and the daily life, law and the reality of sufferings. What can be done to influence the behavior of warring parties? What are the challenges? And what lessons can be learnt from practice and how to remedy the situation becomes the basic object of this paper.

A convenient stating point in the discus of this paper would be to attempt to define what is meant by armed conflict.

2.0 WHAT IS ARMED CONFLICT?
The most authoritative definition of armed conflict is contained in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeal Chambers decision on jurisdiction in the TADIC case\(^2\) to the effect that:

"...An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within the state. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached, or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.\(^3\)

This definition has since being used several times by the ICTY’S Chambers and by other international bodies\(^4\)

3.0 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND WOMEN: A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW MAKING
International humanitarian law came into being to limit human suffering in times of armed conflicts and to prevent atrocities. The first instruments of international humanitarian law were motivated by the principles of humanity. Conventional origin of the principle of humanity may be found in the preamble of the St Petersburg declaration of 1868. The declaration through its following preamble left a mark and also left the first principle of the law of war or armed conflict as follows:

"Considering that the only legitimate object to accomplish during the war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; that the object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men or render their death inevitable; that the

\(^2\)ICTY, Prosecutor VsDuskoTadic, Appeals Chambers decision of 2\(^{nd}\) October 1995.

\(^3\)Ibid, at page 70.

employment of such arms would therefore be contrary to the laws of humanity.  

This general customary principle was later embodied in the annexure to the 1899 Hague Convention II and 1907 Hague Convention IV. To this extent, the St. Petersburg declaration represents customary international law and would be binding upon all states and not merely those who were formally parties to it and its general participation clause notwithstanding. However, while the focus of early international humanitarian law was on minimizing direct causes of human suffering among participants in armed conflicts, the discipline itself was never restricted in such a way. Indeed, international humanitarian law has its foundation in general exhortations of the Martens clause and, originally, in the call of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) founder, Henry Dunant, to “Press forward in a human and truly civilized spirit, the attempt to prevent, or at least to alienate, the horrors of war.” The Martens clause which first appeared within the preamble to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 provides as follows:

“Until a more complete Code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that in case not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of principles of the law of nations, as they result from this usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”

The Martens clause predates the general principle of public international law resulting from the steamship Lotus case. The effect of the Martens clause is two folded and limited to international agreements that deal with the law of armed conflicts. Firstly, in areas where the law of armed conflicts treaties is silent, customary, international law governs the situation, secondly, what is not specially prohibited is not necessarily permitted. Different versions of the Martens clause appear throughout the corpus of the law of armed conflict. The most recent expression of this clause reads thus:

“In cases not covered by this protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established customs, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”

Moreover, the first code for the conduct of warfare, the famous Lieber Code adopted by Abraham Lincoln for the use of his Union forces in the American Civil War in 1863, is also quite general in nature in its scope. Contemporary international humanitarian law was born with the signing of the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the wounded in

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5 Quoted from Jean P, “Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law” P. 50
6 See Article 23(e) of the regulations
8 (1927) PCIJ, Serial A. No. 10 to the effect that what is not specifically prohibited is permitted.
10 See Article 2, Additional Protocol 1 of 1977.
11 1863. These are instructions for the Government of armies of the United States of America in the field.
armies on the field. This development was a response to a Swiss Philanthropist, originator of the International Relief Agency, the Red Cross, who, following his experience at the battle of SOLFERINO in 1859 made a proposal for the establishment of an international body for the aid of the wounded in wartime.\footnote{DunantH, Un Souvenir de Solferino; Geneva 1802 (published in translation: A memory of Solferino) American National Red Cross 1939 and 1959.} Since 1864 a tremendous number of international conventions declarations, treaties, protocols, acts, agreements and resolutions as well as regional and subregional instruments relating to international humanitarian law have been adopted. On 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 1864, the Geneva Convention was finally adopted. The epoch making Geneva Convention of 1864 influenced the evolution of the law of nations. States for the first time in history, accepted in a formal and permanent document, a limitation of their own powers, not for the sake of the individual and or altruistic ideals. For the first time ever, war or armed conflict yielded to law. In less than a century, the principles of the Geneva Convention was gradually extended to other categories of war victims and this extension led to the rigging of the text of the Hague. It is precisely for this reason that it is called the mother of Convention.\footnote{Jean P, “Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law op cit at page 62.}

The first revision of the treaty was made in 1906 when the number of its articles was increased from 33 but without modification of its essence. It was applied quiet fully during World War 1 except with respect to the repatriation of medical personnel from which the belligerents departed by keeping a considerable number of doctors and nurses (women inclusive) in prison camps to care for their wounded compatriots. The second revision which was made in 1929 took into account the development of medical aviation and eliminated the section 1\textsuperscript{omness} clause in the proceeding version, a provision under which the convention was not applicable unless the belligerents were parties to it.\footnote{It was at the diplomatic conference of 1929 that the right of Muslim countries to use a red crescent in place of the Red Cross and also a red lion and the sun of Iran (which later rejected the emblem and returned to a red crescent) was recognized.}

The principle of making medical personnel in captivity and returning them to their army of origin was maintained but the ban on their retention was to be valid only in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. The Geneva Convention was generally well respected during World War II, but the belligerents took advantage of the clause introduced in 1929, and held doctors and nurses from the opposite sides in prisons of war camps to treat their compatriots. The contention and controversial issue of retaining the medical personal received a compromise solution during the diplomatic conference of 1949.\footnote{Both Doctors and Nurses thus retained were not to be considered as prisoners of war but were to have the same right as those of prisoners of war, plus certain facilities necessary for the exercise of their profession.}

Essentially, discuss on the Geneva Conventions becomes imperative here as it lays down the necessary springboard for all other laws meant to at least prevent and reduce death and destruction as far as the hard realities of war or armed conflicts allows.

The first Geneva Convention deals with the wounded and sick members of the armed forces on land. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Geneva Convention deals with the wounded, sick and ship wrecked members of the armed forces at sea. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Geneva Convention deals with prisoners of war and the 4\textsuperscript{th} Geneva Convention deals with civilians.
Nigeria has not only ratified the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols of 1977, it has also incorporated the Convention into domestic law by enactment.\textsuperscript{16} It has further enacted the Nigerian Red Cross Society Act,\textsuperscript{17} incorporating the Nigeria Red Cross Society and issued the code of conduct to the Nigerian Armed Forces during the Nigerian Civil War.

4.0 WHY PROTECT WOMEN?
The daily lives of many women today are caught up in situations ruled by fear or the threat of destruction and extreme sufferings. The deliberate targeting of women civilians, the destruction of their properties, looting, force displacement, use of women as human shields, rape and other forms of sexual violence,\textsuperscript{18} indiscriminate attacks and other acts of violence\textsuperscript{19} against women unfortunately all are too common in most armed conflicts in the world today. Women today are also actively supplying their men folks in military operations – not by taking up arms but by providing them with the support needed to wage war.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, there are women endangered because of their presence amongst the armed forces but who are there completely against their will i.e. abducted for sex or to work and clean in the camps. During the period of their abduction, and often after, these women and girls can be in considerable danger from attacks by the opposing forces as well as theirs abductors.\textsuperscript{21}

Women have further been under suspicious and targeted for their suspected or actual role of their men folk in order to get to the absent men by intimidating and attacking the women.

Despite these examples of voluntary and involuntary participation of women in armed conflicts as combatants and in supportive roles, some countries and cultures refuse the participation of women in combat roles in the armed forces. The majority of women experience the effects of armed conflicts as part of the civilian population. As members of the civilian population, women suffer direct or indirect effects of fighting which amongst others include lack of food and other essentials needed for healthy survival. Women invariably have to bear greater responsibility for their children and their elderly relatives and often the wider society especially when the men in the family have left to fight, interned or detained and even in worst situations, missing or death or internally displaced or even in exile.

Ironically, many women often do not flee the fighting or the threat of hostilities, because they and their families believe that the very fact that they are women (often with children) will afford them a greater measure of protection from the warring parties. They believe their gender;

\textsuperscript{17} No. 52 of 1960.
\textsuperscript{18} Such as Rape, enforced prostitution, defilement, indecent assault and sexual slavery.
\textsuperscript{19} Such as Sex trafficking, abduction, forced abortions and domestic violence etc.
\textsuperscript{21} The best known and wide scale example of such abduction was that of the so called comfort women in the far east during the second world war – a term which is no way encompasses, the horrific nature of the ordeal to which these women were subject to during their detention by the Japanese military. In recent years, women and girls have also reportedly been abducted by the armed groups in other countries such as Uganda.
their social constructed role will protect them. Some women have been found to harbor and feed soldiers thus being exposed to the risk of reprisals by their opposing forces and placed in difficult and inappropriate situation. Because of the proximity of women to fighting and for the presence of the armed forces, women invariably have to restrict their movements, thus severely limiting their access to supplies of water, food and medical attention and their ability to tend their animals and crops, to exchange news and information and to seek community or family support.

5.0 THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: GENERAL AND SPECIAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

International humanitarian law is a body of law that provides essential protection for those directly affected by an armed conflict. It is respected by the parties to the conflict. Generally international humanitarian law accords women protection on equal footing to those of men. There are equally humanitarian law treaties which recognize the need to give women special protection according to their special needs. This protection is enshrined in the four Geneva Conventions, for the protection of war victims and their Additional Protocols. The Convention and Protocols protect women (and men) as members of the civilian population not taking part in an armed conflict. Women (and men) as members of the armed forces are also protected unless captured by the enemy.

The 3rd Geneva Convention which relates to the treatment of prisoners of war stipulates that prisoners of war shall be treated humanely at all times. Besides this general protection, women are also afforded special protection based on the principle outlined thus:

“Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex.”

The above principle is followed through in a number of provisions which expressly refers to the conditions of detention of women in prison camps e.g. the obligation to provide separate dormitories for women and men and for separate sanitary convenience. The principle of differentiated treatment for women also resulted in the provision relating to the separate confinement for women from men and the immediate supervision of women by women. Women and men who as members of the civilian population are afforded protection under the 4th Convention relating to the protection of civilians persons in time of war and Additional Protocol

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<td>This is however not often the case as the ideologue which justify the use of violence against women (are based) on a particular construction of sexual identity. Masculinity given men the power to control the lives of those around him especially women. Even though women are less likely than men to be victims of index crimes, only women face crimes peculiar to their gender such as Rape, prostitution and sex trafficking, defilement, abduction, abortion and domestic violence.</td>
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<td>It is been argued rather rightly that international humanitarian law is not the only body of law relevant to situation of armed conflict. Human Rights laws are also applicable. These two bodies of law should not been seen as mutually exclusive and their methods of implementation should be seen as complementary.</td>
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Ibrahim Abdullahi 2014, 2(2):45-57

women are granted protection against abusive treatment by the parties to the armed conflict and also against the effects of fighting. They are entitled to humane treatment, respect for their lives and physical integrity and to live free from torture, ill treatment, execution and harassment.

In addition to the above general protection, women are accorded special protection under the said Convention and Protocol 1 provides thus:

“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent assault”. 30

International humanitarian law also lays down special protection for pregnant women and mothers including small children. 31 The provision stipulates:

“They shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the state concerned”. 32

Pregnant women and nursing mothers shall be given additional food in proportion to their physical needs. 33 Pregnant women and mothers with dependent infants who are detained or interned should have their cases attended to with outmost priority, 34 and maternity cases must be admitted to any institution where adequate treatment can be given. 35

In the conduct of hostilities, the parties to an armed conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilians objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 36

6.0 PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

Most armed conflicts today are non-international in nature as they take place within the borders of states and are waged between a state and organized non-states armed group(s) or among such groups themselves. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character, occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum, the following provisions (common Article 3):

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other similar cause shall in all circumstances be treated humanely without any adverse distinctions founded on race, colour, religion, or faith, sex birth or wealth or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and persons, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

30 See Articles 75 & 76 of the Additional Protocol 1 and Art, 27(2) of the 4th Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilian persons in times of war.
31 Children in this context are generally considered to be children under seven years of age.
32 Article 38, 4th Geneva Convention.
33 Ibid. Article 89.
34 Article 76(2), Additional Protocol 1 of 1977.
Outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatments;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution without previous judgment pronounced by regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.

2. The wound and sick shall be collected and cared for.

Women (and men) who do not take part in hostilities in non-international armed conflict do not have prisoner of war status when they fall into enemy hands. In such situation, they are to be afforded the fundamental guarantee defined by Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict. They are entitled to the same protection as men but person not taking part in such a conflict are protected by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions

Even though no special provision relating to special treatment is contained therein, the rule establishes fundamental guarantees for the treatment of all persons not taking part in the hostilities. Similarly, Additional Protocol II stipulates in general terms that:

“…Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault are forbidden”.

Protocol II also provides for special treatment of women who are arrested, detained, interned in relation to the hostilities. In such situation, except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women shall be held in quarters, separated from those of men shall be under the immediate supervision of women.

Women as members of the civilian population are also protected against the effects of hostilities in non-international conflicts. Additional Protocol II stipulates that:

“The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack”.

7.0 OBSERVANCE OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN PRACTICAL TERMS

Whether there is observance of the legal protection for women in armed conflicts can be seen from the following perspectives:

7.1 SEXUAL VIOLENCE

In fact, the perceived perception that as women you will be safe is often not the reality. On the contrary, women have been targeted precisely because they are women. The conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina brought world recognition to the issue of rape of women as a means of warfare. Rape, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and forced

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37 Article 4(2)(e) Additional Protocol II.
38 Ibid. Article 5(2)(a).
39 Ibid. Article 13.
40 The ICRC assisted for example, large number of mostly elderly and frail women left behind in the former United Nations protected Areas in Croatia (i.e. UNPAs frequently referred to as the KRAJIMAS). They had been left by their fleeing family members to protect the property and even then elderly and often bedridden women were not free from harassment and attack.
41 Is the unlawful carnal knowledge of women without her consent or with her consent if such consent is obtained by fraud, duress or any form of intimidation. This definition has been criticized as being gender
Impregnation are violated and a violation of international humanitarian law and are now an unprecedented part of the vocabulary of war. In any conflicts, women have been systematically targeted for sexual violence. From Bangladesh to former Yugoslavia, from Berlin to World War II to Nanking under Japanese occupation, from Vietnam to Mozambique, from Afghanistan to Somalia, women and girls have been the victims of sexual violence in armed conflict. It is only possible to give estimates as to the number of victims of sexual violence as not all victims survived and the majority of the victims will never report the violence against them. Even where reports are made, the greatest smaller factor in the rape question is the negative attitude of the police to rape complaints. Researches in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Brazil and United States – indicate that police often hear complaints with various misinterpretations, laughing as they recount their obvious traumatic experiences.

In BAGOSORA trial judgment, the trial chamber recalled the testimony of several witnesses as follows:

“The bodies of the death were frequently piled near the round blocks and a times were collected by local officials. Female victims were left lying on their backs with their legs spread and stained with semen. Dallaire Saw objects crushed or implanted in virginal, breast cut off, stomach opened and the mutilate genitals of men”.

This sexual violence has a multiple consequence for the mental health of women. At the psychological level, it leads to radical changes in the image that the victims has of herself, in her relation with her immediate social circle and beyond, in the community as whole, and in the way


Rape may not be a new crime as lessons can be learnt from the marauding armies entering the conquered town on a rampage of looting, and raping. See Brown Miller S, Against Our Will; Men, Women and Rape. (Simon & Schuster New York) 1975. Many believed that raped is a crime and can never be justified as a means of war fare or show of power, as a reward for the victorious army or as a lesson for the vanquished unable to protect up their women folk.

Sometimes this may be the basis of broaden political objective of ethnically cleansing in areas or destroying a people.

Many women are generally too afraid to speak of their experiences for the very real fear of ostracism or retaliation by their family or community. Many also believe that no one can help them nor that they have been violated and as there are often no witnesses to the violation as the recent case of KOSOVO and during the period of the NATO air strikes in Chechnya during the Russian Military Campaign, in rural areas of Sierra Leone and in numerous other conflicts around the world.


Americas Watch Criminal Injustice Violence against Women, Brazil, 1999.

Ibid.

Prosecutor VsBagosora et al, case No, ICTRY 98 41 – T 18th December 2008, Para 1908.
in which the she sees the past, present and future. It thus has a lasting negative impact on the 
victim’s perception of herself, of events, and of others. At the community level, it stigmatizes the 
victim, depriving her of any social status or intrinsic value as a person (she is seen as unfaithful or 
promiscuous) and thereby modifies relationship with the community with an overall deleterious 
effect.

The ICRC has long considered sexual violence as a war crime and a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law.51

7.2 DETENTION

Women are now a day detained as a result of armed conflict often in worse conditions than men. 
This is because majority of the detainees are men and there are few prisons or places for detention 
solely for women. In many cases, women detainees are consequently, housed in the main prison 
and since, they are fewer in number, their section is normally the smallest and lack adequate 
sanitary and other facilities.52 Detained women face horrific situations including sexual violence. 
There is a serious rise of pregnancy and gynecological problems and fear of the consequences 
these may have both for the women in detention and after their release, when they return to their 
families and communities.

7.3 DISPLACEMENT

Horrific armed conflicts that have taken place around the globe have seen displaced women on 
the increase. Displaced women have been isolated in unsafe areas thus making them fragile as 
victims of violence, rape and even murder and may arising from these displacements be subject of 
forcible recruitment into fighting forces. So many cases have arising where women fled without 
documents and this has an effect on their status.

8.0 THE WAY FORWARD

Humanitarian laws remain on the whole, a suitable framework for regulating the conduct of 
parties to armed conflicts, international or non-international. Treaty and customary laws have 
developed over the years. Recent experiences have demonstrated the enduring relevance and 
inadequacy of humanitarian laws in preserving women life and dignity during armed conflicts 
and thence the need for development in the law. What is required is therefore not only greater 
compliance with the existing legal frame work but the adoption of new rules. There is need to 
discuss rules where inadequacy is long established.

51 See the statement before the commission for right of women, European Parliament, Brussels, 18th 
February 1993. CICR a denonce la pratiquedel viol commis par toutes less parties all conflict 
commesautres exactions commises a rencontre des civil s. le viol estconsidere un crime de guerre et ilest 
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Resolution 2B of the 26th International Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference (Geneva 1995). The 
Conference: (a) expresses its outrage at practices of sexual violence in armed conflicts in particular the 
use of rape as an instrument of terror, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault … and 
strongly condemns sexual violence, in particular rape, in the conduct of armed conflicts as a war crime and 
under certain circumstances a crime against humanity, and urges the establishment of strengthening 
mechanism to investigate, bring to justice and punish all those responsible. See equally ICRC update on 
52 See Lindsey C. “Women and War” international review of the Red Cross Vol. 82, No. 839 September 
2000 pg 572.
The undertaking in Article 1 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions to ensure respect for international humanitarian law means that the contracting parties are obliged to help bring about compliance with the Geneva Conventions whenever they are applicable even in conflicts in which those parties are not involved. This provision thus reinforces the responsibility of each contracting state, which besides regulating its own conduct, must act by all appropriate means to ensure that humanitarian law is observed by all other states. This article has been invoked several times by the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, as well as the ICRC. The said undertaking by state parties to the Geneva Convention and the Protocols Additional thereto to respect and ensure respect for those instruments in all circumstances encompasses a wide range of means in addition to those expressly provided for by the international law, for example the appointment of protecting powers or international fact finding commissions. These include diplomatic, confidential or public approaches and public appeals.

There is the need to build more respect for humanitarian law especially amongst weapons bearers through dissemination sessions, first aid courses, advanced courses for commanders, practical support to incorporate IHL into training, education, policy tools such as bilateral declaration and special agreements between parties as it relates to women even in ceasefire and peace agreements.

Reparations for victims of violation are another area in which legal development is urgently required. There is insufficient respect for applicable rules to the practical course of suffering during armed conflicts in recent years as the emphasis has been on developing criminal law procedures to prosecute and punish those who have committed serious violation of humanitarian law; but appropriate means of halting and addressing violation when they occur are still lacking. Reparation is essential for victims to overcome the deeply distressing experience they have had to endure and take up their lives once again. Reparations should be adapted to the circumstances and needs of the victim. Reparation here does not necessarily imply financial compensation. Other forms of reparation include restitution, rehabilitation, satisfactory and the guarantee that the violation(s) will not be repeated.

Humanitarian laws in the area of providing adequate protection for displaced persons should be strengthened. Specific legal protection continues to be deficient in this regard. The adoption in 1998 of the guiding principles on internal displacement was a significant step in fortifying the international legal framework for protecting internally displaced persons. Women who fled without documents attesting to their civil status may find it difficult to gain access to

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53 See e.g. A/RES/63/96 (2008).
56 In 1983 and 1984, the ICRC based itself on Article 1 common to the Geneva Convention in issuing formal appeals to the states parties to the Geneva Convention to use their influence with Iraq then at war with one another, and prevail upon them to comply with the laws of armed conflict. In connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia alone, the ICRC issued over 50 public appeals, often in response to particularly tragic or deadly events; in order to express its acute concern at the serious violations of an international humanitarian law that were taking place there.
social services or to move freely within the country. Therefore legal development is necessary to ensure the perseverance of the family unit. Thus the Permanent Court of International Justice held in the Chorzow factory case that;

“Reparation must as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability have existed if that act had not been committed”.

Among the different forms of individual reparation, restitution and compensation can be claimed and are most commonly awarded.

9.0 CONCLUSION

Humanitarian law remains as a whole, a suitable framework for regulating the conduct of parties to armed conflicts – international and non-international treaty and customary law have developed over the years, gaps have been filled and ambiguities clarified. Recent experience however has demonstrated the enduring relevance and inadequacy of humanitarian laws in preserving women lives and dignity during armed conflicts. Abuse of women’s right by combatants seems to rise in higher proportion to the number of international laws adopted to ensure women’s safety. Warlords have continued to murder, rape and main women with the aim of conquering the future and the world seems to be turning blind eye to this obvious fact.

57 Permanent Court of International Justice, case concerning factory at Chorzow, merits, Series A, No. 17, (1928) Deviations from the standard of full reparation are discussed for situations of mass atrocities. See e.g. Ethiopia – Eritrea claims commission, final Award between the State of Eritrea and Federal Democratic of Ethiopia, Eritrea’s damages claim 17th August 2009 Para 22.

58 Ibid at page 47

This collapse of the social order has paved the way open to lawlessness. Society has slide towards tolerance of such behavior through sheer negligence which in turn violates the principles championed by international humanitarian law since its inception. In truth, women have never before been so poorly protected in practical terms during periods of armed conflicts. The problem has reached such disastrous proportion that appeals for funds to help women in wartime or during period of armed conflict elicit little more than polite murmurs. Until an antidote is found for the murderous violence of internal, regional and international conflicts, women survival will depend largely on the capacity of humanitarian institutions to come to their aid at the right time and with the appropriate means. Indeed this is a terrible beauty.
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE UGANDA POLICE FORCE

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Abstract

Conceptualization of community policing has remained persistent especially in the social sciences where different people are bound to conceive concepts differently. A closer look at the implementation efforts on community policing in Uganda police force brings this to glare the differences in understanding of what it constitutes. The fragmentation of societal needs and priorities may explain this, nevertheless, it is pertinent not to forget the true concept of community policing and its theoretical base. The main objective of this paper is to bring to perspective the concept and theory of community policing so that as implementation efforts are ongoing a certain trend of uniformity can be sustained. Basically, this paper utilized existing literatures on the concept and theory of community policing in seeking and understanding about community policing. The paper identified differences in definition among scholars and also certain principles which are found in almost all models of implementation over time across borders, in which considerable progress have been achieved by adopting them and if followed will offer a coherent approach towards successful community policing. In conclusion, the paper observed that if really community policing is to be advanced, then a proper understanding of what it constitutes in principle most be comprehended by the police, citizens and leadership in general.

Key words: Community policing, society, community liaisons officer, partnership

Introduction

The concept of community policing in the Uganda police force is advently becoming popular in practice; globally the concept is slowly but gradually assuming a multidimensional as well as a multifaceted idea. Yet, the philosophy remains singular all through from the mid 70’s when the drive began to trickle down (Aliyuyero et al, 2012). Ever since, multitudes of literature have piled up all in an attempt to define, explain and theorize community policing. However, one challenge facing community policing today is that of conceptualization. There exist in literature various definitions but most important is where we can point out the demarcating line between community policing and community oriented policing, are the two concepts the same or different? In some instances the two concepts seem to be used interchangeably having the same characteristics. Some scholars seem to take the two concepts meaning different things. On one hand community policing mean a police oriented affair having to deal with how officers will adopt new strategies by collaborating with the community in preventing crime and promoting the sense of security, while community oriented policing mean a community based approach and initiative by the people towards crime control and prevention in an attempt to compliment the effort of the police as well as work in partnership for the betterment of the community. This has affected implementation as a result of consensus and conflict interest which has reduced its acceptance, lack of specific indicators which would have made the impact measureable, lack of an overall strategy within the institutional framework, lack of community consultation and participation in decision making as to the nature, contents and most acceptable and appropriate form of community policing which would promote the partnership being sought. Meanwhile, law
enforcement has been quietly revolutionized assuming a great source of debate as to the exact nature and scope it possess (James, 2002).

Interestingly, there is a consensus among the academia, Uganda police force and government as to the viability of moving towards a community oriented policing in an attempt to reduce citizen fear and overall attainment of the quality of life, or safe city in other instances. It is the intention of this paper to revisit some of the efforts towards conceptualization and theorization of community policing so that practice is aligned towards the core functions of community policing. In particular, the paper will look specifically at the theoretical bases of community policing that will enlighten both policy makers and practitioners in the field.

The Concept of Community Policing

The concept of community policing have been defined by many scholars and practitioners in various ways. Among these conceptual definitions are the institutional. According to the Uganda Police Annual Crime Report (2012), crime and social disorder is the focus of community policing. This is achieved through service delivery which includes aspects of regular law enforcement, prevention, problem solving, as well as community engagement and partnership. Community policing model try to strike a balance between reactive responses with proactive problem solving specifically on the causes of crime and disorder, community policing is essentially about partnership between the police and the citizens. Partnership in this case would mean each party having an agreed stake in the affairs of community policing, but is this the case, the amount of intervention of both the police and community in policing is not known, what is practiced in many Ugandan areas is sensitization programmes as little more than community policing quackery, consisting of pre-crime interventions that are based on neither existing knowledge of the causes of crime or existing knowledge of what programmes are known to change offender behavior.

Philosophically, community policing represents a drive which aspires to establish partnership between the people and the police in addressing contemporary challenges to security such as social and physical disorder, crime and fear towards achieving overall quality of life (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1998). In application however, visibility and acting become the operational role of the police officer who tries to ensure that disorder and crime are managed properly. On the part of the community information, support and feedback are required and police should respond to all concerns (Manning, 2003). At every attempt to define community policing therefore one will be inclined to know from which angle the concept is being approached, this can offer a credible insight as to what actually represents the view point of the author. Nevertheless, having a single definition of community policing remains a fleeting illusion because community policing can also be looked from the perspective of the community policing the police in committing crimes, for instance, many drivers on Ugandan roads have signs that alert fellow drivers of the presence of the traffic police ahead, this is a value most taxi drivers have embraced without regret. Tilley (2008) in his contribution to community policing observed that the importance of policing has to do with the people and for the community rather than policing of the community, it aspires to improve the quality of life, aiming to solve community problems alongside the community and by the community. Beyond this, it has proven difficult to pin down what specifically is involved in implementing community policing. On this point, there exist broad agreement among scholars and many police officers (Tilley, 2008). Stipak (1994) in his...
contribution also defined community policing as a management strategy which aims to promote joint responsibility of community members and police for the purpose of safety. In other words, community policing is about police-citizen partnership.

Additionally, The Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice (1994) observed that community policing embodies two major components which include community partnership and problem solving. Problem solving in this context involve diagnosing effective and applicable antidote to glaring community ills. The involvement of stakeholders like the local authorities, schools, churches/mosques, social agencies and business groups in crime prevention partnerships with the police becomes necessary for the success of community policing. However, bringing on board in unison a fragmentation of such society is not easy due to the fact that society will always have intra and inter conflict relationships. Therefore, community partnership in essence must begin with proper communication which facilitates the building of trust between the people and the police, making the use of force unnecessary and useless.

In the final analysis on the concept of community policing, Allendar (2004) states that community policing represents a philosophy of full time service, personalized policing in which a particular police officer patrols and work in an area on a permanent basis from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.

Theories of Community Policing

A number of theories have been advanced by scholars in an attempt to offer explanation in principle, and pave the way for a point of reference in academic discussion as well as a point of departure towards implementation initiatives of community policing.

One theory used to explain the philosophical bases of community policing is the Normative Sponsorship Theory by Tiedke, et. al (1975). The theory posits that a significant number of people have goodwill and that cooperation becomes a necessary factor towards building a harmonious community. It postulates that a community programme will be supported only if it is “within the limit of established standard” to all people (Trojanowicz and Dixon, 1974). Simply put, the police cannot achieve any positive transformation without the support of the public. It’s important to note here that society is divided into strata and classes, with common interests in some areas and conflicting interests in many fundamental areas. As a result of the inequality in access to societal resources, those who have access to resources will want a change in the structure and this is a basis of conflict in society and thus the death of goodwill. Conflict perspective therefore argued, that the police were not created to ‘serve society’ or ‘people’ but to serve some parts of society and some people at the expense of others (Alemika & Chukiouna, 2000).

Another theory advanced specifically to explain community policing is by Wilson and Kellings; Broken Windows theory, based on this theory social psychologist and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired; all the rest of the windows will soon be broken, the sign of one broken and unrepaired window send an indication that nobody cares so another window can also be broken and nothing will happen (Oliver, 2000).

According to Pollard in Bratone et.al (1998), Kellings and Wilson’s preposition is that the moment deliberate discourtesy such as drunkenness, begging, vandalism, disorderly behavior, graffiti, litter are not controlled, an atmosphere is created in which more serious crimes will be committed. Till today, any discussion on community policing always go hand in hand with the
broken windows theory (Allender, 2004). However, this theory under scores on the argument that there’s order inherent in society and that this order is consolidated by the fact that different structures in society work together harmoniously for the sustenance of society. The police are necessary to ensure that public peace is guaranteed through the maintenance of law and order, therefore the police are friends of the public since they exist for the good of the people.

From a radically different dimension, Wong (2008) offered a different viewpoint called the Social Resource theory that attempts to address three main prepositions, (a) what is the role and function of the police? (b) What is the relationship of the police with the people, and (c) why do people call the police? The social resource theory re-conceived the idea of crime and policing from the angle of the people and not that of the state. From the people’s viewpoint, crime is a personal problem resulting from people’s unmet expectation, scarcity of resources and police inefficiency. The police in effect are social resources which are supposed to solve the problems of the people. The ultimate purpose of community policing is to ensure better, responsive and responsible efficient and effective police service. The theory is of the people, for the people and by the people, a theory of democratic governance, empowerment, and a theory of self-help (Wong, 2008).

The social resource theory begins from observing that crime represents illegality but only from the state point of view. However, for the people crime represents one of the experiences of life, the theory represents a radical shift in theorizing community policing because it completely gave people the power in effect and made the police influence a social resource, made visible by the state by choosing within the citizens to address societal ills (Wong 2008). This theory overlooks the issue of partnership, in partnership it’s a win win situation, if then community policing is advocating for partnership, then the issue of social resource by the police doesn’t arise.

Methodology
This article was generated from a qualitative approach. Methods employed included documentary review, interviews and observation. The Police’s policy on community policing was reviewed. Further, visits to police units and communities were conducted to observe the situation. The author also observed the situation by the roadside in urban areas to establish the partnerships in the communities.

Findings and Discussions
Policy and Managerial Implications
In Uganda, as elsewhere, the training of police officers and support staff needs to be set in the context of a comprehensive human resource strategy if it is to ensure that training is focused on the strategic needs of the organization and that valuable skills gained in training are not wasted through unnecessary transfers. The problem of transfers has been pervasive and wide-ranging in the Uganda Police Force, with countless examples of officers transferred without apparent regard to the training investment made in them. This issue, which reflects wider weaknesses in personnel policy, has affected community policing bearing in mind that partnership is the basis and yet built after a reasonable period of time. The transfer policy of the police is three years but most often personnel are transferred thus affecting community policing taking root in the communities it’s supposed to operate.
Facts about Community Policing

Without clear indicators and wider research it is hard to be certain, but it seems doubtful if Community Policing, as currently practiced, has yet led to any substantive change in the public image of the Uganda Police Force. Indeed the obstacles to a full realization of the benefits of Community Policing in Uganda remain formidable. In discussion with police and non-police sources alike there are clear signs that the police regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than of listening to them. They thus learn less than they might, while doing little to mitigate their authoritarian image. A more practical problem is that the lack of an effective monitoring support service for Community Liaisons Officers in the field means they are left largely to their own devices to interpret and deliver training.

Conceptualization of community service

This has been defined in many different ways. According to one Uganda police Magazine. In its most basic form it is aimed at removing the barriers between the Police and the public. It is also described as a policy and strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime and improved quality of life. It is aimed at improving Police service and legitimacy through proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime causing conditions. It assumes a greater accountability of the Police and a greater public share in decision-making. It should show greater concern for civil rights and liberties. This can be summed up as a partnership approach to policing, the police and the public together”.

The Training Notes produced by one of the Community Liaisons Officer clearly outline “an approach to community policing aimed at “lowering and if possible, removing those real or imaginary barriers which exist between the public and the police”. The Notes go on: “The role of a Community Liaison Officer is to be a Police Officer in that he will go to the public, teach them, assist them in their dealings with the police, advise them on crime prevention matters, demystify the law and police procedures and form an open, friendly and readily available conduit of communication between the public and the police”.

In regard to the above, the need to “prevent crime” seems to be central to their approach to community policing. This does not seem to be quite how the Uganda Police Force saw it. From the notes crime prevention, although important, is a less immediate issue than improving the public image and community-police relations generally.

On the other hand, police officers are biased about the concept of community policing. “Some colleagues of ours are not supportive and not interested in community policing because it is assisting the public to become aware of the law and their rights. Some do not wish the public to know about community policing issues such as bond and bail. They say community policing is spoiling our things” (Female CLO).

The Image of the Police

Community Policing has focused on crime prevention, and only limited efforts have been made to improve the image of the police. Significant work remains if the police are to regain their credibility and the trust of the public. Uganda Police has in some instances turned into a very brutal anti-people force. It has been involved in some of the most violent encounters in which many unarmed civilians have lost their lives. The Mabira protests, the Kayunga protests, the Kiseka market protests, and the Kasubi tombs protest; all of them saw loss of innocent lives.
However that may be, the establishment of community policing was perceived by police and public alike as a key element in the establishment of the Uganda Police Force as a credible and effective force. Widely seen (not least by the Ugandan press) as corrupt, inefficient and brutal, the Uganda Police Force itself tended to see community policing as a promising way to bridge the gap between the Uganda Police Force and the public, and establish a new approach to policing based on mutual trust and cooperation. It was also the hope of the Uganda Police Force, if not a specific intention of the project, to use community policing to improve its public image, and thus help to secure public confidence and cooperation.

Identification of Community Needs
Community policing is centrally controlled from divisional and district Headquarters. Monthly returns are filed covering meetings, problems encountered, and assessments of the local situation. Headquarters officials write to each District telling them “what to cover during the following month”. Assessing community needs tends to reflect policing priorities in crime detection. There is no evidence (such as focus group reports, lists of focus group questions; questionnaires; needs assessment guides) of any systematic consultation of community members to determine their needs and priorities. Community Liaisons Officers are expected to develop their own course outlines and content. There is no feed-back or monitoring system in place for community policing, and no indicators for measuring the impact of activities.

Challenges
Taylor (1998) identified five major challenges community policing is facing (a) insufficient holistic researches, most evaluations are carried out on specific programmes, (b) general implementation especially by city government, (c) problem of full implementation by, most of what constitute community police remains in paper, (d) involvement of politics, protecting community policing from criticism, and (e) difficulty in determining the intricate relationship between community policing and crime. The above challenges identified by Taylor (1998) still remain valid today in the Uganda Police Force in addition to poor motivation of Community Liaisons Officers, in terms of promotional opportunities, community policing has suffered due to un-coordinated transfers, no consultation with the general public concerning appropriate time of meetings, no notice required and seasonal preferences are not considered to promote better attendance, lack of provision of guidelines and training materials to Community Liaisons Officers so as to facilitate a more effective, efficient and targeted approach to community policing. Additionally, Hills (2011) also identified another source of challenge to community policing which is “policing a plural society where inter communal conflict as well as inter religious conflict flourish”. In a situation like Uganda where the community is fragmented in terms of tribe, religion, there’s a like hood that crime and criminality will be rampant and the community that is supposed to collaborate to tackle security challenges in collaboration with the police is party to the crime then community oriented policing is out of question or were the police officers are also influenced by their values and affect their decision then there cannot be community policing.
In essence therefore community policing most be capable of moving towards the most difficult of security challenges facing human society while tackling the minor criminal elements that could lead to crime.

Conclusion and Suggestions for future research
The foregoing review has shown that organizational and institutional arrangements are important variables in determining the successful conduct of community policing in Uganda. The article has marshaled evidence that the concept isn’t well understood by both the police officers and the general public. Over all, the article demonstrates that Community policing do appear to represent a different mode of operation which encourages openness and flexibility, some of which include the public education, neighborhood watch, neighborhood town meetings, store front ministrations, weed and seed, foot patrol and so on. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the current tempo is sustained and improved upon, there should also be a continuous stride towards making the command structure less central and continuous engagement of the whole rank and file in the drive, both senior and junior police officers should participate in different ways to foster greater understanding among them.

Furthermore, the article has taken stock of some of the challenges facing community policing in Uganda. Among the challenges noted include poor motivation of Community liaisons Officers, in terms of promotional opportunities, community policing having suffered due to uncoordinated transfers, no consultation with the general public concerning appropriate time of meetings, no notice required and seasonal preferences are not considered to promote better attendance, lack of provision of guidelines and training materials to Community Liaisons Officers so as to facilitate a more effective, efficient and targeted approach to community policing.

It is on the basis of the foregoing account that the following issues and areas for further research are put forward in a bid to improve future community policing in Uganda and possibly beyond.
• Community policing should be perceived and practiced as a professional endeavor based on principles of policing and management ethics. However, a conducive political environment is also important in community policing.
• Strategic planning with specific objectives and targets should be in place to enable the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system that measure impact rather than performance.
• The restoration of public confidence and trust should be central to community policing.

REFERENCES


ABSTRACT
The issue of the unresolved national question has often been reverberating in the political development of Nigeria right from colonial to post-colonial eras. The study therefore examines Boko Haram and the National Question in Nigeria and argues that it was the unresolved national question that snowballs into Boko haramism in the Nigerian polity. The research adopts the conspiracy theory as its framework of analysis. The study calls for the total democratization of the Nigerian state as one of the prerequisites and the sine qua non for addressing the negative consequences posed by the unresolved national question and its offshoot such as Boko haram and insecurity. The research posits that the term ‘indigenship’ should be de-emphasized and totally discouraged as it tends to deepen discord and acrimony which is capable of causing disintegration amongst Nigerians while emphasis should be placed on ‘citizenship’ as it tends to breed unity and collectivity. The term ‘residency’ should be emphasized and encouraged and should be used in place of ‘indigenship’ and be given constitutional backings with practical mechanisms for its application. The study therefore argues that, only when Nigerians agreed to come together, understand their differences and agreed to manage and live by it that peace and unity can be brought back in the country. The research therefore recommends that political contest should not be anchored on the basis of place of origin and indigeneship rather on meritocracy and performance records.

Key Words: Boko Haram, Unresolved National Question, Insecurity, Nigeria’s Unity, Ethnic identities

Introduction
Nigeria as a country has often been in the dilemma of confronting the conflict of ethnic contradictions and incompatibility in the past 50 years. According to Bamidele:

“A geographically demarcated piece of land called Nigeria came to being in 1914 when the Northern and Southern protectorates were merged together by the then Governor-General, Lord Lugard. And with coming together of over 400 ethnic groups forcefully against their own volition, tendencies are there for contradicting behaviours and conflicting ways of relating to one another” (Bamidele, 2011).

It is argued that the necessary pre-requisites needed for the creation of a country was lacking in the Nigeria situation. The necessary nitty-gritty needed for the peaceful coexistence of a country was missing in the case of Nigeria. For this reason, numerous writers have expressed their views as regard the unification and the togetherness of the country Nigeria. Notable amongst them was the late sage, Obafemi Awolowo, in his book titled “Path to Nigerian Freedom” in 1947, he argued that:
Nigeria was a mere geographical expression. There were no Nigerians as there were French and Germans.

This view opined by Awolowo gives us two assertions in accordance with this study that the term ‘Nigeria’ was not necessary ab initio and that the term ‘Nigeria’ does not exist in reality. This argument is underpinned by the avalanche of crises that have befallen the country Nigeria right from its inception and designation. According to Otite (1990), the viewpoint of Awolowo can only still mean that one could not speak of Nigeria as a society with a national identification in the same sense as one could speak of say the Katsina emirate, or the Kingdom of Benin or Ife. Awolowo argued that Nigeria being a multi-national or polyethnic society could not be regarded as one nation. Awolowo was always known to have asserted that one could not be a good Nigerian if he was not a good Yoruba, Igbo or Hausa first.

According to Adesina (2011), in his back page column on Daily Sun captioned: Constitution review and unfinished matters, where Adesina recalled a conversation between two of our founding fathers, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Ahmadu Bello, as contained in a book, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto written by N. Paden. According to him, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe had told Ahmadu Bello: “let us forget our differences…..” to which the letter replied: “No, let us understand our differences.” I am a Muslim and a Northerner; you are a Christian, an Easterner. By understanding our differences, we can build unity in our country”. Bello was further quoted as admitting that the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates as “mistake of 1914” (Adesina, 2011 cited in Bamidele, 2012).

The study thus aims at unraveling the cause of Nigeria disunity and the avalanche security problems bedeviling the country on the failure to have addressed the unresolved national question. According to Anthony Enhaoro, the failure of Nigeria so far may be attributed in great part to the perennial tensions and conflicts among its nationalities, resulting from mutual insecurity, poverty, jealousies and fears. He further argued that rather than manage primordial identities, which are our nationalities, positively, successive constitutions have studiously and dismissively ignored them. But as disillusionment with the Nigeria project has grown, it is to these celebrated identities that the people have begun to look for refuge. Thus the nationalities that the colonial invaders thought they had buried have forced themselves back into our collective consciousness. No amount of blank repetitions of hollow appeals to unity can change those realities (Enhaoro, 2002). This argument is consolidated by the vigorous campaigns carried out by diverse ethnic groups that they should produce the successor of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan that is if he decides not to re-contest. It should be noted that the basis of this campaign is not anchored on meritocracy or performance records but on the place of origin of the successor and this has further deepening disunity amongst Nigerians.

Long before the creation of Nigeria the entity called Nigeria, the various people that existed independently then had established their own indigenous systems of administration and governance. There were in place recognize political entities such as the Benin Empire, Kanem Bornu Empire, Sokoto Caliphate, Oyo Empire, to mention a few. The empires and kingdoms had established contact with one another and with other people through trading activities. There were peaceful administrative patterns and leadership styles were predicated on hereditary and sometimes revolves around ruling families. Political succession was non-confictual during this period. It should be noted however, that Boko Haram insurgency became worse after 2011 general elections and it is becoming more worsen as the 2015 general elections get closer as interest in this said election increases unprecedentedly and as such, hitting up the polity. This study
therefore underpins the advocacy of true federalism as it will help preeminently in addressing the unresolved national questions such as unity in diversity, the adaptation of the principles of derivation in the sharing of national wealth as it was done in the past when agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the role of the military, the powers and roles of the police force, the respect for human rights, the implementation of equitable federal character principle, the redrafting of the constitution by the people of Nigeria (themselves), the enthronement of meritocracy, the issue of indigenship and citizenship, the respect for rule of law and the independent of the judiciary, and the respect of ethnic identities and the encouragement of unity in diversity, etc. all these and more constitute the basic unresolved national question.

It should be noted however, that the failure of the state to address the foregoing has led to the serious insecurity situation in Nigeria which gave rise to different militia groups and sects and most recently, the emergence of Boko Haram.

In his introduction to Billy Dudley’s posthumous book (1982:8), A.D. Yahaya stated that:

The political future of the country as one indivisible nation is resolved with the end of the civil war.….. It is therefore not conceivable for the present generation of Nigerians who were so much part of the struggle for the survival of the federation to resuscitate the unity of the country as a political issue. The major political issue today is therefore, not the unity of the country (Dudley, 1982 cited in Mustapha, 1986).

The events in Nigeria since 1983, such as the No Nation!No Destiny! Broadcast of the FRCN Kaduna; the acrimonious and chauvinistic campaigns associated with the 1983 elections; the incessant disputes over the question of federal character; and the debacle over Nigeria’s affiliation to the Organization of Islamic Countries tend to suggest that the unity of the country cannot be taken for granted (Mustapha, 1986). The issue of Nigeria which is a multi-religious country, affiliating to the Organization of Islamic Countries against the general wish of other religions suggests that the unity of the country was actually taken for granted and this has been reverberated and cemented by the recent upsurge of Boko haram incessant killings of Christians in places of worship in the Northeastern region suggesting that Nigeria is a monolithic-religion as against what is reasonably attainable. Mustapha argues that the Civil war did not resolve the National Question in Nigeria. What is true is that the Nigerian state was able to overcome a specific challenge of its integrity. This does not, however, mean that no future challenges or probable, or that the state will always have the capacity to overcome such challenges. The emergence of Anya Anya II in the Sudan was a case in point. The unity of the country cannot therefore, be necessarily guaranteed by the state as currently constituted (Mustapha, 1986).

What is now referred to as the “National Question” arose from the diverse characters of Nigeria as a plural and multi-ethnic society. The notion is traceable to the structural defects and imbalances created by the amalgamation in 1914 of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria to form a unified colony of the British Empire (Vanguard, 2013). The amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates and the Lagos colony to form a single protectorate - the protectorate of Nigeria is also responsible for the disunity and the security challenges being faced by the country. There are numerous factors responsible for the present threat to disintegration and the security problems ravaging the country ‘Nigeria’ - these are religion, ethnic affiliation and identity, imbalance federation, political loyalty and propaganda, citizenship and indigenship, educational imbalance, economic inequality, justice system, etc.
Conceptual Clarification

Before analyzing the unresolved National questions and its offsprings such as insecurity and Boko Haram, it is pivotal to first clarify the key concepts used in this study.

The National Question

The term “National Question” refers to the oppression of nations, nationalities and/or minorities within nations (Aborisade, 2013). The National question according Odion-Akhaine (2000) involves the unresolved contradictions in the society that have continued to entrench Nigeria in a vicious circle of crises. The national question posed politically refers to the right to self determination including the right to secession. This meaning is necessitated due to the oppression of some ethnic nationalities by others in a multi-ethnic setting as Nigeria (Odion-Akhaine, 2000). It is a truism however, that the sum total of conflict, unemployment, insecurity, and the subsequent emergence of Boko Haramism is as a result of the failure of the Nigerian state to address the unresolved national questions. The pivotal questions to be asked and subsequently analyzed are as follows: Are Nigerians really Nigerians; were they interested to be amalgamated together; are their ethnic identities respected over national identity; Does Nigeria belong to certain ethnic groups while others are denied sense of belonging; Are Nigerians proud of being Nigerians or their ethnic groupings such as the Igbos, Hausas, Yorubas, Ijaws, Itsekiris, Ukwanis, Ibibios, etc. Is a religion superior to the other religions; Are they compatible i.e., are they to be operated in a single geographical entity or they should be in a distinct territorial entities? Can a Yoruba man become a governor in an Igbo land or can an Igbo man become a governor in Hausa Land? All these questions, issues and more constitute the unresolved National Question begging for resolution.

According to Mustapha, the objective basis of the National question lies in the educational, economic and political inequalities of the Nigerian society. However, these inequalities in themselves would not be too problematic except when seen within the context of the class dynamic of Nigerian society. It is the class nature of Nigerian society that gives these inequalities their specific meaning within the context of the national question. Apart from the contradiction between Nigeria and imperialism, those between the northern and the southern parts of the country, and those between the majority nationalities, have been politically the most decisive. Specifically, these contradictions have manifested themselves in a series of inequalities which have assumed logic of their own, and today inform much of the dynamics of the politics of the National Question. While the internal dimension of the National Question might be expressed in linguistic, cultural or regionalist terms, its objective basis lies in these material and political inequalities, and understanding of their evolution is vital for their transcendence (Mustapha, 1986).

These inequalities revolve around - education, economic, political and social inequalities. In the view of Akwara, et al. (2013), the vast majority of Nigerians have always reduced the national question to contradictions and antagonism between the various ethnic nationalities in the country. In order words, they see the national question in terms of inter-ethnic hostilities only. But the national question is far bigger and more complex than this. The national question is a big complex of political, economic, ideological, cultural, historical, religious, legal and other problems that arise during a people’s struggle for liberation and for favourable internal and external conditions for future development; and also in the course of establishing equal, friendly
relations between them and others (Akwaro, et al, 2013). The National Question is tied to the erosion of the state and its failure to meet the needs of the citizens, often by exclusion, marginalization and injustice in securing and protecting lives and welfare of the various groups inhabiting the national space (vanguard, 2013). Some of the sub-categories of these questions include: to what extent do citizens and groups feel a sense of identity with the Nigerian state? Does the state protect our interests? Is justice and fairness preserved in the manner in which the state relates to every section of the citizenry? To what extent is justice dispensed in the extradition and distribution of the proceeds of resources extracted in certain territories of the state? Onyeoziri (2010:10) observes that the national question “afflicts many political systems, hardly has a final solution, is complex or multi-dimensional in nature, and is historically contingent”. The study therefore argues that the complete democratization of the Nigerian state is the basis and condition for the solution of the national question and its attendant negativity.

**Bokoharamism**

The term “Boko Haram” has generated a lot of public discourse as it tends recently to be a term regularly mentioned not only in the mouths of Nigerians but also, citizens of other part of the world. Since the return to democratic rule in May 1999, Nigeria has witnessed a number of security challenges associated with militancy, armed robbery, kidnapping, political assassinations, arms proliferation, piracy and ethno-religious conflicts. However, the outbreak of Boko Haram uprising in July 2009 heralded new security challenges in the country (Afeno, 2013). The group’s official name is jama’atu AhlisSunna Lidda’awatiwal Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad”. It earned its nickname “Bokoharam” - meaning Western Education is evil from the teachings of its founder Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2003, in the restive northeastern city of Maiduguri the capital of Bornu State.

According to Yusuf, western education, or ‘boko’ brought nothing but poverty and sufferings to the region and was therefore forbidden, or ‘haram’, in Islam. He began peacefully mostly preaching and quickly gained followers among disaffected young men in the northeast. But his anti establishment rhetoric and hints that Boko Haram was building an arsenal of weapons also caught the attention of the authorities (Okpaga, etal, 2012). The activities of Bokoharam with its incessant killings of innocent Nigerians and the threat to declare Nigeria an Islamic state in a country conglomerated by Christians, Muslims and traditionalists underpins the assertion that Nigerians have never agreed to live together and this brings us to the issue of the unresolved national questions.

According to Alozieuwu (2012), the challenge posed by the Bokoharam sect in Nigeria is not only about viciousness of either its terror campaigns, or the sect avowed mission to impose Islamic law to the country but about the confusion regarding the exact causes of the violence. It is pivotal to note that before the advent of colonialism, there were no conflict between Islam and Christianity. Prior to the advent of colonialism with its attendant incursion of the British rule and the subsequent subjugation of the African continent, there were in existence in most African enclaves or cultural distinct entities, local administrative machineries anchored upon traditional institutions. In order words, one can adduce that it was the advent of colonialism and the subsequent mistake of 1914 which led to the bringing together the North and the South who had distinct life styles and religious beliefs in one geographical condition that occasioned the incessant crises experience presently in the country. How a religion could believe to be superior
to the other religions? The maiming and bombing of places of worship of the Christians is an indication that Islam and Christianity are proven to be incompatible and the amalgamation of both is really catastrophic and a “mere geographical expression” as opined by Obafemi Awolowo.

The Islamic theocratic state theory suffices as the Bokoharam sect has hardly masked its intention to bring down the Nigerian government, the Kufur system, and ultimately Islamize Nigeria (Alozieuwa, 2012) hence Lengmang’s (2011) documentation of the allegation that some segment of the Northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level Sharia coexisting side by side with a secular federal system. Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, “they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence”. He attributes resentment to the Sharia coexistence with secular federal system to the view by many northerners that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region, and so shares the fallacy of western education being incompatible with Islam; all stemming from conspiracy (Anyadike, 2013). The study thus argues that if the emergence of Bokoharam is to annihilate western education and its features for bringing underdevelopment in the region then such argument is faulty as most of the gadgets, and technological devices used by this insurgent group are product of western educational researches and discoveries. Bokoharam’s successive destructions, attacking and killing of innocent Nigerians would have been futile if not for western educational scientific discoveries. The machine guns, the IEDs, Rocket Propelled Launchers, the phones used by them for terrorists’ communication etc are all discoveries of western scientific educational researches. The study therefore opines that it was the imbalance federal system operated in Nigeria, religious extremism, failure to identify unity in diversity, the preference of indigenship to citizenship, place of origins, ethnicism and tribalism etc are what constitute the unresolved national question that has snowball into Bokoharamism and not necessarily the evil nature of western education as propagated by the sect.

**Insecurity**

Insecurity as a concept will be best understood by first analyzing the concept of security. It is the failure of security that gives rise to insecurity. A nation that is engulfed with numerous security challenges is far from attaining the status of development and democratic ethos.

According to Omoyibo and Akpomera (2013), security is a concept that is prior to the state, and the state exists in order to provide that concept. Security is the prime responsibility of the state. Nigeria’s developmental problem is tied to the avalanche security challenges bedeviling the country in recent time. According to Dipo Kolawale (2004), Africa as a continent has often been in the dilemma of confronting the conflict of relevance in a world in which the developed (rich) nations dictate to the developing (poor) ones. It is a conflict engendered by a combination of factors which include but apparently are not limited to historical antecedent, multi-nationalism, multi-culturalism, multi-ethnicism, economic poverty and poverty of planning (Igbokwu, etal, 2012). The study therefore argues in line with the assertion above that the security problem bedeviling the country can be linked to the multi-cultural, multi-national, multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria society. And also the problem of economic poverty and poverty of planning cannot be left out. All these issues are intricately tied with the issue of the unresolved national question in addendum, to the corruptive lifestyle of the Nigerian government.
For many African countries, this dilemma is even more acute and pronounced. Faced with a growing increase in population explosion (Ogunleye-Adetona, 2010) and a corresponding decrease in economic productivity and political accountability, occasioned by many years of higher level political corruption, bad governance, weak institutions and absence of the wherewithal to transform their human and material resources, these countries turned into veritable incubation centers for the emergence of violent anti-state groups whose deriving ideology, it would seem, is antagonism against their states (Stem & Ojendal, 2010 cited in Katsina, 2012).

In the view of Akin (2008), security refers to “the situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measures for the protection of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions”. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without and threats to their lives or properties (Achumba, et al, 2013). It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violence occurrence (Ogunleye, et al, 2011). Igbuzor (2011) noted that security demands safety from chronic threats and protection from harmful disruption.

What constitutes security in modern times is a question that has never been answered satisfactorily by scholars. It perception even within one community varies in time (Ejogba, 2006 p.305). For instance, until recently, most of the mainstream writings on security studies literally defined it in terms of a state’s capabilities to defend its territorial integrity from threats, actual and imagined, as well as acts of aggression from other potential enemies (Okwori, 1995 p. 20).

However, states build and equip armed forces towards achieving this goal. The main assumption of this conception is that threat of violence, and the actual ability to commit violence by a state, against an enemy successfully defers threats and aggression (Rouke, 2005, p.308: Alabi, 1997, p.129). At the domestic level, the belief is that internal law enforcement agencies and other instruments of domestic intelligence are all that is required for a state to be secured (Katsina, 2012). It is a truism however, that a secured state is a prerequisite and a sine quanon for development.

On the other hand, insecurity is the contrast or antithesis of security. According to Beland (2005), insecurity is “the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection”. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security (Achumba, et al, 2013).

According to Jegede (2011), the insecurity situation in the country has led many to wonder if Nigeria has not returned to the state of nature where, according to Thomas Hobbes, life was solitary, nasty, brutish and short. Adah (2011) compliments Jegede’s position when she made her observation known that public functions are now held amidst tight security and that the Nigerian government has failed to secure itself not to talk of securing the “common man” as enshrined in section 14(2c) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Evidently, as Igbuzor (2011) observed that the state of insecurity in Nigeria is greatly a function of government failure, or can be linked to government failure. While this assertion is true, there is no doubt however, that the failure of government to provide adequate security needed to run a democratic government as in the case of Nigeria is tied with the inability and incapacity of the federal government to resolve and address the unresolved National question which has pre-eminently given rise to the serious security problem bedeviling this country.
Hazen and Horner (2007) described the Nigerian situation as a ‘paradox of plenty’. A situation where the country earns a great deal of revenue through oil sales, but fails to use these earnings to meet the needs of its people and to develop infrastructure as well as the economy. When this situation exists, crime rate is bound to rise and the security of lives and properties cannot be guaranteed (Achumba, et al, 2013).

From all the foregoing analyses so far, the study tends to argue that the dereliction and deficiencies of the federal government to provide a secured atmospheric condition for Nigerians was as a result of its failure to remedy the origin of the problems ravaging the country. All the problems and reasons put forward by scholars to be responsible for the avalanche security problem bedeviling the country are directly or indirectly tied to the failure of the government to address the national question. A situation where the people inhabiting a geographical entity have not agreed to live together ab initio, any policy or effort put together by the government of the day that is meant to address the problem at the surface level without tackling the problem from its origin is just an exercise in futility.

Theoretical Framework

Given the primary focus of this study, the conspiracy theory has been adopted. A conspiracy theory is an explanatory proposition that accuses two or more persons, a group, or an organization of having caused or covered up, through secret planning and deliberate action, illegal or harmful event or situation (see the Merriam-Webster Dictionary). This explanation above helps to provide a framework of analysis for this study as it is argued that the Bokoharam insurgency are being sponsored by powerful politicians to cause harmful event in the country. It is a clandestine malevolent arrangement sponsored by people who have penchant for mischief and to render havoc in the country which is capable of pushing the country into disintegration.

Some scholars suggest that people formulate conspiracy theories to explain, for example, power relations in social groups and the existence of evil forces (Bakun, 2004). It has been suggested by some thinkers that conspiracy theories have chiefly psychological or socio-political origins. Proposed psychological origins include projection; the personal need to explain a significant event (with) a significant cause and the product of various kinds and stages of thought disorder such as paranoid disposition, ranging in severity to diagnosable mental illness. Similarly, socio-political origins may be discovered in the need of people to believe in event causation rather than suffer the insecurity of a random world and universe (Fox, 2009; Goertzel, 1994; Douglas, et al, 2008; Hofstadter, 1964; Hodapp, et al, 2008; Cohen, 2010). It is pivotal to note that the socio-political, ethnical and cultural origin of insecurity problem in Nigeria needs to be discovered in order to find a lasting solution to the problem of insecurity in the country. Attempt should be made at resolving and addressing the primary source of the conflict which originated as a result of the unresolved national question rather than tackling it from the secondary sources. The ethno-sociological diversity of the people inhabiting Nigeria ought to be recognized, identified and respected.

According to Ake (1996), socio-economic insecurity is one of the reasons that accounts for the identification of people with their respective ethnic groups. Therefore, their impoverished socio-economic situation coupled with their poor level of enlightenment, renders them vulnerable for easy mobilization by ethnic entrepreneurs (Kaur, 2007; Metumara, 2010).

The political scientist Michael Barkun, discussing the usage of this term in contemporary American culture, holds that a conspiracy theory is a belief which explains an event as the result
of a secret plot by exceptionally, powerfully and cunning conspirators to achieve a malevolent end (Barkun, 2004). In relation to this study, it is therefore argued that the advent of Boko Haram and the subsequent unprecedented increase of insecurity may be occasioned by disgruntled Nigerian politicians who felt that their interests in government are being threatened. For instance, it will be recalled that notable Nigerian politicians who lost elections have made statements that the nation would be ungovernable as a result of their defeat. They felt that elections were rigged with a view to infringing on their interests. In addendum to the above position, the various security operatives and institutions in Nigeria has also conspired to worsening the insecurity problem in Nigeria. No wonder Michael Parentis argued that:

“In most of its operations, the CIA is by definition a conspiracy using covert actions and secret plans, many of which are of the most unsavory kind. What are covert operations if not conspiracies? At the same time, the CIA is an institution, a structural part of the national security state. In sum, the agency is an institutionalized conspiracy” (Parenti, 1996).

In view of this assertion as it relates to the study, the Nigerian security agencies have been accused overtime to be conspiring with the Boko Haram sect with a view to worsening the insecurity problem currently bedeviling the country. For instance, the Nigerian Army has been accused of providing intelligence security report to the sect in order to aid their activities and also, the police force is not spare out as they have also been accused of conspiring with the members of the sect to frustrate and truncate democratic practices in the country. President Goodluck Jonathan himself has often stated that they are evidence that some members of his cabinet are Boko Haram apologists. The assertion of the President is entirely what conspiracy entails.

*Boko haramism, an Offshoot of the Unresolved National Question in Nigerian: The Dilemma*

Many of the issues and concerns that have come to assume the status of the national question and which are burning at the centre of national consciousness are traceable to the structural imbalance deficits and imbalance federalism evolving from the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates to form a unified colony by the colonial Governor - General, Lord Lugard in 1914. These imbalances have deepened and become reified into a skewed ontology enabling certain groups within the emergent state to persistently thrive and incur benefits from what ought to be a national communion to the exclusion of others even when these groups do not necessarily possess the material basis to justify such privileged advantage (Ekiti, 2012). In line with the above analyses, the study tends to unravel some of the unresolved issues begging for resolution in order to place Nigerian a peaceful atmospheric condition. The study therefore attempts a rigorous look at these imbalances created by the colonial government and the Nigerian state as well and their offshoot and offspring, such as insecurity and Boko Haram. The research therefore examines some of the issues that ought to be settled and resolved in other to bring Nigeria in the peaceful path. This includes:

*Education*
Firstly, one legacy of disunity bequeathed in Nigeria by the British colonialists is the unequal educational development of the North and the South. The assumption of the iniquitous Boko Haram ideology, “Western education is evil” has its genesis in the once hostile attitude of the northern traditional rulers to that subject. A building with a faulty foundation would always be a dangerous one, the sad story of Nigeria (Akinola, 2014). According to Mustapha (1986), one of the most hotly contested issues in the National Question in Nigeria today is that of the access of educational facilities by the different nationalities and regional groups in the country, and the access to bureaucratic post and resources which educational qualifications make possible. It was Lugard’s view that in the Southern parts of the country which were the first points of colonial contact:

...education seems to have produced discontent, impatience of any control and an unjustified assumption of self-importance in the individual...The local press, inspired by a ...misdirected education, is... doing much grievous harm... by...its invective against all Government action.

It was the introduction of western education in southern Nigeria that ushered in some form of awareness that saw southerners objecting to the colonial government exploitative style that actually discouraged them in subsequent introduction of same in the Northern Nigeria. Mustapha argued that, Christian missions were the major agency for the advancement of western education in southern Nigeria and their exclusion from most of the Muslim North was ostensibly in keeping with British promises not to temper with the religious life of the people at the time of the colonial conquest. However, one wonders if the reason why Boko Haram sect designated western education as being evil was as a result of the educational imbalance between North and South created by the British colonial masters as the reason for their action, then one would be forced to argue that even when the colonial administration finally introduced an educational system of its own into Northern Nigeria, that system was diverted by the pre-colonial Northern aristocrats in collaboration with the colonial masters at benefitting the sons of the Northern aristocrats. This imperialist design by the British had the blessing of the emirate aristocracy who had a stake in maintaining an ignorant and superstitious populace, and which was also facilitated by the religious and cultural prejudices of the bulk of the population.

In the final analysis, the study therefore argues that the Boko Haram sect has no empirical basis to have channeled their grievances against the southern Christians in the North as they are not responsible for their educational woes. In other words, their destructive action should have been directed against their emirate aristocrats who collaborated with the British government in facilitating an imbalance educational system in Nigeria that is if the argument above is anything to go by with.

As a consequence, Northern Nigeria rapidly fell behind the South, in terms of the development of Western education during colonial and 5 years after colonial administration as shown by the table put forward by Adamu in 1973.

Table One: Secondary School Output in Northern and Southern Nigeria, 1906 - 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SCHOOL</th>
<th>PUPILS IN ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>SOUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, it is pivotal to note that the colonial masters should be indicted mostly in terms of the disparity in the educational fortunes between the North and the South. As Adamu writes:

*Until 1931, the most important aspect of Northern education was obedience and respect. In Katsina College, it was good character not academic achievement that was considered in awarding certificates. There was no examination.*

The dynamics of this inequality in education is such that some Nigerian Patriots of Northern origins have come to the conclusion that the educational gap is unbridgeable (Adamu 1969, cited in Mustapha, 1986). This educational imbalance created by the colonial government in collaboration with the Northern Pre-colonial aristocrats also form part of the unresolved national question.

**Citizenship Vs Indigenship**

Secondly, another issue bedeviling the peaceful coexistence of Nigeria is the issue of citizenship and indigenship which also form part of the unresolved national question.

One of the undoings of Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, is the stifling problem of “indigeneity” as conditioned by the citizen law. Indigeneity and problems of citizenship in Nigeria make a person born and bred in Lagos, Ibadan, Kano, or any other part of the country not a true member of his society, contrary to what is obtained in the United States and other “developed” countries. This is because an Igbo man cannot contest and win governorship election in Katsina state or a Hausa man, with Nigerian citizenship status, cannot contest election in Lagos and win, even though he was born and bred there and has contributed to its development. An Itsekiri man living in Oyo state for over 25 years making necessary contributions to the development of the state, is not regarded as an indigene of the state, irrespective of the number of years he has spent in Oyo state, he and all members of his family are still regarded as settlers and non-indigenes, hence, they cannot have access to or benefit from what is purely reserved for the indigenes, even if such indigenes have not been in Oyo State for over 30 years (Eniola, et al, 2012).

The negative consequences of ethnic conflict in Nigeria have stimulated the debate which is hinged on contestable issues such as the dichotomy between citizenship and indigenship. The term “citizen” typically refers to any person who owes allegiance to a sovereign state and thereby receives certain protection with that state (Renne, 2014). Citizenship, according to Cambridge International Dictionary of English is a state of being a member of a particular country and having rights as a result of this.

On the other hand indigene is used in Nigeria to distinguish natives of a particular part of Nigerian from other Nigerian citizens found in that locality. It is also used to confer special privileges which are beyond the reach of non-natives on the natives. According to Renne (2014), while trying to distinguish indigeneship from citizenship, held that indigeneship is a natural link between a person and a geographical location (his ancestral home) where he traces his roots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>9,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>3,643</td>
<td>28,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>15,276</td>
<td>180,907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from Mustapha 1986:85
through a blood lineage and genealogy that puts him in contact with his kin and kindred, citizen is a man-made arrangement that seek to confer on a person certain rights that are enjoyed by all persons in a certain geographical location.

The study therefore argues that the dichotomy between citizenship and indigeneship has gone a long way in establishing division and conflict which has further ensured the need for disintegration. The problem of indigeneity manifests in numerous ways such as employment, promotions, admission into schools, favouritism and even appointment of people into positions across the country. This problem also manifests in the tactics used by Bokoharam in causing havoc in the country. For instance, they tend to attack non-indigenes of the Northern extractions and places owned by Christians who are considered as alien in those areas. A good example of this is the kidnapping of students in Chibok Local Government Area in Bornu State. The argument here is that, according to research made, 90% of the students kidnapped are Christians who are considered as non-natives of the area.

Only in Nigeria do you hear of citizens, being deported out of states where they reside to states that are considered as their places of origins. The poor, destitute and disheveled, are being packed from the streets and deported to where it thought they are ethnically affiliated. A recent analogy of this was the Lagos State government’s action to have deported many Igbo’s which they caught on the street to their places of origin. This action is barbaric, antediluvian and totally condemnable.

The Nigerian constitution, chapter IV which talks more on Fundamental Human Rights holds in section 41 (1) that:

Every citizen of Nigerian is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and resides in any part therefore, and no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit therefrom.

It is pertinent to note that why the 1999 constitution is outrightly against any form of segregation and discrimination, the constitution has further aggravated and compounded it by not providing means for full implementation of the rights of citizens. This has further repudiated the universal acceptability of the constitution as a mere paper work and a theoretical expression of the ruling class without adequate mechanism for its practicalization.

This denial of the constitutional and inalienable rights of many Nigerians in residing in places other than their homeland has a profound implication on Nigerian’s unity and enormous consequences of national cohesion and this and more form the basis of the unresolved National question which has further worsened the security situation in the country.

**Fiscal Federalism**

Thirdly, another problem bedeviling Nigeria’s unity and which also constitutes the unresolved national question is the problem of Fiscal Federalism. In 1948, Governor Richards noted that the creation of Nigeria as a single country was by accident by the British sovereignty. He argued that it is still far from being a single country or one nation socially or even economically, as there are deep differences between the major tribal groups. They do not speak the same language and they have divergent customs and ways of life and they represent different stages of culture (Ifesinachi, 2006). Nigeria problem of unity and federalism have been a recurring decimal right from colonial and post-colonial eras.
From its originating instance, the choice of the federal option as a platform for sharing power across the divergent national entities bounded by the British was never an altruistic one (Gana, 2003), as unique political expediencies shaped the consensus of the 1954 constitutional process between the colonial state functionaries and the “nationals” in agreeing to toe the line of a federal arrangement. Thus, while the colonial operatives considered this as a system that would reassure their allies within the Northern Oligarchy of continuity in progressing at their own pace, the southerners, who were basically at the vortex of the anti-colonial struggle regarded federalism as a means of attaining sovereign independence (Ekiti, 2012).

It should be noted however, that the Nigerian nationalists who negotiated and bargained with the colonial masters to adopt federalism were somehow myopic in foreseeing the possibilities of inter-ethnic competition eroding the attempt towards national integration. As noted by Eleazu (1979):

*The ‘founding fathers’ of Nigeria adopted federalism as a pragmatic instrument for holding together the entity called Nigeria... They thought that through federalism they would maintain unity in diversity; that within the federal structure the diverse ethnic group can be welded into a modern nation. They were full of hopes for this country...but by 1966, the hope was blighted.*

However, Revenue allocation and fiscal federalism has generated debates, agitations and counter agitations by political astronomers which have led to the constant review of the revenue allocation formula in the country. It is pivotal to note that revenue allocation which is an important segment of fiscal federalism has been given primacy in the history of Nigeria as it could be traceable to Governor Huge Clifford era. In fact, numerous commissions on revenue allocation and management have been formulated in Nigeria to fashion out scientific and universally acceptable formula for revenue allocation and derivation in Nigeria ranging from the 1929 Sir Graerme Thomson Recommendation, the 1935 Sir John Maybin Recommendation, the 1946 Sir Sydney Philipson Commission, the Sir John Hicks and Sir Sydney Philipson Review Commission which formed the main part of Sir Macpherson constitution of 1951, Sir Louis Chick Fiscal Commission of 1953, the Raisman Commission of 1958, the Binns Commission of 1964, the Dina Commission of 1967, the 1977 Professor Aboyaide Technical Committee and the 1979 Pius Okigbo Commission. All these systems of revenue allocation formula and derivation had received political and social lampooning from Nigerian citizens as they have failed abysmally in fashioning out generally acceptable revenue allocation and derivation formula for the country.

However, the constitutional amendment of 1999 recognizes the establishment of Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) which was established by the Federal Military Government. Since 1990 there have been slight changes on revenue allocation formula. By 1995 it was 48%, 24% and 20% for the federal, state and local government respectively while 7.5% was reserved for derivation. The current revenue sharing formula which has been in use since 2005 is as follows; Federal government 47.19%, State governments 31.10%, while 15.21% is for the local government and 6.5% Joint Management Fund (to be distributed as follows, ecology fund 1.5%, mineral development 1.75%, agricultural development 1.75% and 1.5% as reserved fund). Also, 13% derivation based on horizontal formula arrangement has to be provided from the state and local governments shares (Ugwu, 2009). It is pertinent to note that one of the
The principle of fiscal federalism are concerned with the design of fiscal constitutions - that is how taxing, spending, and regulatory functions are allocated among governments and how inter governmental transfers are structured. These arrangements are fundamental importance to the efficient and equitable provision of public services (Shan, ND). However, an ideal federal system should have independent revenue control mechanism. In order words, the states should be designated constitutional and practical powers to control/manage the resources emanating from their domains. It should be noted however, that this assertion, taking into cognizance Nigeria political development has been a mere theoretical postulation without practical application.

These anomalies ravaging Nigerian Political development has made this study to describe Nigerian federalism as a “misnormal” and a mere gimmick to hoodwink Nigerians. These and many more form the basis of the unresolved national questions begging for resolution.

Concluding Remarks

In the final analysis, the emergence of Boko Haram and its subsequent violent confrontation with the state is a direct consequence of the failure of successive governments in Nigeria to sincerely address human development and other pressing national issues which constitute the compact of national question. The current constitutional conference constituted by President Goodluck Jonathan which is currently on in Abuja with a view to addressing the problems ravaging Nigeria is just an exercise in futility. Its composition and terms of reference are faulty abinition. Apart from these loopholes, its decision will also be subjected to further scrutiny by the national assembly and as such has no empirical validation.

For a holistic notion of development to become the raison d’etre of the Nigerian state, there is need for the promotion of national consciousness. Every ethnic/tribal group should be given sense of belonging and tribalism/ethnicism should be de-emphasized while emphasis should be placed on nationalism and statism.

However, all Nigerian ethnic/tribal groups through their reliable representatives should come to the drawing board and should be given the opportunity to discuss if they really want to be together, their conditions and how they want themselves to be governed. Only this can a true, peaceful and developed Nigeria be achieved.

Recommendations

There should be a complete democratization of the Nigerian state prime a facie so as to douse insecurity tension currently ravaging the unity of the country.

All the various tribes and clans, social groups, pressure groups, professional organizations, market women and men, the deformed, in the country should adequately be represented in a sovereign conference to discuss how they want to be governed, the conditions, the issue of justice delivery, the issue of religious compatibility, revenue allocation and derivation, the issue of indigenship and citizenship, power relation, system of government, distribution of federal and state portfolios, human rights, people oriented constitution, economic development, equal educational development, Nigeria’s unity, etc. In addendum, each of these representatives should be elected or appointed by a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote by the body it is representing and subsequently be forwarded to the president for constitution. The appointment of
members of this conference should be independent from the president’s influence. And finally, the outcome of this conference must not be subjected to further legislative and executive scrutiny. Only then, a true country devoid of conflict and war would be established.

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Torture: A Crime against Humanity

Inam ul Haq

Abstract
The term torture is a generic concept and can be defined, debated and deliberated under various conditions, in diverse contexts and claims. There is no consensus among the scholars, practitioners about the meaning of the term. It has been used as an investigative technique inflicted on a third person for the purpose of extracting information or confession. According to the United Nations Convention on 10 December 1984, Torture means any kind of act which causes severe pain or sufferings whether physical or mental and is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes obtaining information or a confession. This definition does not include “pain or suffering arising only from inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Torture has been used less against citizens, however, more often against the people who are not the members of society like slaves, foreigners, prisoners of war and members of racial, ethnic and religious outsider groups. However, in the twentieth century, the rises of liberal democratic states have caused a decrease in the practice of state torture against citizens. Increase in torture can be attributed to three developments in the twentieth century. This paper highlights the use of torture in a democratic country like India.

Keywords: Definitions, Torture, Coding of Torture, Conventions against Torture

Introduction
Torture can be defined as afflicting pains through the use of hot iron rods, electric shocks to genitals, removing fingernails, denying food, water or sleep for days or weeks. Torture is a kind of act to break individual’s will and has control over the victim’s body. Intention is a necessary condition for an act to be called as torture. The International Committee of Red Cross defines torture as existence of a specific purpose plus international infliction of severe suffering or pain, cruel or inhuman treatment for no specific purpose. The world medical association 1975 defines torture as the deliberate, systematic or infliction of physical or mental suffering by one or more persons acting alone or on the orders of any authority, to force another person to yield information (Jeremy 2010).

According to United Nations convention 10 December 1984, torture means any kind of act which causes serve pain or sufferings whether physical or mental is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes obtaining information or a confession. This definition does not include “pain or suffering arising only from inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions” (White 2009: Garcia 2009). During the earlier period torture has been used less against citizens, however more often against the people who are not the members of society like slaves, foreigners, prisoners of war and members of racial, ethnic and religious outsider group. However in twentieth century, the rises of liberal democratic states have caused a decrease in the practice of state torture against citizens. Increase in torture can be attributed to three developments in the twentieth century (a) changes in quality, intensity and nature of military conduct that led to an increase of torture against the prisoners of war. (b) the prevalence of civil conflicts in state divided along racial,
ethnic and religious lines increased torture. (c) changes in the nature have brought about an expanded definition of treason and states have also become more effective? (Einolf 2007).

Torture is a crime as it corrupts moral understanding of those nations who are practicing it and tends to radicalize the hearts and minds of communities to which the victim belongs. Studies have proven that State sponsored torture serves as a powerful tool for terroristic groups across the world and undermines counter-terrorism efforts (ibid, 2009). It is noteworthy, that terrorists and torturers shared a common objective that is to create fear. The question is why torture is wrong? Torture is considered a crime against humanity and is prohibited in an extensive range of human rights convention as according to the article 5 of the universal declaration of human rights (1948) declares that no one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment. Common article of Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits violence to life and person in particular, cruel treatment and torture and outrages upon personal dignity. Torture is also prohibited by European convention on Human Rights (1950), the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1969), the Inter-American convention to prevent and punish Torture (1985), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and Genocide Convention (1948) (Miller, 2009), perhaps the notable international agreement that prohibits the use of torture is the united nations convention against torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which obligates the use of torture and requires the punishment of torturers found within their territorial jurisdiction. And comes for signature in December 1984 and 140 states have signed the convention Garcia, 2009). According to United Nations convention, torture means any kind of act which causes severe pain or sufferings whether physical or mental is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes obtaining information or a confession. This definition does not include “pain or suffering arising only from inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions” (white, 2009, Garcia, 2009)). International covenant on civil and political rights (1996) states in article 7 that “no one shall be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment (Lee, 2007). Torture is of so many types like judicial, punitive, interrogational, dehumanizing, and terroristic. The interrogation practices employed upon by torturers are waterboarding, beating, electrocuting, burning and forcing sexual acts etc. The above mentioned United Nations convention identifies four reasons of torture.

- To obtain information
- To obtain a confession
- To punish
- To force the sufferer or others to act in certain ways (miller, 2009).

Torture in India

India is considered as world’s largest democracy. Still torture remains an embedded and often routine-law. In the name of investigation crimes, extracting information and punishing criminals, torture is inflicted upon them. According to national project on preventing torture in India (NPPTIs 2008) 1.8 million people fall victim to police torture. Each year in India the most vulnerable section of the society particularly Dalit women’s, religious minorities and poor are targeted (torture and impunity in India 2008). Since 2000, according to statics submitted to the Parliament by Ministry of Home Affairs, prison custody deaths increased by 54.02% by 2008. While police custody deaths increased by 19.88%.
Inam ul Haq 2014, 2(2):83-86

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<td>910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>1140</td>
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<td>1157</td>
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<td>2003-2004</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>1591</td>
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<td>1477</td>
<td>62.31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
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<td>96.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over all</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Torture in India, Asian Center for Human Rights Report

**Coding of Torture**

- By coding torture fell into six categories.
- Focus on intent, motivation or emotion
- Characteristics of the individual being tortured
- Conditions that gives rise to torture
- Judgments
- Focus on method
- Focus on outcome (Morrison, et: al, 2009 pg. no, 6).

**Definition of torture focus on intent, motivation or emotion**

By explaining victims falling in the category of intent, motivation or emotion refers to the result of torture, answering the question why people torture. Their response is to show openly the reasons of torture rather than the methods behind torture. This category has split in two large sub categories showing different kinds of intents (a) Destructive (b) Constructive. The purpose of torture as creating a destructive outcome describes two goals of torture

✓ To pressure or break a person.
✓ To cause pain.

It also describes torture as deliberate or willful and this indicates that torture is done for pleasure of the torturer imply sadism. The constructive intend defined torture as to gain something without indicating whether this goal is good or bad and identifies four goals like information, strategic advantages, self-gain and punishment. These four goals also define torture in their own way like the responses falling into information or compliance identifies torture as a way of extracting information or the victim should submit to the will of torturer. The victims that fall in the strategic advantages viewed torture as a tool of power or political interest. Self-gain indicates that there might be some goals when they use torture however they were not specific. Finally the victims coded into punishment viewed torture as a tool of punishment.
Definition of torture focusing on the victim

This category defines torture as the process used for responding to the conditions under which torture becomes implemented and focuses on attributes of victims such as helpless or powerless and unwilling and held against their will.

Judgmental definition

Judgmental category indicates how the respondent feels about torture or his views of its morality, justice or humanity. Under this category it is unclear whether the victim tolerated or rejected torture. In response to rejecting torture five types of justifications were coded into further sub categories. Those identify torture as
- Unnecessary
- Unlawful or unjust
- Immoral, inhuman, abusive
- Sadistic
- As a violation of human rights.

Definition of torture focusing on method and on outcome

These definitions focused on the method used to torture someone. It is used to get information and laid focus on hurting and harming which had sub categories (a) physical (b) psychological or abstract method. It also defines the outcomes of torture in a long perspective describing what happens after torture has occurred. (ibid2009).

Conclusion

In short torture is a crime and has been criticized by various international organizations, like United Nations Conventions, Inter-American Charter of Civil and Political Rights. Torture corrupts moral understanding. However torture may be justifiable in many ways like in time-bomb argument, robbery cases etc. Torture is prevalent in the whole world; however some countries are doing it in secret while others are doing it openly. In India torture is most probably done against the poor and against the women folk.

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NIGERIAN UNITY AND THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

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Abstract

The forthcoming 2015 general elections are going to be the most heated of all elections in Nigerian democratic history considering the war of words and pocket of violence traded between the two major political parties (ruling People’s Democratic Party-PDP and All Progressives Congress-APC). Therefore, the centrality of this paper deals with the consideration of the major hurdles facing Nigerian democratic consolidation at this moment. With the use of qualitative data, attempts have been made at seeing Nigeria's democratic transition, possible implications of the threat on Nigeria's national unity, hard-earned democratization, peace and security. The paper recommended that Nigerian unity should not be compromised with any personal, ethnic/regional and religious interest. It also maintained that the judiciary should stay up and resolves her independence and justice adjudication question so as to restore confidence and hope in political conflicts resolution. Adherence to all these and many others will keep Nigerians and its democracy one, after 2015 general elections.

Key words: Nigerian Unity, General Elections, Democracy, Election Rigging, Peace and Security

1. Introduction

As political animals that we are, nothing seems to have gripped the imagination of Nigerians as the issue of the coming 2015 general elections, which in my view is a watershed moment in the history of our dear country. The way we are able to handle this very important event will largely determine how successful we will be in our efforts at remaining a united, indivisible and stable country. Already, the fault lines are apparent and politicians are ready to exploit them to the fullest to achieve their sometimes not so noble objectives. The North is determined to have it back and its leaders are pulling all the stops to see that that happens. On the other hand, the body language of the incumbent president strongly suggests he wants another term in office. The unfolding scenario may portend danger to our nation if Nigerians from all parts of the country do not close ranks and put the interest of the nation first. The post-election violence of 2011 should be a reminder that election matters in the country have become serious business, which must be handled with the utmost seriousness and patriotism in order to avoid repeat of history (Abubakar, 2014).

Nations from the four corners of the world are enthusiastically waiting the February 14, 2015 general elections in Nigeria. Though they do not live in Nigeria, they will be affected in one way or the other by who becomes the President basically that it is the largest hob of African economy. This is due to the view of Yusifu (1990) who noted that the current trend towards the democratisation of political regimes in Africa is creating openings which in spite of everything, may result in economic and political changes.

According to Jega (2001:1) Nigeria’s current transition to democracy commenced on May 29, 1999, at the end of General Abubakar’s short transition from military to civil rule, when President Obasanjo assumed power as an elected civilian Head of State and Government. For the past four decades, democracy has been an acceptable platform of intercourse among nations on the
international plane and that; it is also most widely acceptable system of governing the people. The global acceptability of democracy stems from its ideals and ethics that it equips itself with. Ajayi (1998), in Lawal and Oluwayode (2012:449) assumed that a major trend since the end of the cold war has been the enabling environment for enhancing the global propagation of the liberal democratic paradigm, incidentally, the democratic movement albeit rudimentarily, was flagged off in the colonial Nigeria with the benevolent introduction of the elective principle by the 1922 Clifford Constitution and invariably, through the introduction of party politics.

The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides a legal framework of Nigeria’s national unity. Specifically, section one under the General Provision in part one states that, Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state to be known by the name Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Therefore, Federalism has not been a reverberating achievement in Africa; although unitary regimes have had no improved testimony one promising political system has been the constantly federal and occasionally democratic government of Nigeria. According to Ademolekun and Kincaid (1991:173), the principal challenges facing Nigeria, which are not unlike those facing other heterogeneous African countries, are national unity, democratic politics, and socioeconomic development. This has become a test because; an incomplete democratic transition increases the risk of international and civil war in countries that lack the institutional capacity to sustain democratic politics. The combination of increasing mass political participation and weak political institutions creates the motive and the opportunity for both rising and declining elites to play the nationalist card in an attempt to rally popular support against domestic and foreign rivals (Mansfield and Synder, 2009: 381). More recently still, there have been waves of unrest in which erstwhile neighbours are pitted against each other and those assailed are told to ‘go home’ and are expelled from specific geo-physical spaces. Furthermore, the assailed ethnic groups are frequently referred to as ‘settlers’ by other groups who claim to be ‘indigenes’ of particular geo-political settings. In these contestations, the same language once used to rally Nigerians of diverse origins in the anti-colonial struggles has resurfaced (Alubo, 2001, in Alubo, 2004:136). Specifically, the nation building struggle is being further imperilled by these new challenges and contentions.

This work centres on the examination of the nature of major challenges to democratic consolidation, Nigeria's democratic transition, possible implications of the threats to Nigeria's national unity and hard-earned democratization; and prospective recommendations that will keep Nigerians and its democracy one, after 2015 general elections.

2. The Challenges

Nigeria’s democracy was 14 years on the 29th May, 2014 with no enormous news of transformation and little cause for celebration by the common people. The truth however is that within this phase, the country has recorded modest achievements in the;

- Maintenance of democratic and political stability,
• Creation of institutions that will support democratic governance, like the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigerian Legislative Institute, etc., and
• Formulation of economic policies aimed at improving human development.

However, the major challenge still remains the institutionalization of our democracy. After 54 years of independence and 14 years of continuous democratic rule, majority of Nigerians suffer from lack of basic amenities of life. One of the reasons is not farfetched from the mystified democratic system. At 54, Nigeria appeared to have derailed from the tracks of development. Igwokwe (2014:12) highlighted that a lot of people have blamed the presidential system of government which was adopted in 1979 as the major problem. He wondered if Nigeria would have done better if she had continued to practice the parliamentary system of government. In addition, they are run-away corruption; blood-cuddling terrorist activities and forms of insecurity; mind-boggling acts of impunity by those in the corridors of power; epileptic power supply; an all but collapsed economy, leaving on its trail a burgeoning army of unemployed youth; decrepit infrastructure; to mention but a few. These issues in the view of Bolarawole (2014:17) are well known to Nigerians. Categorically, this assertion is made in corroborated that;

Elections in Nigeria have historically been conflict ridden. The campaigns preceding elections are invariably marked by pettiness, intolerance, and violence. Already there are several reported incidences of intra-party, as well as, inter-party violence, conflicts, including abductions and assassinations. And the elections and their outcomes have often been neither free nor fair, characterized by violations of the process (both inadvertent and wilful), corrupt conduct by officials, rigging of results and so on. Again, reports indicate that incidences of these were pervasive during the party primaries, and that some candidates are busy scheming to ensure a favourable outcome for themselves, by hook or crook, in the oncoming elections (Jega & Ibeanu 2007, in Unanaw and Ogbadule, 2014:12).

In the submission of Udama and Unale (1993); Akhojie (1996); Edeh (1999); Ogbonaya (2000); and Gbinijie (2014), the Nigerian so-called democratic mood and modality is in contrast to the definition and tenets of democracy. It is a consummate misnomer. It can be specifically noted that, democracy in Nigeria is the wresting and larceny of power by rigging, thuggery, assassinations, Kidnapings and total Machiavellian acrobatics together with the stealing of power by a criminal league, concourse and clique called Political Party for and through their individual members leading to the pauperization of the franchise and breach of all tenets of universal adult suffrage (Gbinijie, 2014).

2.1 Absence of Democratic Dividends

The symptoms of the old corrupt dictatorship are again so early, rearing their heads. In the...National Assembly composed largely of former active supporters and apologists of military dictatorship, legislative bills to alleviate corruption and economic deprivation are being ignored. The various vote-catching populist steps taken by the incoming successors are dying just as soon as they have been proclaimed with fanfare. ...strategic power still resides in the hands of former actors in the old dictatorship. The general mood among the people and in the land is that of sagacity. The claim of liberation will depend on real and substantial economic and social alleviation of the people who have suffered so much and who have been
oppressed so much throughout decades of successive brutal dictatorships in the country (Edeh, 1999:5).

Delivering of democratic dividends is in two perspectives. First is the creation and maintenance of basic infrastructural facilities on one hand, and another is the democratic institutions like:

- The Judiciary,
- Security Agencies,
- Constitutionalism and the law,
- Independent National Electoral Commission, and
- The Civil Society Organizations.

Unfortunately, the way and manner in which democratic system is operated in Nigeria is a type that is remote from its philosophy and ideals. Therefore, Fagbohun (2013:15) believed that there are no essential basic amenities of life even in amidst of (14years) uninterrupted democratic rule and there is practically no democratic culture in Nigeria. The dividends of democracy as they often advertised are tokens and far below anticipation of the majority of Nigerians. Trivialities are presented as proof and special favours being done to the hapless victims of poor governance or lack of governance in the name of ‘dividends of democracy’. Komolafe (2008:2) vividly pictured this notable issue when he said that;

There have been occasions when state governments advertised regular “payment of salaries” to civil servants in their employment as “achievement”. You may wonder if a governor that collects billions of naira from the Federation Account monthly without any worthwhile capital projects being executed should not least pay a few thousands of civil servants who, in most cases, do not earn living wages. In another State when the government should be telling the people how many thousands of pupils have been enrolled into tens, if not hundreds, of quality schools and recruitment of thousands of teachers, the government was inaugurating the renovation of 50-year old school as a ‘dividend of democracy’. Rather than come up with how the government has reduced the percentage of households without pipe-borne water from say 80percent to even 50 percent, the government would be celebrating the drilling of five boreholes as achievements. We do not hear stories of how tens of communities have been provided with primary healthcare centres, what we hear is the loud noise celebrating how government repaints the building of a hospital that was built in the First Republic. Potholes are filled in few dilapidated roads and a day is then set-aside in the business of governance to inaugurating them. Even in colonial days, road rehabilitation used to be routine affair of the Public Works Department (PWD) all over the country.

The annual celebration of deceit in the name of “dividends of democracy” is actually an indication of an acute crisis of conceptualisation of development. Expansion and rehabilitation which characterises the democratic anniversary across the three tiers of government poses challenge to democratic sustainability and accountability in Nigeria. If the performances of Ahmadu Bello (in the North), Obafemi Awolowo (in the West) and Michael Okpara (in the East) were like what are today celebrated as “dividends of democracy”, no one would be invoking their names with utmost reference (Komolafe, 2008:3).
In the same development, the extent to which Nigerian government has consistently damaged the democratic values is incontrovertible. To this end, Ali (2013) noted that political party is peopled by individuals who have no business doing the State work. He added that they are bunch of rogues and charlatans who are bent on actualizing anti people’s agenda with the instrument of the state. To them democracy is an enterprise, and making money of which it is normal and an accepted corollary.

One thing Nigerian politicians are skillful at doing is stealing from the treasury and scheming to perpetuate themselves in office. They are careless and would go extra mile to achieve this political greed even if it entails shedding the innocent blood. The interests of the people are always in jeopardy. Political alliances are formed to foster and to perpetuate selfish political goal; strategizing on how best to further plunder the national resources and treasury. This has been the colour of Nigeria democracy from the first republic (Ali, 2013).

In Nigeria political system, patronage and rent-seeking are way of life. Those who are in government are desperate to hold on to power at all cost while those who want to come on board are going about it in a do or die manner. Hence, Nigeria’s political temperature is always at a boiling point, the essence of service is largely misunderstood. Those who seek public office do so for egocentric reasons ranging from stealing to personal enrichment at the detriment of helpless Nigeria. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no fundamental difference between the so called democratic rule in Nigeria and the hitherto practiced military rule. In this ugly situation, it is difficult if not impossible to talk about democratic ethics in Nigeria.

Consequently, fourteen years into democratic and presidential system of government in Nigeria, it can be said that the country still requires very strong pillars for the sustenance of its democratization before it can eventually, arrive at democratic value orientations, assurance, patience and resilience to make these institution sustainable. Jega (2001:1) submitted that the efforts to build these pillars are daily confronted and challenged by substantial threats, which manifest themselves, for example, in the reckless misrule by elected officials, corrupt practices by public officials, insensitivity to and intolerance of opposing views and perspectives, communal and ethno-religious conflicts and general insecurity of lives and property, all of which creates apprehensions about the possibility of authoritarian reversal. Matters are not helped but are rather aggravated by the wide gulf which exists between the rhetoric and the reality of so-called international assistance for democratic sustainability, especially from the international actors who have made the exportation of democracy their thriving business. Jega emphatically stated accordingly that;

There is, of course, a strong relationship between good governance and democratic consolidation. It can be said the more purposeful, focused and concerted the move towards good under a civilian dispensation – defined in terms of transparency and accountability of public officials, responsible conduct, as well as their responsiveness to the demands need and aspirations of the governed – the greater the chances of successful democratic transition and consolidation. Conversely, the more public and elected officials exhibit irresponsibility, seem unaccountable and unresponsive to popular needs and aspiration, and the more poorly they conduct
themselves in governance and state-craft, the greater the threats to democratic consolidation and sustainability.

As a result the above, there seems to be this gnawing gap as pointed by Bolaji (2010) between the high quality of policy designs and the sincerity of public officials to implement these policies for the good of the people.

2.2 Political militancy

As a matter of fact, elections in the view of Biggins (2008) pose a few dangers. Achebe (Achebe, 2012:245) supported this view with an assertion that the political crisis in Nigeria across States of the federation is triggered by the usual corrupt practice in which individuals with lots of money and time to spare (many of them half-baked, poorly educated thugs) sponsor their chosen candidates and push them right through to the desired political position, bribing, threatening, and on occasion, murdering any opposition in the process. Another responsible factor is the use and dump manipulative tendencies of Nigerian political leadership. As a result of this, Iwundu, and Thom-Otuya (2013:18) said, when youths are unable to speak up to defend themselves and those who used them for their self-seeking political ambition, dump them after achieving their selfish ambition and fail to disarm them, the answer is not farfetched, it is to unleash terror and violence on their exploiters and cohorts. This explains why the rich are not happy. Again, Abbas (2012), in Fagbohun (2013:9) illustrates with emphasis that;

With unprecedented political thuggery and uncontrolled violence, characterized by wanton destruction of lives and property, election period in Nigeria is best described as warfare… Incidence of intra-party and inter-party conflicts and violence have led to endemic abductions and assassinations of opponents and innocent victims, flagrant and official rigging of election results. Further violations of established process have invariably transformed election periods in Nigeria to as a matter-of-do-or-die or a matter-of-life-and-death… or that of by hook or crook… This electoral politics has, of course signalled serious dangers for democratic and partisan politics in Nigeria.

One paramount reason for political thuggery is the wholesale determination of political lords to perpetrate themselves in power at whatever cost. Those who have tasted the sweetness of political power know that when they relinquish it, they are likely to live in frustration and regret throughout their lives. Therefore, they struggle to remain in power by exterminating all hindrances including human lives through the use of thugs (Abekhale and Tor-Anyiin, 2013:92).

Another obvious reason for political thuggery is the desire of the ruling class to plant unpopular candidates who would be a stooge and be manipulated to their advantage. They ensure that their candidate wins at all cost. This has given rise to the emergence of terrorist groups’ threatening the peace and unity of the country. Akukwe (2012) posited that;

The former Governor of Borno State Senator Ali Modu Sheriff recruited some members of the sect hitherto practicing their faith in relative peace, armed them and mobilized them as thugs to help him win re-election… Encouraged by the promise they unleashed mayhem on political opponents of the Governor and helped secure second term victory for Sheriff. The Governor, just like his colleagues all over the
country reneged on the promises to include them in power sharing. After successful rigging and thuggery operations no effort was made to retrieve the arms from the sect. With excess and idle munitions in the armoury the sect started a series of local attacks until fifth columnists infiltrated their ranks, gave them sophisticated trainings, fundings and intelligence. Other State Governors did the same in their respective States. Odili sponsored cults in Rivers state, Chimaroke had killer squad in Enugu State that put the fear of hell into people, Mbadinuju's Bakassi killed the NBA chairman and wife in Anambra State-the public reaction against it cost him the next elections. Yuguda has his own which he used against opponents in Bauchi State even in the recent past election. Alao Akala used NURTW touts he inherited from his political godfather Adedibu against opponents. Ibori in Delta State and Alameisigha in Bayelsa State all sponsored cults for electoral purposes. This use of thugs is the vogue among State Governors, the only difference between them and Borno State is that either the ring leaders were personally settled at the expense of their followers or they were intimidated and blackmailed into submission by security agencies of the various States.

This politically weird means of power acquisition as opined by Gbanijie (2014) has often given rise to despotism, political impunity, unthinkable corruption and fascism. There is also the unpleasant factor of the violence associated with partisan politics that is often designed to keep balanced, well educated, fair-minded Nigerians away (Achebe, 2012:245). Political leaders use armed intimidation against political opponents, sponsor various armed thuggery groups and they exploit State armed apparatus to give them cover. This is the kind of illegality that birthed Boko Haram terrorist which has maimed countless persons all over the northern States in Nigeria.

3. Democratic Transition

(True) democracy is the political principle and practice that recognizes the institutionalization of liberal structures of governance that enfranchises and gives the people the rights to elect and impeach/recall their leaders. Consequently, Achebe (2012:245) educated that the question of choice in selecting a leader in Nigeria is often an academic exercise, due to the election rigging, violence, and intimidation of the general public, particularly by those in power, by those also with the means -- the rich and influential. Democracy concretizes the basis of their participation in the decision--making process and enhances their freedoms. Indeed, a government of the people, by the people for the people (Gbanijie, 2014).

Present democratisation process in Nigeria suffers from several problems which Aworolo and Lawal (2009:172) identified as:

- First, it is being carried out within inefficient and non-viable rules.
- Second, the process itself allows for manipulation of existing rules.
- Third, the counteracting agencies charged with policing and enforcement of the laws and those who work in those agencies are not properly constrained by the laws and INEC itself is not divested of this 'pathology' and as such cannot be relied upon to play a role expected of an umpire since it is the party in power that appoints its officials and funds its operation.
So it can be said that the masses-as the followership from Achebe (2012:245)’s perspective are concerned about—don’t really have a choice of leadership, because there’s not a true democratic process (sic).

4. National Unity: The threat and Consequences

We have resolved that we are not going to be the cause of Nigeria breaking up. But if others decide that the country should be divided, and they insist that Nigeria should break up, we won’t say no because we realise there is nothing we are getting in the current arrangement that other sections of the country are not getting. If they insist, why don’t we sit down and talk and at the end everybody agrees that Nigeria should be divided… let it be (Abdullahi, 2014).

Nigeria remains the most populous country in Africa with a diverse cultural legacy. Its’ population according to the 2006 census is over 160 million with not less than 250 ethnic groups with three (3) major dominants. The majority groups include the Hausa/Fulani in the North-East, the Yorubas in the South/West and the Igbo speaking people in the South-Eastern part. These groups because of their population opportunistic positions as explained by Abdulrahman (2006) in Abdullah and Saka (2007:22), have been seen as consistently dominating the political as well as economic scene before and after the attainment of independence in 1960 and this has led to agitations for States creation by the marginalized groups. They said however that the more States were created, the more the complaints of marginalization and inequality by new minorities against the new majorities in each State. Consequently, the unity of the country since political independence in 1960 was hampered by the propagation of ethno-religious and political uproar necessitated on one hand by cultural, communal and religious differences and on the other hand by fear of political supremacy nursed by the marginal groups.

National unity is a feeling of being united as a country, especially in times of trouble. However, there are visible indications of diversity in almost every face of peoples’ life in Nigeria. These differences as pointed out by Okobia (2000:1) among other factors have all along hindered the effective unification of the Nigerian people.

Biggins (2008) for instance assumed that in Congo, street children are used by political parties to create public disorder during mass demonstrations in which the authorities use excessive force which sometimes lead to death of these innocent children. Those who survived are thrown in jail where they experience physical and sexual abuse. Nigeria is not an exception. To this end, Fagbohun (2013:9) said what has been the cost to the Nigerian nation? The first military coup d’état of 15th January, 1966 had immediate justification in the violent crisis that followed the 1964 general elections. Since then, Nigeria has had to grapple at every election with disturbing and undesirable consequences:

- Loss of lives and property. It has led to the entire family being wiped out. We have witnessed the destruction of countless property worth billions of Naira,
- Nigerian society at large and small communities have been divided,
Social and moral values have been desecrated thereby leading to loss of hallowed cultural norms,

- There has been disruption of environmental controls with attendant health implications. Corpse are thrown into drainages and water wells thereby creating health hazards, and
- There is general deepening of poverty and hunger.

To this end, Ede (1999) reiterated that the symptoms of the old corrupt dictatorship (that often led to the military coups and attendance violence) are here again and so early, rearing their (ugly) heads. Hence, if the violence trend continues, and particularly if the vote is close, marred or followed by widespread violence, it would deepen Nigeria’s already grave security and governance crisis (ICG, 2014).

There is an impending challenge to the unity of the nation ahead of 2015 general elections. On this note, Ali (2013) perceived that If Muhammadu Buhari (and the opposition All Progressives Congress-APC) on one hand wins the election; he will not allow his victory to be hijacked like Bashorun Abiola’s “Hope 92”. He will fight back. His fight will likely shift the Northern political paradigm. Those of them who are in the (President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s) Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and have been advocating for a shift of power back to the North will betray President Jonathan and shift their allegiance to Buhari in the spirit of Arewa. Supportively, the International Crisis Group-ICG (2014), in Aderinokun e’tal (2014:1), Nigeria is heading towards a very volatile and vicious electoral contest in 2015. They highlighted thus;

Factional feuds within both parties could degenerate into violence during their national and state primaries. Competing claims to the presidency between Northern leaders and their Niger Delta counterparts could also result in violence in either or both regions, particularly after the pools. As in 2011, clashes could erupt in some Northern States if the APC, whose frontrunners are all northerners, loses the pools, there is similarly a high risk of violence if the PDP loses the presidency, particularly in the Niger Delta, home region of the Party’s candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan....

The Boko Haram insurgency and the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe could prevent voting in parts of those north-eastern states. If this occurs, the opposition APC, which has large following in those (and other northern) States, could lose a significant number of votes, reject the presidential pools’ outcome and question the elected government’s legitimacy.

An election not held in all States may also fall short of the constitutional requirements for electing a president, namely that the winner score 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 States, thereby raising serious legal disputes.

Ethnic political clown will surface and if this situation comes to pass, it will create political mess of colossal magnitude; and its consequence will shake Nigeria to its foundation. Ishaka (2014:7) pointed out that, the contribution of political crisis as one of the immediate causes of the military coup of 1966 and the remote causes of the tragic civil war should not be lost on the current political class. Equally disturbing are the increasing availability of firearms, the rise in communal violence across several Northern and some parts of South-Western States like Nasarawa, Benue,
Kogi, Taraba, Gombe, Osun, Ekiti, Oyo, etc., since 2013 and deepening criminality in the Niger Delta. All of these will eventually create significant challenges to the;

- Continuous existence of the nation as an indivisible entity,
- Legitimacy of government in power after the election,
- Sustainability of Nigerian democracy,
- Sanctity of peace and security that ought to guarantee the safety of a nation, and
- Attitude of the electorates.

The resultant effect of these is not different from the civil war which is akin to bloodshed and wanton destruction. This should as well fuel the issue of the need for the sincere and sound reform of the electoral process.

5. Conclusion

Nigeria is now a scuffle country, almost everybody does what he or she likes. Only very small numbers of people are willing to protest about the wrong things going on. This basically hangs on the facts that, given the opportunities most will do the same. There seems to be an unwritten and unspoken agreement between leadership and the followership to an extent that each is free to operate according to he/she likes. The selected few rulers’ rules as they like, likewise the subjects follow as it pleases them. The government has no consideration of the public, and vice versa. Indiscipline and free-for-all is now the order of the day. Today, in Nigeria, citizens cannot sleep with their two eyes closed due to non-existence of security of life and property. There is no job security even in the public sector any longer. Electoral victory now belongs to the ‘spoilt’. Majority of the civil/public servants are now being lured into corruption by some politicians who head various Ministries, Parastatals and Boards. There are no employment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled human resource. All these are examples of a failed State which fuel political and national instability. Achebe (2004:250) exemplified this when he defined a failed State as;

...one that is unable to perform its duties on several levels which is when violence cascades into all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings.

6. Recommendations

Antecedents of truncation of democratic regimes in Nigeria since independence in 1960 have been due to coups and wars in the world over. It should become a necessary flashback to politicians on the dangers inherent in being silly around elections rigging, corruption and the violent signals it portends to the 2015 general elections. There cannot be stable and standardized democratic transition without adequate electoral reforms and holistic mass attitudinal reorientation. It is further recommended that;
Nigeria unity should be seen by all and sundry as sacrosanct. It means that President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s second term ambition is not worth the shedding of even a drop of the blood of any Nigerian as well as the agitators for power shift to the Northern Nigeria.

There should be consciousness that a stolen mandate will certainly not receive support of the people. The threat for parallel government by the opposition parties should be taken as a serious national matter by the security agencies, the INEC, the ruling People’s Democratic Party, and the local/international observers not to rig the forthcoming general elections.

The blood of the martyrs of Nationalists (in the pre-independence) and Nigerian democracy since 1963 should not be allowed to be in vain. Political stakeholders should tread the elections with more caution for the overall interest of the yet delicate democracy in Nigeria.

Peace and security of the nation is not a negotiable matter. It is said that one should not throw stone into the market because you may not know whom it will hit. Anybody can be a casualty (low or highly placed). It has occurred severally in Nigeria since the first Military coup on January 15, 1963. The list is plenty.

The Judiciary should stay up and resolve her independence and justice adjudication question. It should discharge its crucial duties with probity and transparency, remaining unbiased and steadfast.

Most importantly the electorates should be ready to move from the (*sidon-look politics*) into political activism so as to determine the direction of our nascent democracy.

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ABSTRACT
There has been a heated debate as to what actually is the nature of social science. Theorists and social scientists have been at loggerheads as they battle in an attempt to explain the true nature of social science as contrasted with ideology and why according to them, it is called social science and not science per se. Others still have argued that what we now call social science was once and is perhaps presently an embodiment of ideologies which itself cannot be said to be free of self-interest, prejudice, ethnocentrism, value ladeness etc. In an attempt to participate in this hot boiling debate, we have argued that there is a synergy between the duo of social science and ideology. We argued that the concept of value ladeness did as a matter of fact extrapolate into the different strands of social science theories and ideologies respectively but maintained that they are ‘distinctively’ different though they share similarities.

Key words: social science, ideology & value ladeness.

INTRODUCTION
It is no mincing words that one of the major problems with social science is that in all its strands of discipline, there seems to be no consensus amongst theorist and writers as each hold different point of view. Such multi-faceted conception and description of what is real becomes what leads us to ask: Is Social Science value neutral or value laden? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, one is quickly led to ask that why then does it advocate policies of social actions. It is therefore reasonable to question whether social science is not just a collection of ideologies and social scientists a bunch of ideologues, selling their wares under a false label (Webb, 1995:63).

It is therefore the thrust of this paper to engage in a critical examination of the concept of ideology and social science respectively with a view of showing their areas of convergence and divergences. To achieve this, the paper shall attempt conceptual analysis of ideology, its major tenets and the types of ideology there is; this will be done in the light of what we know as social science in order to ascertain whether social science and ideology share a symbiotic relationship or whether they are mutually exclusive.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The origin of ideology can be traced to Antoine Destutte de Tracy who conceived it to mean a discipline which involves the general science of our "intellectual facilities, their principal phenomena, and the more remarkable circumstances of their activities (Destutte-Tracy, 1801:4). Convinced of the sensationalist epistemology of Locke and Candillac, Destutte de Tracy believed one could resolve all ideas into the sensations that produced them and thereby test their soundness. The sensationalist assumptions of his project led him to propose that "ideology is part of zoology" and he consequently paid close attention to the way physiological circumstances shaped and often misshaped ideas. Though Karl Marx appropriated this concept of ideology, he explored not physiological but cultural
determinants. He concerned himself with the way material and economic conditions influenced ideas, especially when they produced a false consciousness of the supposed reality to which they referred (Richards, 1993: 103).

Before we delve into the mainstreams of this paper, it is germane that we first understand what we mean by ideology before we can argue whether social science is an ideological conception along with other forms of ideologies. According to Webb, “In order to say whether social science is or is not an ideology, it has to be compared with those things that we call ideology” (An introduction to problems in the philosophy of social science, 63). Webb argues that if we are to define ideology as a logical and deductive interrelated set of political beliefs held by social group, since there are no such sets, such definitions would be futile for all practical purposes (Ibid, 64)

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF IDEOLOGY
Argument on ideology can be seen as the perception of the world from a subjective narrow point of view rather than as a whole. "It is the picture of the world seen from a particular standpoint, which is influenced by a multifarious collection of factors" (Harris: 1982, 63).

We therefore argue that ideology can be seen in the light of this perception of the world from a subjective standpoint which is though not devoid of self interest, ethnocentrism prejudices etc. Quoting Karl Marx, Kevin Harris argues that Ideology is necessarily misrepresentation (Ibid, 65). The concept of ideology is enshrined in those belief systems of human cultures, customs, education etcetera to which they can seldom free themselves. Every action of human is necessarily tailored to some end; hence one cannot but wonder whether we can totally bracket ourselves from such stereotypical and socio-cultural commitments owing to the fact that we are a product of our age (environment). This is why we are inclined to argue in the same vein with Kevin Harris that it is impossible for us to totally extricate ourselves from ideology on the pretext that both man and ideology were born twins! Against this backdrop, it is not to say that we should resign to fate and follow to whatever abyss our ideological colourations leads us as it regards our thought pattern, behavior, interactions and representations. But we can critically attack ideology as Kevin Harris suggested so as reducing its grip on us. He further opined that:

We might never be able to escape the prevailing ideologies of our time and place. If this were so, then we could be regarded as victims of our social-historical circumstances, who in certain situations might have little alternative but to see the world in the disguised and distorted form in which it was misrepresented to us, or in which we misrepresent it to ourselves... But the question that really face us is whether we can ever escape our ideological immersions and put ourselves in a position to see the world in a different way (Harris: 1982, 94)

From the foregoing, Harris attempts to argue not for the existence of ideological colouration but for the ways in which we can consciously identify and free ourselves if not totally but at least to a good degree from the chains of ideology which seems to pervade all of our existences.

Harris argues further that the reason why we cannot be totally free from ideology is buttressed in the fact that we are at one point or the other operating within a particular ideological program. And these ideologies vary from one another. Some can be right and too detrimental as compared to the other which could be mild and a little accommodating. Harris puts it this way: "It is in our best interest only if we end up adopting a less distorted or undistorted perspective for coming to know the world, or; to put that in different terminology, if we forsake a particular ideological research program in order to embrace a more
progressive one. For Him, we cannot however, simply decide to go out and change our beliefs and perspectives for these things are determined by ongoing social practice, and short of changing social practices very little can be achieved (Ibid, 95).

We therefore, agree with Harris that one is a product of his socio-cultural milieu and the logic of his time which appear as the most prevalent. However, like Harris suggested, we must attempt to decipher the correct logic of life from those which appear too erroneous, through conscious awareness and critical disposition with a view to attacking every ideological system that we seem to identify, by so doing we could like the French philosopher, Rene Descartes also “wake up from our dogmatic slumber”. For according to Harry Schofield in his book *The Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*, “Ideology, culture and education are inter-related...Education and culture are words which are almost frequently used”. According to him, Culture means doing the done thing...the done thing to which we referred have become traditionally accepted (Schofield, 1980, 107).

Our reasoning from the foregoing is that there is a close similarity between ideology, culture and education as argued by Schofield. Since from our definition, *ideology refers to the representation or supposed misrepresentation of the world in a particular way and culture refers to a repetition of what has already been done from ages immemorial*. Such monotony would to my mind, consequently make us have a subjective perception of the world which is akin to those held by previous generation. This is in the same vein what Paulo Freire attempt to prove in his book *The pedagogy of the oppressed* where he attempted to articulate arguments against the banking system of education and such issues as Man’s inhumanity to man (the former being the oppressor and the latter, the oppressed) as it is revealed in such concepts as feudalism. Paulo Freire describes it thus:

... Who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible significance of an oppressed society? Who suffer the effects of oppression more than the oppressed? Who can better understand the necessity of liberation? It will not be defined by chance but through the praxis of their quest for it through recognizing the necessity to fight for it. And this fight, because of the purpose given it by the oppressed, will actually constitute an act of love opposing the lovelessness which lies at the Heart of the oppressors’ violence, lovelessness even when clothed in false generosity (Freire,23).

He further opined that the *pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization* (Ibid, 25).

**THE NATURE AND MEANING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

By way of definition, the phrase ‘social science(s)’has been defined by the online edition of the Oxford Dictionary (British and world English) to mean: ‘the scientific study of human society and social relationships’ (www.oxforddictionaries.com). On the other hand, it has again been defined as ‘a branch of science that deals with institutions and functioning of human society and with interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of society (The Merriam-Webster dictionary). The above lexical orientations portray the discipline as a scientific enterprise. It is believed to comprise sociology, anthropology, economics and political science; and loosely, history, archaeology, linguistics and law. It has been observed in the Columbian Encyclopedia (1897) that as at the 19th century, the social sciences comprised five fields namely, jurisprudence (amendment of the law), education, economy, health, trade and art. However, kuper and kuper(1985) emphasizes that the underlying are discipline branches in the social sciences informed by the need to address problems of social significance, they are , environmental studies, social works, sociology, public administration,
psychology, anthropology, business studies, area studies, communication, criminology, demography, Development studies, Economics, Education, Geography, History, Industrial relations, information Science, Law, library Science, Linguistics, media studies, political science and Public Administration.

It was against this backdrop that Webb argues that “There is only one central methodological question about the social sciences, and that is whether they are sciences at all” (Webb, 80). The introduction of a scientific mode of analysis into the study of society was an attempt to cope with the uncertainty surrounding the study of social life (Ibid, 8). According to Chris Akpan in an article published in 2008 on The question of value-freedom in the social sciences: a philosophical reflection, he argues that social sciences are seen by many as a different form of science dealing with a different subject matter (human social behaviour or action) and as such, would not, or perhaps would never attain such success recorded by the natural sciences (African Pentecost 140-146).

THE NEXUS BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY

The above is what forms the thesis of this paper. It attempts to suggest that there is a relationship between social behaviour of man in the society with the concept of ideology. The question that readily comes to mind is therefore whether social science itself is not a collection of ideologies. Webb has argued that there are clear difference between the duo of social science and ideology. According to him:

... To suggest this is not to imply that social science is better or worse than ideology in a normative sense. Ideology performs political and social functions that are incapable of being performed by social science, and social science comments on social life in ways that cannot be emulated by ideology, (Webb, 62). What Webb attempt to argue from the above is that social science and ideology is in fact very different things like the two-edges of a knife. No doubt, they have some areas of convergence but its dissimilarities appear to be clear cut. He further Posit in the same vein that "to suggest that 'social science' is not ideology does not mean that it is a science; it merely means that it is a different kind of thing to ideology".

In evaluating the nature of social science, Chris Akpan has argued in another paper A Panoramic view on the philosophy of social science that:

The social sciences are a complex web of inter-related disciplines concerned with the exploration of distinct features of human behavior... One thing is obvious: the subject matter-is Human social action” the complexity that adorns human behavior is what each of the social sciences (no matter its sub-division) attempts to understand. It must be noted that not all behaviors fall within the purview of the social sciences. Behavior is said to be social when it has social significance (Akpan, 67).

Another attempt at rationalizing on the nexus between ideology and social science(s) is from the perspective of the role ‘self-interest’ play in human interaction. As human beings, we act from the primitive drive of self-interest. Self-interest has been defined as,

The disposition always in all situations to desire undue advantage for and solely for the person or persons involved, in total disregard of the common good. When a person seeks his interest within the confines of the common good, he is not being selfish. This is where the main difference is located. In the act of self-interest, a person places himself always before and above others and thus regards his interest as supreme (Asouzu 2003).

From the previous delineations of ideology and social science(s), we see the role of self-interest (and by extension, its extreme in self- selfishness) as it simmers. In fact, this may
explain why the advent of Economics under the umbrella of Social science was viewed by some, especially Lazear (2000) as “economic imperialism” (Economic Imperialism 2000) probably owing to the fact that the other species of social sciences in their ideological persuasions saw in Economics an over-ridding ideology. In essence, our argument subsists in the fact that human interest bestrides both ideology and Social Science(s). Accordingly, the extent to which the instinct of human interest characterizes ideological or Socio-Scientific perceptions of the world demonstrates the extent of the nexus (necessary connection) between ideology and social science. However, to suggest that social science is 'merely' or 'only' an ideological perception therefore would only make sense in so far as there is little or no difference between the two (ideology and social science). It will be suggested that there are very great similarities as there are also areas of difference, “… our major concern is therefore focused on what differentiates them and not what they have in common” (Webb, 64).

In addition, Webb further argues that prior to this our contemporary time, the concept of ideology is far from new: it was pejoratively used as a term of abuse by Napoleon; this sense of the word when used in the context of seeing someone as an ideologist, means that such an individual has a mode of thought considered as dogmatism and indoctrination. Looking at the various usages of the terms, Webb informs that ideology can be seen as:

Systematic, coherent, quasi-logical, congruent, constrained belief, such beliefs referring to social and/or political structure, beliefs that demands high affective identification, loyalty, commitment, held by a group, a form of distorted thinking in cooperating a philosophy of historic, social theory, futuristic beliefs which could be considered in the light of a myth... It is a form of dogmatic, closed rigid manner of thinking (Ibid, 65).

VALUES IN IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

One of the major fusion between ideology and social science circles around the question of values which has to do with human nature and the society in which we live "Both social science and ideology are infused with values at base, but because they are both value laden does not mean that they are the same thing" (Ibid, 71). It is no gainsaying the fact that the theories of social science do make value assumptions about the world like those similar to ideology. We can therefore argue that what gives meaning to and serves as the ontological equilibrium upon which social science comfortably lies is the question of value. These values are therefore necessary to identify what we consider to be significant in social science.

Webb quoted Max Webber as an advocate of value-freedom in social science, who noted that values must come into play in such situations of selection of topics for study and that there is no such thing as value-free selection. This argument goes to buttress the fact that human nature is ontologically self interested, egocentric, ethnocentric as well as anthropocentric in all its dealings and hence an attempt to totally bracket one’s mind from such self interested intentions would only be tantamount to a futile exercise or a wild goose chase. Webb avers that, if we are to follow this line of thought, it follows deductively that ideology and social science cannot be distinguished by the mere fact that one purveys values and the other does not. However, while we cannot separate ideology and social science on the simple grounds of the presence or absence of values, a distinction can nonetheless be made on two further grounds:

1. The presence of additional values in social science not found in ideology
2. The role and function of values in ideology and social science being fundamentally different.
For social science, Webb Contends that such additional values referred here are those of openness and the acceptance of challenge and dispute as a legitimate and proper activity. He further argues that, there are debates which are sometimes referred to as theoretical disputes. There is no social science discipline that is not marked by division of this kind. A further point noted above was the function of values in social science where such values are to be explored with respect to their limits. They are placed in Juxtaposition with other values to discover potential contradictions (Ibid, 76).

In respect to ideology, the function of values is very different, Webb opined that while the individual social scientist will struggle for coherence in his thought, an ideologist (ideologue) will attempt in varying degrees to be itself coherent but more importantly will address itself to the maintenance of coherence and unity of action of a group.

He further maintains that, the first function of ideology is to his mind, the ability to promote a persuasive view of the world. But one will not stop to reason, in what sense does Webb attempt to use the adjective "persuasive" is it in the sense of one being deterministically controlled to perform an action? Or is it in the sense of such perception of the world being convincing enough or better still having some valid logic in it? Furthermore, Webb argues that another purpose of ideology is to exclude what he (Webb) calls 'divisiveness' which he avers often manifest itself in a lack of openness.

Deductively, ideological fragmentation is not evident in openness but is an evidence of competitive struggle within a group or movement.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that there is as much similarity between social science and ideology as there are also differences. We have in the foregoing shown that the concept of ideology is distinct from social science based on the standpoint of value and valuation functions. However, the most important difference between ideology and social science is seen in the nature of the beliefs held and how they are held: social science is open and argumentative and it is also marked by a tentatively held belief system. Further, social science and ideology are functionally different just as we have argued earlier.

Without Ideology many of the great accomplishments in the world today would not hold sway, the reason is that often times than not, a shared belief system help to mobilize individuals for collective social action and are thus of great value. However, social science and ideology will remain closely linked while they shall ever have areas of divergence.

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ABSTRACT

Every Society is faced with one problem or the other. Whatever is the problem, the goal of every government is to solutions to them. One way by which leaders try to solve these problems is through federalism. This paper looks into the origin and practice of federalism in Nigeria. It is argued that the system has not produced the desired results because the various military and civilian rulers have not done enough to make it work. The paper also argues that, contrary to the view of some writers, the Nigerian federal system was not an imposition of the former British Colonial Masters; rather, it was adopted with the full participation and endorsement of Nigerian leaders then, and for the interests of the generality of Nigerians. As the 2015 election gathers momentum, care must be taken so that the country will not fall a victim of self-fulfilling prophecy of disintegration.

KEY WORDS: Federal System, Federal Character, Power Sharing; Military Rule

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, the United States of America, Switzerland, India, Germany, Canada, are some of the countries in the World that are practicing a federal system of government. Some of these countries have many things common which includes; a large population, diversity of culture, different religion, diverse economic resources, and so on. While the system has helped some of these countries to solve or reduce some of their lingering social, economic, religious and political problems, there are some factors militating against the success of the system in some other countries like Nigeria. For instance, in Nigeria, the fear of domination of one region by the other is lively. Marginalization and tribalism are still noticeable. The level of development in the country is still low. Agitation for state creation is on the high. Religious conflicts are still common in the country. Yet, these are some of the issues federalism is expected to resolve in the country. It has even got to a point where concerned Nigerians are asking whether the system is a curse or blessing to Nigeria. This is because, the system, as it is being operated in the country, seems to create more problems than it intended to solve.

Our first assignment in this paper would be a discussion on the meaning and some essential features of a federal system of government. We shall later trace the genesis of the system in Nigeria. Then, we shall look into why the system has not achieved its desired results in Nigeria. The paper also looks into some efforts at resolving issues in the Nigerian federalism such as the Federal Character principle and power sharing mechanism. Finally, we shall make some recommendations on how the system can work effectively in Nigeria.
FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, WHAT IS IT?

Scholars of great reputation have written volume on this topic, and they have given diverse definition to the concept. In some cases, these scholars do not agree with one another as to how best the concept can be defined, yet, they are all competent authorities. The reason for these diverse definitions may not be unconnected with cultural and social background colouration. We shall consider some of these definitions. According to Akpeninor (2007: 41) "Federation is a union comprising a number of potentially self-governing states or regions united by a central government." He went further to say that “It can be considered the opposite of the unitary state.” Appadorai, (1975: 495), submits that;

A federal state is one in which there is a central authority that represents the whole, and acts on behalf of the whole in external affairs and in such internal affairs as held to be of common interest; and in which there are also provincial or state authorities with power of legislation and administration within the sphere allotted to them by the constitution.

To distinguish a federal state from other states, the author goes ahead to enumerate some basic features of a federal state, saying: “These then are the essential features of federation: the division of powers, the supremacy of the constitution, and the rigidity of the constitution.” (1975: 496).

For Utim Benjamin, (2005: 2)

Federation is a constitutional arrangement in which law making powers and functions are divided between the central and state governments in such a way that each, within its respective sphere of jurisdiction and competence is equal, independent and co-ordinate to the extent of the federating states voluntarily surrendering some functions exigent on perceived capacity and desire to a central government for their collective good.

According to Michael Ogu (2011: 2) federalism is simply put: “The method of dividing powers in so that the general and regional are each within a sphere co-ordinate and independent.” Wheare is generally regarded as the father of federalism. The definitions considered earlier are only instances of Wheare’s definition. Wheare himself, an American, was influenced by the history of American federalism. We shall adopt his version of federalism because other definitions after his are merely responding to it. As mentioned, Wheare’s was influenced by the history of the American federal system of government. The 13 independent states of America came together in the famous Philadelphia Conference of 1787 and voluntarily agreed to form a federation, releasing some of their powers to a central government on matters of general interests.

Wheare further gave some basic features of a federal system of government to include the following:

- There must be at least, two levels of government.
- Each level of government must be independent.
- The levels of government must derive their powers from the constitution.
There must be a Supreme Court that will adjudicate between the two governments in time of constitutional crisis.

There must be financial autonomy for the two levels of government.

During the constitutional amendment, none of the governments should be seen as inferior.

For Wheare, therefore, any state that is able to meet these basic standards can be said to be a federal state, if not, such a claim is a ruse. Wheare’s standards have been accused of being too legalistic and structural. The reason being that, it is argued, it is possible for a state to possess those features highlighted by Wheare, yet, it may not be federal. This argument contains some elements of truth, however, his point is that, there is no state that is federal that does not possess these features, and we believe that Wheare was only laying a blue-print for a federal system of government.

WHY COUNTRIES ADOPT A FEDERAL SYSTEM

Omotoso, (2010: 141) wrote: “The attraction for federalism bothers on its perceived integrative tendency which makes it capable of serving heterogeneous societies in situation of crisis.”

Countries adopt a federal system as a way of solving some problems which are general. For instance, the preamble of the American Constitution has this declaration:

We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more permanent Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution of the United States of America.

Nigeria adopted a federal system of government because of her large size and her diversity. Nigeria houses peoples of diverse culture, religion and language. Apart from the dominant Yoruba, Hausa/Fulani and Igbo, it has been estimated that there are over 250 minority groups in Nigeria. These peoples have different religion such as Christianity, Islam and the African Traditional Religion. According to Obafemi Awolowo, (1947: 48-49),

If a country is bilingual or multi-lingual like Nigeria, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on linguistic basis; any attempt to experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or a multi-lingual or multi-national country must fail in the long run.

A federal system can also be adopted in order to enhance strong military defence and mutual economic benefits. When resources are pulled together, strong defence is possible and the economic welfare of the people is improved upon.

HISTORY OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The history of Nigerian federalism is a history of Nigerian politics, and to a larger extent, it is correct to say that the Nigerian federalism is a brain child of the British government. Following the partition of Africa among the colonial powers at the famous Berlin Conference of 1884/85, the present day Nigeria was formally ceded to Britain (Ayanele, 1998:209). Britain then
established her authority on the area, especially after the fall of Benin in 1897. The various kingdoms and empires lost their initial independence as they came under the subjugation of the British rule. In 1906, the Crown Colony of Lagos was merged with the Southern Protectorate. What is later known as Nigeria was at this time known as the Southern and the Northern Protectorate. In 1914, Lord Fredrick Lugard amalgamated the two protectorates, and the name, Nigeria was adopted for the country. Then, a central government was put in place to take the control of the whole country.

The government of Nigeria did not change structurally and significantly until John Richards became governor and introduced a new constitution which was called the Richards Constitution of 1951. The constitution introduced what has been dubbed regionalism. Bernard Bourdillon had created western and eastern region from the old Southern Protectorate in 1935, meaning that Nigeria had three regions, including the northern region. Richards then created an assembly each for these regions. However, this could not be regarded as a federal structure because, according to Ayanele (1998; 160), the regions were not empowered to enact laws. They were to make annual estimates for their region, sent representatives to the central government in Lagos and to advise the governor on any matter he referred to them. Referring to this period in the history of Nigeria, Akpeninor (2007: 43), wrote: “Until that point, the constitution had a unitary tendency in creating three regions and delegating some powers to them, the Richards constitution became the forerunner of the later Federal constitutions.”

Nigeria continued to make progress in the quest for a well-ordered society. In 1950, at the Ibadan Conference where all the major regional leaders of the country representing their people were present, after a lot of deliberations and compromise, some decisions were taken, chief among which was the desire for a federal system of government. Again, similar decision was also taken at the London Conference of 1953 and the Lagos Conference of 1954. At this time, the regional leaders showed more commitment to the practice of federalism because they made some compromise without which it could not have been possible for the system to take-off. Commenting on the determination on the parts of the regions, Richard Sklar, (2004:3-4), wrote:

Northern leaders forsook their preference for a virtual confederation of autonomous regions by which they hoped to protect a traditional system of authority exercised by Muslim emirs in the Northern provinces. In return, the eastern leaders agreed to retract their demand for either a unitary form of government or, at the very least, a strongly centralized federation. … However, the western leaders were obliged to cede control of Lagos, the country’s primary commercial Centre and principal port, which was designated as the federation’s capital city and its environs, federal territory.

It was the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution that finally enthroned federalism in Nigeria. Powers were constitutionally divided between the central and the regional governments. Each region had a bicameral legislature and equal representation at the Federal Executive Council. The regions controlled the Marketing Boards and resources under them. Election matters were handled by the regions. Above all, each region had a constitution, apart from the federal constitution (Irabor, 2011: 3). Describing this era, Nuhu wrote:
“Indeed, so far, the golden era of Nigeria’s was attained. At least, at that time, there was the true operation of the principle of fiscal federalism that apparently enhanced the remarkable potential of economic viability of the regions.” (2004: 50)

In 1966, the military government of General Aguyi Ironsi upturned the Nigerian federalism his Unification Decree of number 34, abolished the federal system and planted in its place, a unitary system. The government of Gowon, however, reversed the order with the promulgation of Decree No, 8 of 1967. General Gowon went ahead to create 12 states from the existing four regions (Mid-western region was created from the smallest region, Western region, in 1963). In his speech, he showed a commitment to federalism. He said:

To this end, I agree with my colleagues in the Supreme Military Council to the promulgation of the Decree No. 8 which completely decentralized this country and even went further than the Republican Constitution as it existed before 15th January, 1966. (Gowon: 1967)

HOW A FEDERAL SYSTEM IS FORMED

There are two major theories on the formation of a federal system of government: the aggregative and the disaggregative theories. These theories coincide with the view of Richards Sklar (2004: 41) that: “Some federal unions have been formed ‘from the bottom-up’ by pre-existing political entities; others have been created ‘from the top down’ by federating the governments of previously unitary states.”

We have an aggregative federal system when previously independent states or regions come together to release and handover some of their authorities to a new central authority to exercise power on their behalf for their own good and benefits. In other words, the new government is a creation of the independent states. A good example of this system is the United States of America. In 1787, 13 independent states came together at the famous Philadelphia Convention and founded a federal state known today as the United States of America. The American federal system is therefore a form of the “from the bottom-up” federalism.

The disaggregative federalism is found in a place like Nigeria. From what we have said earlier, the administration of Nigeria from 1914 to, say, 1946, was purely unitary. The complaints of Nigerians, home and abroad (Okungbowa & Epku: 2012, 127), largely necessitated a federal system as a way of finding lasting solutions to the problems confronting the country. Roberts and Simbine had written that:

… when socially and culturally distinct people find themselves together in the same polity through circumstance of history, to live peacefully together, they have to strike a balance, which must be acceptable to all the parties involved. Federalism, the system which shares power in such a way that each recipient unit assumes a separate existence and commands relatively exclusive authority over some clearly specified sphere of state activity, in principle, ensures such a balance (Omotoso, 2010: 141-142).

The Ibadan Conference that was held in Ibadan in 1950 provided the opportunity for Nigerians through their leaders to determine their fate. What we had in the case of Nigeria was that, there
was already in place a highly centralised government and structure. But after series of negotiation, it was agreed that the central authority should release some of its powers to the new states. We therefore have a “from the top down” federal system in Nigeria. That is, we have a central or national government that relinquishes some of its powers to the federating units. In this arrangement, power is seconded by central government to its component units, unlike where power is given to the central government by the federating units as in the case of America, which makes the system there to be in the form of “from the bottom-up”. An important fact students of comparative politics must note is that, while the central government of America is the new state, in Nigeria, the central is the old government and the federating units are the new ones. The point being made here is that, in the case of the Nigerian federalism, it is the government at the center that creates the regional or state governments, whereas, in the American federalism, the federating units are the creators of the central government.

Some scholars have argued that the Nigerian federalism is a creation of the British colonial master, and that the system is a failure in Nigeria because it was an imposition on the people (Osadolor, 1998, referenced by Omotoso (2010)). These scholars therefore hold the British government responsible for the failure of the system. Iraboh, in particular, was convinced that the British imposed federalism on Nigeria when he wrote:

> The British deliberately imposed the federal system on Nigeria in order to maintain a neo-colonial control of the country after independence. Since federalism is more or less an evidence of some form of disunity, political weakness and an uneven economic development, the British deliberately wanted to keep the federating units as apart as possible so as to meddle in the internal affairs of Nigeria to their own economic and political advantage after they would have granted her independence. (2011: 3)

The nearest valid argument to back this claim is the allegation that the British divided the country unevenly, so much so that the northern region was larger both in population and territory than the combination of the east and west. (Iraboh, 2011: 3) However, a contrary view to this claim by Peter Ekeh submits that:

Thus, there is a temptation to assume that the formulation of Nigerian federalism was borrowed from more mature and older federations in the west. Quite to the contrary, Nigerian federalism was totally homegrown from domestic circumstances of social formations of new ethnic configurations that emerged from the experiences of negotiations for self-government in the decade of colonization in the 1950s. (2004: 19)

The questions that must be answered are: why was the system a success form 1945 up to 1966? And, after Independence, what have we done to right the wrong of the past even if we agree that the colonial masters created the problem? After all, the problems that are associated with the Nigerian federalism that we mentioned earlier were not as pronounced as they are now before the 1966 military take-over. Our history needs to be re-read in order to be fair in our assessment of the colonial rule. This will also help us to know where to look for solutions to our problems. The truth is that, the advent of the military into the Nigerian politics in 1966 eroded the federal system
and actual practice of the system in the country. This is because, by its virtue, military regime necessarily operates a form of unitary system where orders flow from the above. The government of General Aguyi Ironsi, with decree no 34 of 1966, abolished the federal system in the country and planted in its place a unitary system.

THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERAL CHARACTER
One concrete effort made in the Nigerian constitution of 1979 to fight marginalization and to allay the fear of domination of one ethnic group by the other was the establishment of the federal Character Commission. The Commission was also enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the country. The third schedule, part 1, item c of the constitution sets out the power and mission of the Commission thus:

(a) Work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assembly for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the federation and of the states, the armed forces of the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and other government security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the state (b) promote and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political at all levels of government.

The principle of federal character was aimed at resolving the lingering problem of marginalization. According to Onifade & Imhonopi (2013; 78):

The federal character principle was later enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria with the goal to accommodate the diverse linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographic groups in the decision-making, socio-political and economic apparatuses of the state. The policy also aimed to foster unity, peace, equal access to resources and promote the integration of the less advantaged state for improvements and good conditions of living in the country.

It was principally intended to give a sense of belonging to all the peoples that and parts that make up the federation by ensuring that none of the parts is marginalized against or neglected in the sharing of the available resources and political positions in the country. To this end, for instance, it became mandatory the every state must be represented in the Federal Executive Council by at least, a minister. Also, at the Senate, each state, regardless of the geographical size or population, has three Senators representing it.

RESOLVING THE CRISIS: POWER SHARING AND POLITICAL ZONING
Power sharing in politics is a way by which political leaders in a country agree within themselves to share elective and non-elective positions in a country among the different ethnic groups that make up the country. This political arrangement is usually common in a country that houses people of diverse ethnicities like Nigeria. It is usually not documented because it is against the provision of the constitution which allows every qualified person to aspire for any political position in the land. This non-documentation of the power sharing in the constitution opens the process to some abuse. However, circumstances at times make it the best option, especially where...
one ethnic group is capable of holding on to power for a very long period of time. Awopetu & Ajinde (2012: 13) have this to say on power sharing:

> In societies where power sharing is properly practiced, the basis for it is to minimize as much as possible democratic competition within acceptable boundaries in order to avoid intergroup violence that would have resulted from differences of opinion along ethnic lines.

Power sharing and zoning formula, if properly planned, and if the planners are sincerely ready to make it work, will go a long way to solving some of the crises that occur in a multi-lingual federal systems like Nigeria. But, like other systems, (political and economic) if the people are not prepare to make the system work, it will not. This is bane of power sharing principle in Nigeria. Ideology is not the problem in Nigeria it is the executioners of the ideology.

**PDP, POWER SHARING AND THE NIGERIAN POLITICS**

The political leadership of Nigeria have always believed in co-existence because of they know that the people and the country have a lot to gain if united. It is for this reason people say: “In unity we stand, in division we fall.” At the same time, they are well aware that access to the power at the center is one of the banes of the survival of the country. The regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) made attempt to resolve the issue of marginalization and ethnicity in the country when the two-party-system was introduced in 1992. The political parties in the pre-independence, first Republic and the second Republic were to a large extent regional (Anyanele; 1998), going by the leaderships, memberships and the results of the parties in the general elections. The Babangida regime created and sponsored two political parties; The Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Party and politicians were enjoined to belong to either of them. The presidential election was widely believed to have been won by the SDP whose candidate was Chief M. K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba man from the south. However, the result was annulled by the military junta. It was widely believed that the north secretly worked again the victory of Abiola because he was not a northerner and the northerners believed that the presidency was their birthright. Abiola later died in detention when he wanted to claim his mandate and this threw the country into crises. The government of General Sanni Abacha that came to power after the inglorious regime of the Chief Earnest Shonekan-led Interim-Government divided the country into six geo-political zones and the presidency was to be rotated among these zones (Olawale & Adesanmi: 2012). However, the ambition of General Abacha to be the next president under this arrangement scuttled the process. Abacha died while in power and he was succeeded by General Abdusalami Abubakar. Abubakar disbanded the five political parties created by his predecessor and when ban was lifted on politics, three parties; the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) were registered.

The PDP seemed to understand the ethnicity and marginalization problems in the country more than the other parties. For this reason, key positions were to be zoned among the zones. For instance, the presidency was zoned to the South-West, in the words of Awopetu and Ajinde (2012; 14) to: “compensate the south-west due to the annulment of the June 12 presidential election of 1993.” To this end, nobody from the other zones vied for the post, and Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as the consensus candidate of the party that invariably won the 1999 election.
This was in keeping with the party agreement of the party members and the party’s constitution on power sharing. The preamble of the party’s constitution is as follows:

(b) to create socio-political conditions conducive to national peace and unity by ensuring fair and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. (c) to conform with the principles of power shift and power sharing by rotating key political offices among diverse peoples of our country.

Initially, this aspect of the constitution was said not to have been documented, and so, it was a merely “a gentleman agreement” (Awopetu & Ajinde: 2012; 15). Based on the understanding that power would stay in the south for a period of 8 years and after that, it would return to the north, Obasanjo picked his running mate, Atiku Abubarka from the north. The understanding probably was that there would be no second term, (although it was allowed), so that after a zone must have ruled for four years, power would shift to another zone but still in the south for another four years. The PDP zoning formula was however faulty on some grounds. It only acknowledged the division of the country in the south and the north but not according to the six geo-political zones. According to a Chieftain of the party, Alex Ekwueme (2013):

Still, because of the importance of the issue, when we came in PDP, we created the rotational arrangement so that the south and the north would have taken eight years term each, and Obasanjo has done his own for the south, and if Yar’Adua was still alive, he would have completed his eight years, meaning nobody would be talking about this or that by now.

PDP lived up to its principle of power sharing and Obasanjo, a Yoruba man from the southwest in the south, and Alex Ekwueme, another southerner but from the southeast in the south, contested the presidential primaries of the PDP. Again, no northerner contested the primary in accordance with the zoning formula. The composition of the voters in the election provided cheap victory for Obasanjo. The delegates included ministers and ambassadors, all of whom owned their positions courtesy of Obasanjo. They also included the governors of the PDP-controlled states who were also seeking Obasanjo’s support for their second term agenda. At the end, Obasanjo won.

In 2007, at the PDP Convention held to pick the party’s candidate for the 2007 presidential election, all the candidates were northerners. This also followed the power sharing formula of the party. Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua won the ticket, and picked Goodluck Jonathan from the south-south geo-political zone in the south. However, before the expiration of his term, President Yar’Adua died in office after a protracted illness in 2010. Following the provision of the 1999 constitution, Jonathan became the acting but later, the substantial president. This was not however without some controversies especially from the north part of the country which did not want a southerner to share their slot with them.

In the 2011 electioneering, the northerners felt that they had not spent their 8 years of rule. They had probably expected that the southerners would not contest the primaries of the PDP. This time the zoning formula was set aside. Some northerners in the PDP, led by Yahaya Kwande (Nigerian Tribune: 2013), went to court that the zoning be respected and preserved while some argued that the zoning formula was an internal arrangement of the party, and that the federal constitution which allows every qualified Nigerian to aspire for any elective position in the land
is supreme to the PDP constitution. The court ruled that, indeed, there was the zoning arrangement but that it was “an internal arrangement of the party”, and so, it could not supersede the provision of the 1999 Federal Constitution. Therefore, Jonathan, and every other qualified Nigerian was eligible to contest.

The northerner leaders lost but Jonathan knew that he needed them in the coming general election. According to Awopetu & Ajinde (2012; 17) the Northern Political Forum, chaired by Adamu Ciroma, tabled two conditions before they could support Jonathan. He was to sign an undertaking that he would not seek re-election after his first term, and that, he would ensure that power returns to the north by 2015. Jonathan was said to have rejected the two conditions. He left them and embarked on real politicking. He picked a northerner, Namadi Sambo, governor of Kaduna state, whom he had made the Vice-President when he became the president in 2010, as his running-mate. The northerners too devised their means of getting what they felt was their “right”. They made arrangement of producing a formidable candidate that could defeat Jonathan at the party’s primaries. In the internal election conducted in the north, Atiku Abubakar was said to have defeated General Babangida, the result of which Babangida did not wholly welcome. The race to win the PDP primaries was between Atiku and Jonathan. Unlike the race between Obasanjo and Ekwueme in 2003, the power of incumbency was not so much manifested in the election. Jonathan won due to a combination of factors: Obasanjo prevailed on the delegates from the southwest to massively vote for Jonathan. Most of the governors were his friends when Jonathan was the governor of Bayelsa State. Besides, the southeast delegates also sympathized with Jonathan who is from their neighboring zone, south-south. The Sambo option also worked for Jonathan while the lukewarm attitude of Babangida did not help Atiku. Atiku himself, though a seasoned politician, was more concerned about support from the north instead of the whole country. At the end, Jonathan won and this paved the way for him to contest the 2011 presidential election. It must be mentioned, however that, of all these factors, the Obasanjo factor stood out (see Obasanjo’s letter in the Nation Newspaper, December 12th, 2013). Evidence of this was the result from the southwest where Atiku scored 14 votes and Jonathan, 483 votes (Sahara report: Jan,14, 2011)

THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The question of whether or not President Jonathan will contest the 2015 is no longer relevant because his actions and deeds lean towards this. Apart from having the constitutional right to contest, his admirers can easily point to his numerous achievements. The issues however are the implications it will have for him, PDP, the north, the East and the entire country. Awofeso (2013), worried by the PDP’s attitude to zoning, writes:

By PDP’s own machinations, “zoning” thus becomes a weapon of ethnic fights rather than a benign policy of ethnic peace it was designed for. And now, worse of all, as PDP interpretative crookedness mutates severally into virulent strands, each meretricious Interpretation of “Zoning” predictably fosters ethnic distrust in Nigeria.

The Yorubas, like other Nigerians, also have the right to contest the presidential election. What will be the implications of Jonathan contesting this election? What then becomes of the PDP zoning formula?
It is not likely that the PDP will still respect its zoning formula. The reason being that, there was no zoning, so to say, in 2011 after all. Atiku and Jubril from the north contested the 2011 PDP presidential primaries. If zoning is discarded as it is likely, then Nigerians should beware that in politics, there is no “gentleman agreement”, and so, the words of the politicians may not be taken seriously. If this is the end of zoning, then this portends danger for the unity and survival of the country. It must be remembered that zoning, as undemocratic as it may be, was a partial solution to the problem of marginalization as we earlier alluded to. Yet, the problem then is still relevant to the future of the country. Going by the nature ethnic politics in the country cum the lopsidedness of the population, the fear is that, a region may become so powerful in voting strength to dominate other regions in the country. Tari Sekibo (2013), made allusion to this when he said:

The structural imbalance has affected our demand for development. If you see what is happening at the National Assembly, if they (northern) want something and is not given to them, they will use their number to subjugate the others. That is what is happening. So, we need structural adjustment in the way the Nigerian nation has been structured.

The major issue at stake here is the population strength. It will be good if we do not forget where we came from.

For the Igbo, they may have to wait for a very long time to produce the Nigerian president. This is because the people in the area do not seem to be so united as to produce the president. Their egalitarian system (Ayanele; 1998; 124) of the pre-colonial days that portrayed a man as the king of his house seems to still have influence on their mode of playing politics even till today. To produce the president therefore, they need to put their house in order. Then, they should seek alliance with the major groups in the country. This seems not to be realistic before the next election. However, they can still make some compromise by supporting another major group this time so that in the nearest future, they can be supported.

The power of the incumbency is a major factor in African politics in general, and in Nigeria in particular. Very few reigning president have been defeated in Africa. For instance, Tafawa Balewa won the 1959 general election to become the Nigerian first Prime Minister. Everything unconstitutional was employed to win the election of 1964 (Ayanele; 1998; 186). The irregularities of the 1964 election were among the reasons given for the military take-over of January, 1966. Alhaji Shehu Shagari came to power in 1979 and won again in 1983 in another controversial election. The poor conduct of the election was also cited for the military take-over of that year. Obasanjo came to power as a civilian president in 1999 and won again in 2003. The election was no less controversial than the others before it. If precedence is anything to go by, if Jonathan contests the 2015 election, he may win. However, this is not to say that the incumbent cannot be defeated as we have seen the examples in some African countries. This is particularly important because a lot of things have happened and many are likely to happen before 2015. The road to the presidency may not be so rosy for Jonathan like that of 2011. For one thing, the Yoruba that massively voted for him in 2011, irrespective of their party affiliation and religious divides are not so much comfortable with his administration. Recently, notable Yoruba elders including Chief Olu Falae, a prominent politician, and Rev Bolanle Gbonigi, a vocal and fearless Clergy (TELL; 2013), lamented how the Yorubas have been marginalized in the government,
claiming that their men were not in the first six positions in the political hierarchy of the country. They also claimed that infrastructure in the area, especially, the Lagos-Ibadan Express Way, are in poor states. Besides, hardly would anyone doubt that Obasanjo worked hard to see that Jonathan became the president in 2011. President Jonathan, according to Obasanjo, himself acknowledged the crucial roles Obasanjo played in his emergence as the president.

According to Obasanjo (2013); “Mr President, you have on a number of occasions acknowledged the role God enabled me to play in your ascension to power. You put me third after God and your parents among those who impacted your life…” There had been a lot of rumours that the relationship between the ‘father’ and his erstwhile ‘son’ was not cordial and the members of the public seemed to be confused as to what to believe. However, the Obasanjo’s letter to the president in 2013 left no one in doubt that the one-time ‘father and son’ have indeed become enemies. Obasanjo was so critical of the Jonathan’s administration that he likened it with the inglorious regime of General Sanni Abacha. The point being made is that, the massive votes Jonathan got in 2011 from the Yoruba people may emaciate drastically in 2015. Sambo was another factor that contributed to the success of Jonathan in the 2011 election. It however remains to be seen if the magic wand will still be possible in 2015. This is because the northerners are eagerly waiting to get back what they thought was their ‘birth right’ which they lost some years back. The Rotimi Ameachi factor is also not in favour of Jonathan. Ameachi is the governor of Rivers state and the Chairman of the Governors’ Forum. He can possess a serious challenge to Jonathan. All these factors put together show that Jonathan may need more than luck to win the 2015 election.

What about the north? The north is warming up for the presidency If there was any agreement, documented or not, recognized by the Federal Constitution or not, that power must return to the north after eight years,, then the northerners may be justified to want to come back to power. To realize this ambition, they have two options: one, they have to put their house in order and produce a credible and acceptable candidate, not only to the northerners but also to the entire people of the country. Then they should zone the position of the Vice-president to either the Yoruba in the southwest or to the Igbo in the southeast. With this arrangement, it is likely they can win the PDP primaries. If this option fails and Jonathan wins the primary then, they have to decide to either wait for another four years (2019) or they put party alliance aside. The registration of the All Progressive Party (APC) can help the northerners to realize their ambition. If the APC zones the presidency to the north with a popular candidate, leaves the Chairmanship to the west and approach the Igbo with the Vice-president, there may be serious trouble for the PDP. The defection of some prominent PDP Leaders to the APC does not show that PDP is in good standing. As things are now, it is either PDP wins and the north loses or the north wins and PDP loses.

What then happens to the country? This must bother Nigerians irrespective of party affiliation. In 2005, the American Intelligence Community held a conference with a topic: ‘Mapping Sub-Sahara African Future”, came out with some declarations, among which is that:

While currently, Nigeria’s leaders are locked in a bad marriage that all dislike but not dare to leave, there are possibilities that could disrupt the precarious equilibrium in Abuja. If millions were to flee a collapse Nigeria, the surrounding up to Ghana, would be destabilized. Further, a failed Nigeria probably could
not be reconstituted for many years if not without massive international support (Nzeribe; 2013). Nigerians must embark on some political strategy if the US prediction that Nigeria may disintegrate by the year 2015 is not to come to pass. Some government officials have come out to say that there is nothing in the prediction and that there had been more serious challenges in the country in the past, yet the country survived them. This prediction should however not be taken lightly because it was specific, and the timing too should worry us. This was a prediction made in 2005 and everything seems to be working together to make it come to fulfillment. The Niger Delta crises, the Boko Haram insurgence and the declaration of the state of emergency in some states in the north, as well as the Jonathan-Ameachi saga, all lay credence to the possible fulfillment of the prediction unless some serious measures are taken to arrest the situation. Mass unemployment and marginalization are also parts of the issues that call for serious and timely attention. Then, the electoral body, INEC, must help to prevent the collapse of the country in 2015. The electoral bodies have contributed to the various political crises in the country since independence (Oluwasanmi, 2007).

The 1964, 1979, 1983 electoral crises in the country were generated and perpetuated by the electoral Commissions. If the presumed winner is declared loser and the loser declared winner in the 2015 election the violence that gripped some parts of the north following the declaration of the 2011 presidential election may resume in a wholesale dimension in 2015. In order to prevent the Hobbesian state of nature and avoid disintegration of the country, practical steps must be taken to arrest some of the issues discussed in this paper.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Federalism has the tendency of uniting people of ethnic and religious diversities. In fact, one of the advantages of federalism all over the world is the promotion of unity in diversity. It is the best system of government that allays the fear of domination and marginalization. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Nigeria. One of the major reasons federalism works in America is that, the different tribes that form the union are able to put their cultural differences behind them after the formation of the federal government. According to Fukuyama (1998; 118):

Despite the diversity of backgrounds, lands and races to which Americans trace their ancestry, on coming to America, they abandoned those identities by and large and assimilated into a new society without sharply defined social classes or long-standing ethnic and national divisions. America’s social and ethnic structure has been sufficiently fluid to prevent the emergence of rigid social classes, significant sub-nationalism or linguistic minorities. American democracy has therefore rarely faced some of the more intractable social conflicts of other older societies.

The founding fathers of the American federalism must have done serious work to make sure that the Americans forget the cultural differences and began to see themselves as one Americans. For a federal system to unite peoples of deep ethnic diversities there must be great commitment on the part of the people, and most especially, the leaders to make it work. The mere presence of federal structure and institutions are not enough to produce the desired result. The people must sit, talk
and agree on some issues that are fundamental to their existence. The people must be able to
tolerate and accommodate one another. According to Elazar (Omotoso: 2010; 144); “Federalism
can only exist where there is a considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political
action through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available.”

No matter how undemocratic zoning and power sharing may be, it appears logical under
the present circumstance in Nigeria. As a matter of fact, there is nothing that is undemocratic in
what the people want if they freely express it. The system would have worked effectively if the
leadership of the PDP had been so committed to making it work. Power sharing should be
embraced by all well-meaning Nigerians, and should not be left for the political parties alone.
Power sharing and zoning should be enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria. One reason it has been abused by the PDP was because it is in conflict with the
constitution of the country. This can still be done before the 2015 general elections.

However, the above suggestion is just a palliative measure and a short-time solution.
There is no doubting the fact that one of the major reasons people want to control the power at the
center is because, power is a means to ends such as money, glory honour and allocation of
resources, and the more the power the more these ends. Nigeria should take a clue from
Switzerland. That is, Nigeria should adopt a Collegiate Executive. By this suggestion, each of
the six-geo-political zones should elect a Councilor, or if we like, we can still retain the name,
president for a one-time period of six years. After the emergence of the six presidents from the six
zones, one of them should be elected only by the other presidents, as the Chairperson of the
Council for just one year. There must also be an elected Vice-President. The arrangement should
be made in such a way that within the period of six years, each president must have acted as a
Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson at different times. Both the Chairperson and the Vice are
simply the firsts among the equals. They co-operate with colleagues just as their colleagues co-
operate with them, knowing fully well that their turn will still come. One advantage of this
proposal is that, no ethnic group will have the chance to dominate others. Second, no zone will
have to wait endlessly to produce the president. Four, rivalries among the parties will be healthy, knowing fully well that
they need the co-operation of one another at the center. Lastly, this suggestion does not promote a
one-party system. As a matter of fact, it is the people’s programs instead of the party programs
that would be implemented because decisions are jointly taken.

CONCLUSION
We have argued in this paper that the Nigerian federalism was not imposed on Nigerians without
their consent. Even if it were, there were opportunities to reverse it if the Nigerian leaders
believed that it was not the best for the country. Instead, since they made commitments to make it
work, they should then make it work in practice. Whether a federal system is formed for the
bottom-up or from top-down is not a serious issue. Federalism works in America not necessarily
in the way it was formed but most importantly because the people and the leaders were
committed to making it work. The only factor that can make it work in Nigeria is the desire of the
people and the leaders to make it work. A great opportunity now presents itself with the setting up
of the National Conference inaugurated by President Jonathan Goodluck in 2013 to right the
wrongs of the past 100 years of the Nigerian statehood. Jonathan in his inaugural speech at the
Confab had said, as quoted from The National Mirror that he had heard people say that:
We do not need such a conference since we already have an elected parliament and government in place. As cogent as the argument may sound, I have on the sincere conviction that in the truly democratic nation we are striving to build, we must never ignore the loudly express views of the majority of ordinary Nigerians I have heard our people say that we need to openly and frankly discuss our problems and seek acceptable solutions instead of allowing them to fester and remain source of perennial conflict afflicted by strife and violence.

If those in opposition to the Conference are to be proved wrong, absolute commitment, political will and utmost sincerity are required, not only on the part of the president but also on the delegates. Already there are doubts about the conference by some of its delegates on the ground of sincerity. Abdulwaheed Orma of the NLC said:

We are protesting against something that is being brought through the backdoor: the decision for the committee to select their chairmen and deputies at the committee level. This decision was concluded by delegates at the plenary, only for it to be resurface through the Committee of 50, who are only mandated to talk about the voting pattern

Yet, something good can still come out this conference. Some of the delegates are making good demands in the conference. Olawale Isaac from Ibadan, for instance, said in the *Punch* that: “My interest at the confab is about issues relating to peace and security.” Another one from a northern state is talking about employment for the youths. Cultural groups like the Ohaneze Ndigbo and the Afenifere harmer on issues like: resource control, fiscal federalism, federal character principle, power sharing and political structure, citizenship, structures of the security agencies, religion and secularism, and so on. These and other issues are shared by Yushau Shuaib (2014). Suberu Rotimi also discusses some other issues in his paper titled: *Lessons in Fiscal Federalism for Africa’s New Oil Exporters.*” The issues include; (1) General Vertical and Horizontal Resource Revenue Sharing Principle, (2) Accommodation of the Needs of Oil Producing Areas, (3) Revenue Conflict Resolution Institutions and Mechanisms, (4) Economic Management, (5) Intergovernmental Political Relations and (6) Reform of Fiscal Constitution. These issues are germane to the smooth operation of a true federalism.

Nigerians and all lovers of Nigeria should prevail on the INEC not to throw the country into unnecessary crisis in 2015. It should therefore conduct not only free and fair, but also a credible election in the country. If a winner is declared loser and loser declared winner, then, the prediction of possible disintegration must have been helped to come to pass. This paper believes that with commitment, tolerance and sacrifice as well as good leadership, federalism can take Nigeria to a greater height. It is therefore submitted that federalism is still the best government for a heterogeneous country like Nigeria. This one of the greatest legacies of the British colonial masters with the full participation of the founding fathers (mothers) on the Nigerian state, and most therefore not be molested
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EMMANUEL CHRISTUS: THE PARADIGMATIC SOCIOPOLITICAL LEADER

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Abstract

Human sociopolitical, economic and environmental existences are fraught with numerous challenges. The orderliness which God imposed on creation from the beginning has been disrupted by gradual human actions, inactions and blunders. The confusion which is the outcome has generated tremendous tension across the globe that human social and environmental existence is at the brink of extinction. This situation calls for a re-birth, re-structuring and metanoic re-organization of the entire sociopolitical realm to reminisce their Divine prerogative and design. Great minds and sages over the years have proffered numerous theoretical and practical guides for the resolutions of recurrent existential problems, prominent among which are the leadership and followership or citizenship crisis. None of these solutions have satisfactorily met the criterion of refreshing intellectual enlightenment, practical utility, universal applicability and global acceptability, as the paradigm shift in thought and action introduced by Emmanuel Christus (our Lord Jesus Christ). It is the consideration of the revolutionary influence of this *sage of sages* that propelled us to this research on Emmanuel Christus: The Paradigmatic Sociopolitical Leader.

INTRODUCTION

The dearth of true, real, effective and efficient leadership in the global society is a recurrent sociopolitical problem. Many societies grope in darkness because they lack true leaders with visionary qualities that are the quintessential definition of societal progress. Many others have “de facto” leaders (incumbents) who are not real by their exemplary actions because they lack “de jure” qualities (rightful authority) that are the justification of leadership. Consequently, effective leadership, that initiates meaningful changes and transformation which recreates the face of the earth and establishes joy in terrestrial domain, is always a mirage. Thus, lacking in proper vision and mission, many societies have leaders who can neither affect nor influence their environment of jurisdiction, talk less of bringing freshness in their horizon.

After several centuries of living in illusion and groping in darkness, it became imperative that sunlight is needed to illumine the sociopolitical horizon to bring it to Divine treasures of wisdom in existence. Emmanuel Christus came as Divine prototype to bring about this paradigm shift in sociopolitical affairs. His coming, as predicted and expected, leads to “the true knowledge of the hierarchical structure of beings in existence and their due and proper respects, which in turn, will ignite deserved attention to all individuals, things, occasions, events, situations and circumstances” (Nwankwor, in Ukaegba 2013:56). Again, in His coming, Emmanuel Christus teaches and leads to the essential principles of sociopolitical orderliness, beauty and excellence such as “love, forgiveness, justices, peace, unity, altruism, truthfulness, understanding, concern and accountability” (Nwankwor, in Ukaegba 2013:57). In His wisdom, Emmanuel Christus balances the excesses in the wheels of authority and freedom putting them in proper purpose and perspectives.
Furthermore, as the philosopher-educator par excellence, Emmanuel Christus teaches true love, in theory and practice, as the basis of moral actions and societal relationship. His terrestrial ingress fosters the reign of Divine justice as true and proper integration of goodness, holiness and righteousness. It also fosters the essential knowledge of the logical coherence and “unity of beings which in turn encourages comprehensive appreciation of their inherent and integral goodness in one Holy Divinity.” (Nwankwor, in Ukaegba 2013:58).

Moreover, Emmanuel Christus defines law, not legalistically (which is over-bearing), but morally based on genuine love, and ratio-spiritually, based on justice as righteousness. Thus for Him, obedience to law is obedience to its Supreme Spirit, which is God’s will, His laws and principles for societal and existential peace and orderliness. One obligated to laws, political or otherwise, in His views, is one responsible and accountable to God. It is the considerations of the profundity of these sagacious contributions that compel us to the present examination of Emmanuel Christus paradigmatic sociopolitical leadership. This, thus, throws a light on how societies running amuck could be righted.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The key concepts in this essay which we intend to clarify here are as follows:

A. **Emmanuel Christus**: Emmanuel Christus is our Lord Jesus Christ, “the image of the invincible God” (Col. 1: 15), who was sent by Almighty God, the creator of all things, to redeem humanity from the bondage of sin, which originated from the disobedience of the first progenitors of human beings – Adam and Eve. Emmanuel Christus, whose nature is Divine, came as “the way, the truth and the life” (John 14: 6) to deal with the evil precipitated by the fallen nature of man and throw the light of righteousness for human actions, behavior and conducts, in order to guarantee humanity its rightful divine privileges. Emmanuel Christus, whose earthly ancestry was linked to King David and whose kingship was predicted to last forever without end, but little noticed while He lived, has changed the entire course and history of human existence, including man’s sociopolitical orientations and bearings. “From His birth in a Bethlehem’s stable to His death on the cross, He lived on this earth for less than forty years (reliable records place His entire earthly sojourn at thirty-three years),… He never wrote a book, taught a seminar, or created a detailed outline for His disciples to follow…yet His followers today (some two thousand years after His physical death) number more than one billion, with millions more people joining every year. (Briner and Pritchard 1997:1)

From Etymological perspectives, Emmanuel Christus (my preferred way of addressing our Lord Jesus Christ) is a Divine, Sacred and Holy name. The name Emmanuel, which means “God-is-with-us”, was first announced by the ancient prophet, Isaiah, as a sign of God’s presence among His people (Isaiah 7:14). This name Emmanuel, identifies appropriately with Jesus called the son of the Most High God (Luke 1:32), who is a “Wonder-Counselor, God-Hero, Father-Forever, prince of Peace” (Isaiah 9:5). The ancillary name “Christus” is the Latin name for the Hebrew word “Messiah” and the Greek “Christos-Chrien” which means to anoint or the anointed.

According to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, the English equivalent – “Christ” means “the Anointed, a name given to Jesus: a Messiah,” (Kirkpatrick 1983:224) the expected “Deliverer” of the Jews. According to the Old Law, “priests (Exodus 29:29; Leviticus 4:3), King
(1 Samuel 10:1: 24:7), and prophets (Isaiah 61:1) were supposed to be anointed for their respective offices:...’” (Maas, in The Catholic Encyclopedia 1910: Online Retrieved in 2013).

In His earthly ministry, it could not be doubted that Emmanuel Christus (my choice name for our Lord, Jesus Christ), combined in His person the (three) offices of prophet (John 6:14; Matthew 13:57; Luke 13:33; 24:19) of King (Luke 23:2; Acts 17:7; 1 Corinthians 15:24; Apocalypse 15:3), and priest (Hebrew 2:17; etc). He fulfilled all the Messianic predictions in a fuller and higher sense than had been given them by the teachers of the synagogue. In fact in His supposed mission statement, Christus (Christ) quoting from Isaiah 61:1 says: “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me; He has anointed me to bring glad tidings to the poor…” (Luke 4:18). Emmanuel Christus then, is the anointed “God-with-us”.

B. Paradigmatic: The word “Paradigmatic” is the adjective of the noun – “Paradigm”, which simply means “an example” or “examplar”. In more technical terms the Chambers Dictionary defines “Paradigm” as “a basic theory, a conceptual framework within which scientific theories are constructed” (Kirkpatrick 1983:920). The word paradigmatic itself has two Greek roots – “Para” which means beside or beyond and “deikynai” which means “to show”. When combined, the Greek word – “Paradeigma - paradeiknynai” means “to exhibit side by side”; while it’s French equivalent is “Paradigme”. From this perspective, paradigm (paradigmatic (adj.)) is an example or examplar when considered side by side other things, persons, or issues of like nature or characteristics. That is why the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of current English defines it technically or formally as “a typical example or pattern of something”. In respect of Grammar, the Oxford defines it as “a set of all the different forms of a word” (Hornby 2010:1064). The same Oxford Dictionary went ahead to define “paradigm shift” (noun) as “a great and important change in the way something is done or thought about” (Hornby 2010:1064).

Our purpose of considering Emmanuel Christus as “Paradigm leader” with the definitive article – “The Paradigmatic Leader,” is to show that considering from the past, present and even projecting to the future, his leadership qualities, methods and ingenuity is unparalleled, most excellent and perfect both in theory and practice. As we proceed the details of how He brought a “paradigm shift” both in the concept and practice of leadership would be made clearer.

C. Sociopolitical[^1]: The word “Sociopolitical” is the adjective of the compound words social and political, which in turn is derived from two nouns – “society” and “politics” respectively. “Society”, as we intend to use it here, is an association of human beings and suggests the whole complex of the relations of man to his follows. It consists of “the complicated network of groups and institutions expressing human association” (Appodorai 1975: 13). Thus, when we mean society here, we do just mean the state, (although it is not excluded), but we mean the entire gamut of man’s relationship with fellow man in his divine terrestrial domain.

On the other hand, “Politics”, as we use it here, is the act or science of managing and administrating human affairs. It is as we noted elsewhere, “a science that deals with the intricacies and maneuverings in sociopolitical and economic existence and living”, which by so doing, “tries to find out the ideal structure of human-environmental sustenance” (Nwankwor 2006: 35). In politics, more than anywhere else, man is challenged to make optimum use of his God’s-given rationality in solving or finding solutions to his existential questions and quandaries. That is why A. Appodorai defines politics as “the science concerned with the state and of the
conditions essential to its existence and development”, which also treats of “the foundations of the state and the principles of government” (Appadorai 1975:4). This paper dwells more on the foundations, principles and conditions essential for Sociopolitical Order, coherence and harmony.

D. LEADER: The concept of leadership from where the noun – “leader”, comes is ambivalent in that it has varied applications. Leadership can be used in different contexts and can be applied in diverse fields of endeavour such as: family, society, politics, religion, economics, government, political institutions and affiliations, organizations, managerial and entrepreneurial establishments, public and private sectors, academic and educational establishments, intellectual, technological and scientific know-how, skills and technical developments, crafts and artistic prowess, to mention but these few. However, there are some general themes that are associated with these varied forms such as authority, expertise, wisdom, skill, knowledge, focus, direction, ability and capability, ingenuity and experience. It is from this perspective that Chambers Dictionary (Kirkpatrick 1983: 717) defines a leader as one who leads or goes first; a chief… the head of a party, expedition; etc. A leader is a guide, a director, a pathfinder, a manager, an administrator, an organizer, a ruler or a model. It is also from this perspective that different establishments, institutions, organizations or societies have different or specific names for their leader(s). Thus, we have such designations as: Master, Lord, Head, President, Governor, Chairman (Chairperson), Excellency, Eminence, Holiness, etc as official names or designate(s) for (a) leader(s). Depending on what kind of leader or leadership one is considering, there are always some kinds of qualities, virtues, wisdom or ingenuity that is expected of a real, true and efficient leader. Those who do not possess these qualities may be dictators, imposters, authoritarians, totalitarians, despots or vampires.

In this article, nevertheless, we wish to limit our focus on the sociopolitical leadership qualities or attributes and characteristics of our Lord Jesus Christ (whom we prefer to call Emmanuel Christus), with the aim of projecting them as paradigm and sine qua non for our contemporary leaders and leadership who have plunged the entire global society into existential jeopardy by their ignorance, corruption, ineptitude, inefficiency, lack of true vision and mission.

E. SOCIOPOLITICAL LEADER: In our definition of the compound word “Sociopolitical”, we noted that the concept is rooted to “society” and “politics”. Society, we observed, consists of “the complicated network of groups and institutions expressing human association” (Appadorai 1975:13); while Politics is a science that “deals with the intricacies and maneuverings in sociopolitical and economic existence and living”, which by so doing, “tries to find out the ideal structure of human environmental sustenance” (Nwankwor, 2006:35). In similar vein, Prof. Joseph I. Omoregbe has defined sociopolitical philosophy as “the philosophical investigation on how best society should be organized in order to provide man with what he needs, …to develop himself (and his potentials) and live a happy life” (Omoregbe, 2007: vi).

For man to develop himself and potentials, live a happy, meaningful and fulfilling life as well as fend for his existential necessities and comfort, there is need for a good, true and competent leader. A true sociopolitical leader then, is one who is able to lead, guide and direct the society to its primary and fundamental objectives, goals, aspirations and ends. A good and true sociopolitical leader is at once a “de jure” and “de facto” authority who has proper vision and genuine mission of navigating the societal ship of existence with the wise compass of Divine
principles and laws. A competent sociopolitical leader is one with the proper mandate and qualification of leading the society to righteousness, justice, peace, harmony, orderliness, coherence, unity, and love of one another, God and His entire creation. Whenever and wherever there is true sociopolitical leadership and citizenship, the society prospers (Confer: Proverbs 14:34). That is why we reasoned elsewhere that “Leaders determine the pace of progress, while the other citizens direct or dictate the way” (Nwankwor 2008:69 (C.3 N.375)).

In a nutshell a sociopolitical leader, worthy of the name, should be able to lead, direct, guide, organize, administer and manage the complicated network of social groups, associations, institutions and establishments that form the horizon of human socio-environmental and existential sphere. To prosper in this endeavour, the sociopolitical leader must be imbued with Divine wisdom which is the focal principle and dynamic law of existential prosperity, happiness and longevity.

EMMANUEL CHRISTUS’ LEADERSHIP: (AUTHORITY AND QUALIFICATION; METHODS/STYLES; AND WISDOM/LEADERSHIP INGENUITY)

Our intention here is to examine the paradigmatic leadership of our Lord, Emmanuel Christus from three-pronged perspectives viz: His Authority and Qualification; His Methods/Styles; and His Wisdom/Leadership Ingenuity.

EMMANUEL CHRISTUS’ AUTHORITY AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP:

Emmanuel Christus is eminently qualified as a leader from all round perspectives. His authority to lead is from time immemorial and indisputable. As the Word of God (John 1:1) which took flesh and dwelt among us (John 1:14), Christ (the messiah and anointed son of God) is the incarnate love of God who was sent to grant man salvation and eternal life “for God so love the world that he gave his only son, so that everyone who believes in him might not perish but might have eternal life” (John 3:16) .While proclaiming punishment on the serpent who tricked Adam and Eve (the progenitors of humanity) into disobeying their creator (God), God declared inter alia: “I will make you enemies, you and the woman, your offspring and her offspring. He will crush your head and you will strike his heel.” (Christian Community Bible, Genesis 3:15).

This offspring of woman, who is to strike the head of the cunning serpent, is Emmanuel Christus. He is the Wisdom of God in dealing with the disobedience of Adam and Eve. “For though He had the nature of God, He did not cling to His equality with God, rather He emptied Himself, taking the nature of a servant. He became like men and appeared in human likeness. He was humble and walked the path of obedience all the way to death—even the death on the cross” (Philippians 2:6-8). His food, all through his earthly existence, was to do the will of God (John 4:34). The authority of Emmanuel Christus as Divine Sociopolitical Leader is evidenced even from the prophesy of his name. “Therefore the Lord himself will give you this sign: the Virgin shall be with child, and bear a son, and shall name him Immanuel” (Isaiah 7:14). This Emmanuel, God-with-us, shall possess the spirit of God, and therefore his regime shall possess the marks of true sociopolitical order and perfect harmony in the whole of creation which include: Truth and honesty, justice and peace, love and reconciliation, knowledge and understanding, unity and progress, righteousness and prosperity, wisdom and truthfulness, freedom and security.
The prophet Isaiah captures the essence of Emmanuel Christus’ sociopolitical leadership thus:  

But a shoot shall sprout from the stump of Jesse, and from his roots a bud shall blossom.  
The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: a spirit of counsel and of strength, a spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord, and his delight shall be the fear of the Lord. Not by appearance shall he judge nor by hearsay shall he decide, but he shall judge the poor with justice, and decide aright for the land’s afflicted. He shall strike the ruthless with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall slay the wicked. Justice shall be the band around his waist, and faithfulness a belt upon his hips (Isaiah 11:1-5).

Emmanuel Christus justifies His name and qualification, as paradigmatic sociopolitical leader, in His mission statement: The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring glad tidings to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty to captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, and to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord (Luke 4: 18-19).

But more than verbal or epistemological justifications, Emmanuel Christus ontologically justifies his name and mission in deeds, actions, behavior, words, utterance and decorum. He went about doing good-alleviating the burdens of those suffering and oppressed, offering grace and forgiveness to sinners and down-trodden, raising the hope and expectations of the sorrowful and marginalized, and providing protection and security to the helpless and defenseless. His incarnation has indeed marked the jubilee year of freedom from darkness, illusion and falsehood; it has brought unprecedented joy, peace and happiness; He has inaugurated a kingdom of truth, justice and honesty; He has introduced a new principle of love for the redistribution of natural wealth and resources; and indeed has given us the grace of remission of our debts, sins and burdens. Thus, from the “de jure” and “de facto” perspectives, the authority, authenticity and qualifications of Emmanuel Christus as paradigmatic sociopolitical cum economic leader is incontestable. The cry of the masses who witnessed the years of His gracious earthly existence is “He has done all things well”(Mark 7:37). Unlike most earthly sociopolitical leaders who present no credible credentials, authority and mandate for leadership, Emmanuel Christus possesses sterling qualities of good leadership, the stainless character and discipline of a just administrator, as well as the Holy Spirit of a wise judge, Counselor and manager. Within the shortest possible time limits and spatial boundaries, he has reorganized the entire universal realm in their proper, essential and existential focus and Divine pre-rogatives. He neither stole nor forced Himself into office. He was not even willing to allow people (even His disciples) to expose Him or reveal His true identity or crown Him king. He would only assert His identity and mission in order to refute falsehood or correct a wrong impression thereby putting things in their proper perspectives. He remained silent most often, but this became very infectious and affective.

EMMANUEL CHRISTUS’ METHODS AND STYLES OF LEADERSHIP

There is hardly a linguistic paradigm to capture the sociopolitical leadership methods and styles of Emmanuel Christus. If we may apply a feeble language, we may import the internet ideas of Transformational Leadership to give a dim description of this master, teacher, and good shepherd of all-generational sociopolitical leaders. The internet source describes a transformational leader as one who:

...enhances the motivation, morale and performance of followers through a variety of mechanisms. These include connecting the follower’s sense of identity and self to the project and collective identity of the organization; being a role model for followers to
take greater ownership for their work and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of followers, so the leader can align followers with task that enhance their performance.

The ingenuity of Emmanuel Christus as a paradigm Sociopolitical leader is displayed in His choice of followers, apostles and disciples, whom He would later hand over the task of organizing, building and pruning an assembly of faithful who are focused on learning and following the way to eternal life. In His list are people of different backgrounds, classes, sexes, orientations and professions, dispositions and temperaments. The wisdom of this vast array of choice of followers is to ensure equitable distribution, fair play, meaningful representation and justice. The goal is to enhance the motivation, morale and commitment of His followers in the pursuit of the kingdom of God. Again, by identifying with people of all classes and professions, Emmanuel Christus gives them a sense of belonging, dignifies their labours, and authenticates their earthly existence as possible pathway to eternity. By His choice also, Emmanuel Christus criticizes the prevalent discrimination, separation and inequality that exist in human affairs. He, thus, prescribes unity in diversity, since all of us, human beings, divergent as we are, share the same fatherhood in God, our Divine Creator.

Moreover, Emmanuel Christus’ leadership styles include the introduction and definition of leadership as service. In His numerous works, teachings and actions, Emmanuel Christus shows that the primary duty of a sociopolitical leader is to be servant or minister for the led or citizen. His healing of the sick, curing the diseased, raising the dead and driving away evil spirit that tormented individuals, are all invaluable services to humanity. Indeed He is the philanthropist (lover of mankind) par excellence. His works makes it easy for us to understand some of his teachings such as: the good Samaritan as a real neighbor; the greatest as the servant of all; and whatsoever you do to the least of these little ones, that you do unto me (Matthew 25:40). He was later to practicalize in a drama-form, the servant-leadership ideology and theory by washing the feet of His Apostles. In his parting message to His Apostles, He told them to emulate Him by washing the feet of others.

Moreover, Emmanuel Christus’ leadership is characterized by proper analysis and synthesis of issues. While he argues with Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic that “justice is giving each man his own due”, He emphasizes that the goodness of each individual is in relation to the collective affiliation to Divinity. Thus, His direction of justice is towards universal application and global relevance in Divinity. He once declared to people who were pointing to him in the direction of particularity and individual emotional concerns: “Here are my mother and my brothers. Anyone who does the will of God, that person is my brother and sister and mother” (Mark 3: 31-35). He believes that one qualifies for justice (Divine, social, legal or personal etc) by being right with God.

The servant who refused to do the will of the father initially but later did (Matt. 21: 28-32), is recognized as deserving justice on grounds of obedience. The dishonest steward who was reported to be squandering his master’s property, was commended for acting prudently in trying to be lenient with his master’s debtors (Luke 16: 1-9). The dishonest servant would receive justice of forgiveness (welcome into eternal dwellings), because in trying to gain favour from his master’s debtors, he wrote off their debts to him. For once, at least, he exhibited human sympathy and warmth of heart. His clever or prudent action is considered as wise judgment which synchronizes with another of Christ’s teaching: “Forgive and you will be forgiven” (Luke 6: 37).
Moreover, the repentant sinner who was crucified with Emmanuel Christus was forgiven and promised paradise on similar grounds of showing compassion, concern and mercy. This also corresponds with another teaching of His: “Blessed are the merciful for they will be shown mercy” (Matthew 5:7). The repentant sinner’s merciful disposition on the cross is counted as a righteous act which qualifies him for justice of forgiveness and the favour of entering eternal paradise. In the main, righteousness for Christus, is the foundation of justice (Divine, social, legal, personal etc), and not religious affiliations, sociopolitical leanings, party membership and loyalty, blood or biological ties, ethnicity, tribalism, god-fatherism, sex, kinship, “kpolakpo”, material, paternal, maternal or fraternal connections. This righteousness incorporates in itself the idea of fairness.

The woman who was caught in the very act of adultery was to be stoned to death by the legal terms of the Old Testament (law). However, Christus, who came to give full meaning and interpretation of the laws, saw in the demand to kill the adulteress some basic injustice. First, the co-adulterer was not brought or mentioned; and secondly, the accusers themselves were, one way or the other, guilty. He gave them a puzzle which set the woman free from death penalty, and gave her an opportunity of repentance and making restitution for her sin by declaring to her: “go, sin no more”. By this declaration, Emmanuel Christus shows total condemnation of sin in all its ramifications, criticizing the ungodly intention of death penalty, set at the back-ground of injustice and unfairness.

Emmanuel Christus’ Sociopolitical leadership prescribes the methodology of inclusion and unity as He criticizes all exclusive, seclusive, segregative, separative and dissiputive methods and ideologies. He has compassion and regard for all classes of people including children. He was indignant with his disciples for trying to turn the children away from being touched by Him. Opposing the attitude of the disciples he said: “Let the little children come to me; do not stop them…”(Mark 10:13-16). Christus’ actions contrast with the attitude of most sociopolitical leaders who are unconcerned about unemployed youths and general welfare of the young and children. Most Sociopolitical leaders who have obstructing P.A.’s (personal assistants) like Emmanuel Christus’ disciples, would, unlike Christus, be unconcerned, too busy, impatient and unwilling to give ear to the petitions of those in the lower rung of social ladder, not to talk of paying attention to their problems or attending to the needs (files inclusive) of their perceived enemies.

In place of global sociopolitical insecurity, anarchy and chaos, Emmanuel Christus came to inaugurate true peace on earth. He was born as prophesized “a prince of peace” (Isaiah 9:5-6), the angels sang at His birth—“glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of goodwill” (Luke 2:14). In a parting dialogue with his disciples he said: “my peace I give to you, not as the world gives…” (John 14:27). All earthly sociopolitical leaders and ideologies, put together, have not been able to articulate the conditions and criteria of true peace on earth which Emmanuel Christus thought. This inability to articulate the integral criteria of true peace is the cause of global insecurity, disorderliness and chaos. Emmanuel Christus’ criteria and conditions, however, are integral in the sense that they meet all theoretical and practical dimension of existential orderliness. The criteria incorporate the Holy Spirit as the active principle of love, mercy, forgiveness, justice, righteousness, goodness, unity and co-operation.

However, the inability to apply these principles integratively with the assistance of the Holy Spirit could engender disaffection, instability, misunderstanding, quarrelling, fighting,
warring, insecurity, disorderliness, anarchy and chaos which are direct opposites of peace. That is why Emmanuel Christus frankly informed his audience in Matthew 10:34-36 and Luke 12:51-53: “Do you think I have come to bring peace upon the earth, I have come to bring not peace but the sword. For I have come to set “a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and one’s enemies will be those of his household” (Matthew 10:34-36). But the most significant and impressive method and style of sociopolitical leadership which Emmanuel Christus introduced is the balance between freedom and authority. This indeed is His sociopolitical ingenuity.

EMMANUEL CHRISTUS’ WISDOM AND LEADERSHIP INGENUITY
ON AUTHORITY: The most significant wisdom and ingenuity which Emmanuel Christus introduced in sociopolitical field is in the areas of Authority and Freedom. Authority and freedom are in themselves very vast designates. The areas they cover are vast, ominous and transcendent. The terms apply in such contexts as: the natural and supernatural; the sociopolitical and socioeconomic, the religious and cultural; the professional and the technical; the scientific and the philosophical; the moral and the psychological just to mention but a few. In our present context, our discussion ought to be limited to sociopolitical authority and freedom, but given the unique figure of our treatment and the interlocking relationship that exist in considerations of the concepts of authority and freedom, we may, at times inadvertently, be making reference(s) to one or the other type of authority and freedom.

We need to point out “ab initio” (from the beginning) that all “authorities in authority” are mere participants in the creative freedom and wisdom which God endowed existence for the generative activity of “increasing, multiplying and subduing the earth” (Genesis 1: 28). To comprehend the proper nature and goal of things in existence, God sent us His son, Emmanuel Christus, to guide us to the light of truth of sociopolitical order, “for God so loved the world that he gave his only son, so that everyone who believes in him might not perish but might have eternal life” (John 3:16). It is this authority to teach, direct, guide and lead all to eternal life in God, their creator, that makes Emmanuel Christus’s leadership unique and exceptional. Thus, though Emmanuel Christus has supreme and unlimited authority and freedom in sociopolitical and all other spheres, he decided to balance them to show us a model of living. When a test was put to Him on payment of taxes to the authority of Caesar, he puzzled them with the answer: “give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s”(Matthew 22:21). In other words, as the tax was to be paid to Caesar with a coin bearing his insignia, so is Caesar supposed to bring all taxes paid to him, together with himself, to the authority whose insignia Caesar himself bore namely God, his maker and guarantor of authority. By this answer also, Emmanuel Christus emphasis the importance of obedience and respect to temporary authorities, who are equally themselves expected to unreservedly honour and obey God, who granted them the opportunity and privilege of occupying their various positions. That is why St. Paul writing to the Romans admonished:

Let every person be subordinate to the higher authority, for there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been established by God. Therefore, whoever resists authority opposes what God has appointed, and those who oppose it will bring judgment upon themselves (Zinkuratire 2010:1905; Romans 13: 1-2).
Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that obedience and respect to temporal authorities are in respect of what is right and never with regard to what is wrong. “So St. Paul, just as Christus, is certainly not encouraging a blind obedience even to dictators who have no respect for the law of God.” (Zinkuratire 2010:1905 (Footnote); Romans 13:1). Christus overtly condemned the thinking and activities of the Pharisees, Scribes, publicans and other authorities in His earthly life who observed the letters of the Sabbath regulations, and other laws forgetting their real spirit and God’s demand by those rules and laws. St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae has enlisted about seven criteria for obedience to civil authorities23. We must even note that a “de facto” authority, who is not elected properly, appointed or voted into office, “has no locus standi” (proper position/stand) of exercising power; and what is more, if he/she exercises such powers capriciously, irresponsibly or without respect to God and His laws. Even in the case of a “de jure” authority (those properly constituted), the thrust of their exercise of power should be in the direction of what is good, acceptable, and mature and in consonance with Divine laws. Also in conflict situations we, just like the apostles of old (confer: Acts 5:29; 14:19), “must obey God rather than man” (civil authorities). Thus, unquestionable obedience is not necessarily to be given to temporal or civil authorities but to God, who is the Supreme authority in all ramifications of authority.

However, all authorities in heaven, on earth and underneath have been given to Emmanuel Christus (confer: 1Cor. 15:24; Col. 2:10; 1Peter 3:22; Jude 25). That is why “at (the call/mention of) the name of Jesus every knee should bend… those in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.” (Philippians 2:10-11). As God, Emmanuel Christus is all powerful and all power proceeds from Him as supreme authority. By authority here is meant “a claim of legitimacy, the justification and right to exercise that power” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authority). Max Weber distinguishes three types of legitimacy in authority (viz namely, rational legal, traditional and charismatic). It is amazing to realize that in all of these senses Emmanuel Christus is eminently qualified as supreme authority. However, Christus authority in our present context proceeds from his total obedience and unreserved submissiveness to the will of God, the Father, in all things and at all times. In like manner, all earthly authorities and ministers ought to emulate Christus in obedience and submissiveness to the will of God in all things and at all times and circumstances.

ON FREEDOM: The concept of freedom, just like that of authority which we have perused, has many connotations and is used in vast fields including economy, religion, culture, arts, science, environmental and ecological studies, politics, philosophy, arts etc likewise there are several authorities on freedom and their views differ extensively. In the sociopolitical sphere for instance, people have made distinctions of “freedom from” and “freedom to”, individual/personal freedom and collective/public freedom. People also talk of freedom here in terms of independence and autonomy. There are so many diverse opinions that at times people call freedom, unfreedom, and unfreedom, freedom; such that the views are often misconstrued or even antithetical to one another. However, political freedom is a significant feature of democratic societies. “It has been described as a relationship free of oppression or coercion; the absence of disabling conditions of an individual and the fulfillment of enabling conditions; or the absence of lived conditions of compulsion, example economic compulsion in a society” (en.wikipedia../Political Freedom).
Political freedom, in this sense, guarantees the meaningful survival of an individual in social and political milieu. “Left wing political philosophy generally couples the notion of freedom with that of positive liberty, or the enabling of a group or individual to determine their own life or realize their own potential. Freedom, in this sense, may include freedom from poverty, starvation, treatable disease and oppression, as well as freedom from force and coercion, from whomever they may issue” (en.wikipedia/..Political Freedom).

Emmanuel Christus gave full meaning to the idea of freedom, just as He asserted that “you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free” (1 John 8:32). In His healing miracles of different diseases and of those who were possessed and oppressed by different existential forces, as well as his physical and spiritual feeding of those starving of material food and the word of God, He demonstrated His assertion in His mission statement: “The spirit of God is upon me (Him) and it has anointed me (Him) to set the captives free” (Lk. 4:18). Christus indeed is the supreme Divine authority who came to balance authority and freedom. His supreme authority and freedom were not to oppress, subjugate, irritate, or tyrannize the less privileged and down-trodden, but to assist them, heal them, sympathize with them, give them new sense of belonging, and offer hope of existence as well as (give them) life in abundance. Here authority which terrorizes and used to be feared is brought to balance with freedom of the individual and society to choose and determine their existential goals and aspirations. Even though Christus wills that we choose the right and peaceful ways which are the true ones He taught us. He, nonetheless, leaves us with the freedom to choose our own destinies. Thus, by these, He teaches us the true ways that leads to freedom indeed.

From Emmanuel Christus perspectives, we see the confirmation of Hannah Arendt’s views that “freedom was historically inseparable from political action” (en.wikipedia/..Political Freedom). Just as Hannah Arendt conceives the idea of freedom as “the capacity to begin anew”, “the freedom to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known”, (en.wikipedia/..Political Freedom), so Christus’ handling of freedom was novel and emulative. His freedom meant bringing new innovations and ideas for sociopolitical order. His freedom also meant, both in political and social spheres, actions for the enhancement and betterment of the human society. The old legalistic systems and mosaic legislations He viewed in their proper perspectives and spirit, not necessarily according to their wordings and letters. It is from this perspective that we can also appreciate His claims: “I am the way, the truth and life” (John 14:6). He indeed is the truth about things; and the way to the true nature of things, which leads us to knowledge of true things that liberates or sets free. In the political and social realms, He has set standards which lead to the truth that eventually sets free. In the sociopolitical sphere, He sets structures that can guarantee maximum security for minorities, as John Dalberg- Action would suggest. His action of freedom “paripasu” authority is not autocracy, suppression or negligence. It is rather creatively novel as encapsulated in the idea of a lion sitting with a lamb and a small child playing with them (Confer: Isaiah 65:25). So both theoretically (in His teachings) and practically (in His actions), Christus has wisely and prudently demonstrated that sovereign authority with its paraphernalia of power and influence can concomitantly co-exist with freedom of the individual, groups and societies in united action for the progress, development and creative enrichment of the human society and existential environment.
After all, some notable philosophers like Alasdair Macintyre reasons that freedom owes its existence to our “social interdependence with other people” (en.wikipedia/./Political Freedom). Certainly, God who created man and noted that he needed a companion and helpmate, desired him to live in peace and unity, respecting the rights, privileges and freedom of others. That is why the political philosopher Nicholas Kompridis thinks that the pursuit of freedom in the modern era is motivated by two ideals of: autonomy or independence and the ability to cooperatively initiate a new beginning (Confer: en.wikipedia/./Political Freedom). Without freedom to choose and determine our goals, the life of man would be filled with boredom and monotony; and what is more, there would be no innovations and creativity. Emmanuel Christus from savagery, oppression and slavery. In His teachings and actions are the true conditions for enabling grounds and avenues for man’s free exercise of his talents and potentials. Even in His choice of followers and disciplines, He did not go for the already known and talented; He rather chose the unknown, the weak and the unrecognized to bring them to a dignified life of leadership. By His choice and development of His followers and disciples, Christus was saying that given enabling conditions, freedom, love and care, any human being can excel to optimum and that there is dignity and glory in all human labour. That is why certain kinds of artistic and cultural practices are identified as belonging to political freedom by people like Cornelius Cathoriadis, Anthonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Ranciere, and Theodor Adorno (Confer: en.wikipedia/./Political Freedom).

But more importantly, Michael Foucault thinks that political freedom has to do with “power relations” or the power of action upon actions. That is why the supreme authority of Emmanuel Christus to teach the truth and the right is the greatest enabling condition of freedom from savagery, oppression and slavery. In His teachings and actions are the true conditions for freedom of all kinds: “You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free” (John 8:32). Indeed there can be no better grounds of basing the theory and practice of authority and freedom in all their different connotations and applications than the impeccable teachings of Emmanuel Christus on love, mercy, righteousness, justice, forgivenness, unity, cooperation, communion, holiness, humility, obedience and submissiveness. These principles guarantee that authority cannot become autocracy, insensitive and greedy, any more than freedom can become license leading to anarchy, chaos, and disorderliness.

**EVALUATION: WHY PARADIGMATIC?**

When in antiquity venerable sage Plato in the mouth of his mentor Socrates, was confronted with the problem of characterizing the essential quality of an ideal or paradigmatic society or state, he was able through rigorous reasoning to arrive at justice. Plato’s idea of justice is very bogus and incorporates what contemporary philosophers and thinkers have detailed into many parts to include: fairness, equity, equality, brotherhood, integral humanity, “ibuanyi Danda ideology”, orderliness, security, righteousness, unity, progress, patriotism, nationalism, freedom, independence and self determination, self reliance, socialism, communism, democracy, etc. When Plato was to be confronted with an even harder question of who should manage, control, organize, administer, or be in-charge of this his paradigmatic or ideal state, he (still through the mouth of Socrates) was even to puzzle his audience the more by his answers.
The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of day, and there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed, ... of humanity itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come into the same hands, while the many natures now content to follow either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debared from doing so (Plato 1974:263).

What Plato meant by the philosopher here is as bogus as the word justice which qualifies the paradigmatic state/society. By the true “philosopher”, Plato means the man who loves (Greek philiein) wisdom (Sophia) in the widest sense including especially, learning, knowledge and truth (Nnoruka, in Nwankwor’s 2005:xxv-xxvi). Since Plato’s philosophical prophesy was made years ago, no state or society has been free from troubles because the adjuncts of the prediction has not been fully realized.

Plato’s prediction implies that the philosopher kings or rulers must not only be learned and knowledgeable but possess the qualities of educationists and educators; in other words they must be philosophers-educators. “The philosopher educator”, as we reasoned elsewhere, “is a philosopher with a difference. He is a radical teacher who teaches in all ramifications with different signs, symbols and instruments of imparting knowledge, wisdom and understanding. The philosopher-educator... knows and has the knowledge of the intellectual, spiritual, moral, social, political, economic, cultural etc. needs of his age and the geographical pendulum of the generations past, present and future,... The philosopher-educator has a Divine direction and dimension in teaching the society, in that real teaching necessitates wisdom, knowledge, understanding, courage, persistence, perseverance, patience, meekness, impeccable discipline, as well as infinite docility to the sparks of the spirit (Nwankwor, in Ukagha 2013:52-53).

Throughout the length and breadth of history (past, present and future) there is only one “Philosopher-Educator”, Emmanuel Christus, our Lord Jesus Christ. He alone has taught, in theory and practice, all that is necessary and sufficient for societal order, peace, progress and real happiness. The practical wisdom He taught is able to align the entire global society into a peaceful Divine-community. The lucidity of His theoretical expositions of truth and the fecundity of His wisdom is able to unify the entire universe, endowing it with perennial vivacity, prosperity and happiness. Indeed, the wisdom and conceptual ingenuity (both theoretical and practical) which He brought in the social and political realms are at once insuperable and sublime.

One may ask: why are there still troubles, instability, insecurity and unrest in states and societies? The answer is that God, who wants us to be social and political human beings, living with other primates in a limited environment with insufficient resources and means, and operating in temporal boundaries, desires that we emulate His Son-Emmanuel Christus. Once human beings are able to live by the theories and principles of Emmanuel Christus, the global universe will attain unprecedented joy and happiness. And what is more, once the managers, controllers, organizers, administrators, kings, rulers and directors of sociopolitical and earthly affairs are able to lead by the guidelines and sketches of Emmanuel Christus, the Supreme Shepherd, then humanity and existence would experience Plato’s type of justice in all its ramifications. It is a society or state that enjoys this kind of justice and righteousness, that is exalted by Holiness (God) for eternal happiness and glory. Emmanuel Christus’ earthly nativity is the Divine announcement of the earthly possibility of such states and societies. It is possible that following
the Divine principles of Emmanuel Christus, the polemics and quandaries in sociopolitical and existential spheres, can dissolve into orderliness, peace, security and longevity.

One may further argue: Are there not many professional philosophers, thinkers, educators and educationists, learned and knowledgeable people even Christians occupying positions of leadership in the sociopolitical and other strata of existence as of present? So, why are there many troubles and anarchy in the world? The answer is that the numerical increment of leaders in the professional/academic philosophizing, learned and knowledgeable gurus, educators/educationists, even with Christian identity, does not address the issue of truth and altruism in respect of their philosophical and Christian bearings. The issue is not only quantitative but qualitative. That troubles, anarchy, insecurity, and sociopolitical disorders still abound on earth, is indicative of how far humanity and earthly existence is far away from the sublime teachings and impeccable principles of Emmanuel Christus for sociopolitical and existential harmony, coherence, consistency and continuity. That people can acquire legal certificates and certifications as well as wisdom or manifesting the spiritual unction of Christianity is indeed perilous.

Global modernity is gradually tied in a convolution of conflicts between the true and the false, the real and the appearance, theory and practice, all emanating from superficial imitation of Emmanuel Christus and dishonest applications of His loving principles for sociopolitical and existential order. If only existential and sociopolitical leaders, in their ranks and files, should immolate themselves from the trappings of power and authority, like Emmanuel Christus, to obey the Divine loving principles of coexistence, our sociopolitical impasse would have breathed the fresh air of true freedom and prosperity. To have a trouble-free and properly ordered society or state, leaders as shepherds, must be really and truly like Emmanuel Christus. He is a perfect paradigm that guarantees sociopolitical propriety and real security. Any imitation of Emmanuel Christus’ leadership styles and methods that is not in-depth, genuine, sincere, honest and truthful, can at best guarantee insecurity in the future and a possibility of chaos. To tread the part of dignity and honour is for societies, states, individuals or citizens and their leaders to be thoroughly schooled and enmeshed in the ways and systems of Emmanuel Christus.

It is with limited knowledge and temporal insight that people like Machiavelli recommend insecurity, duplicity and dubiousness as guarantors of sociopolitical stability. It is lack of Christus-type of wisdom that Hobbesian “homo lupus homini” (Man is a wolf to man) is the order in global sociopolitical arena. It is because of lack of Christus’-like discipline and decorum that Sigmund Freud’s “libido-centered psychoanalysis” is pervading the mental psyche, conscious and unconscious actions (even those of apex sociopolitical leadership). It is superficial understanding of Emmanuel Christus thesis on love, unity (brotherhood) and peace that have led many to tie their sociopolitical hopes on temporal ideologies such as democracy, socialism, capitalism or even totalitarianism.

The feminist thesis of absolute equality, especially of opposite sexes based on experienced suppression, oppression, subjugation and segregation, is misguided or ill-informed reductionist analysis and synthesis of Christus holistic philosophy and theology of liberation and freedom. To be certain, Emmanuel Christus was never in support of suppression or oppression. “Instead of the message of subjugation by the status quo. His mission was that of liberation and freedom” (Udoidem, 2008:63). He was to espouse, in theory and practice, the “truth-theory” which guarantees absolute liberation and freedom.
Concerning those who propagate segregation and separation, Christus teaches that it is only those that remain with Him and are faithful to His theories and doctrines that can bear fruit, for “cut off from me you can do nothing” (John 15: 5). He also taught that those who are not against Him are for Him (Mark 9: 38-40). However, being for Him is neither to be partial nor selective for He alone “has the message of life”, the thesis in theory and practice, that guarantees “life in abundance” and satisfaction. So, feminism in its absolute equality and liberal renditions, that can lead to such aberrations as lesbianism, homosexualism, neglect of domestic and family duties and responsibilities, is either an epistemological abortion of Christus’ thesis on true freedom, or an ontological exhibition of ignorance of the rubrics of his sublime theory of love.

All types of governments such as monarchy, despotism, dictatorship, oligarchy, aristocracy, totalitarianism, and the so-called democracy or its African brand Ohacracy, that do not respect the supremacy of Divine sovereignty or is not accountable to Almighty God in respect of its dealings especially with the led or the citizens, are condemned by Emmanuel Christus’ theo-centric governance. Likewise, all systems of government such as feudalism, capitalism, socialism, welfareism, mixed-economy, that does not follow Emmanuel Christus’ principles of accountability and responsibility for fellow human beings especially the poor, the less privileged and the “anawin” (or the wretched of the earth), has been proved to be oppressive, exploitative and incapable of developing man, integrally.

Governments which have been insensitive to Christus’ sociopolitical theory have rendered humanity miserable and created existential anarchy. In the past where inordinate ambition has led man to trade on fellow man or sap the energy and resources of his fellow without due compensation, agony and misery have been the order of the day. Human beings have moved from one generation of woes to another of unprecedented exploitation and deprivation simply because the beacon of hope set by Christus’ theory of agape love is either neglected or ignored. The leadership of sacrifice (or sacrifice by the leader) which Emmanuel Christus taught has been misinterpreted by the rich and powerful in the society to mean the sacrifice of the led/follower and the less privileged in the society. Thus, governments are now establishments for the “exploitation of the people, by the powerful, through the parties” (Confer: Omoregbe 2007:41). Ministers, who by definitions are servants, are now served by their policies, decrees, suggestions and advice to their political bosses and patrons, the greatest vampires of the masses and citizens. The party representatives of the people are now the people’s greatest enemies as their deliberations have no apparent solutions to the plight of the common man in the street. Senatorial positions are now honourable associations of greedy dupes for the wholesome vandalization of their nations. This is how Emmanuel Christus’ ethics of love, care, concern, fraternity and compassion is misinterpreted. In this context, the theory which Christus taught and lived for is grossly misinterpreted and dishonestly applied.

The different systems of government adopted by global societies have been irresponsible to our common brotherhood in Divinity which Emmanuel Christus spent his life and Divine resources to expose. His doctrines on peace, unity, love, justices, mercy and forgiveness etc. are quite ample for the rejuvenation of earthly existence. That they are ignored or willfully misapplied is not a question mark on their paradigmatic sagacity. Emmanuel Christus’ sociopolitical wisdom still remains the firmest foundation of establishing any enduring sociopolitical structure. The ingenuity He brought with His analysis of sociopolitical structures, criticism of existing sociopolitical status quo, prophylactic and therapeutic prescriptions for
sociopolitical progress and His reflective insights into the ensemble of existence is quite unique and unparalleled. He is indeed the sociopolitical paradigm and the greatest lesson in leadership.

CONCLUSION

So far, ours is a little opening into the in-depth provisions God made for man, whom He intends to live socially and politically. No man could unravel the profound wisdom and implication of God-with-us, Emmanuel Christus, who came to teach, direct and guide us in the right ways to sociopolitical happiness. Certainly, God, the **Summum Bonum (the Highest Good)**, intends us to enjoy and be happy in our social and political existence, which is a continuation of the communion of the saints celestially and terrestrially. Along the line, the cord of this perennial happiness was severed by man’s inability to manage his freedom, both personal and collective. In the wake of this anomaly, disorderliness, difficulties and troubles set in. Anarchy, chaos, callousness and greed, which God checkmated by giving man rationality, then became the order of the day. Man’s inhumanity to man escalated to such alarming degrees that God’s merciful nature and sense of justice were provoked to action. Thus, came Emmanuel Christus. His advent has ushered in refreshing interpretation and meaning to sociopolitical existence, which is capable of restoring perfect happiness in sociopolitical affairs.

Our endeavour, so far, was to peruse, in a miniature dimension, the ingenuity which Emmanuel Christus brought for sociopolitical orderliness. His interpretation, analysis and handling of such sociopolitical issues as liberty, justice, propriety, right, duty, law, the enforcement of legal code by authority, et cetera, are at once novel, masterly and ingenious. In all of history, there has not been any holistic vision of sociopolitical issues, problems, debates and theories as the theo-centric perspectives which Emmanuel Christus brought through his teachings, answers and reactions. His thesis on love and mercy is able to handle all issues relating to justice, rights and laws. Likewise, His principles of peace and reconciliation can take care of all matters arising from authority, freedom, property, legal and penal codes, as well as the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. In Emmanuel Christus we see a perfect balancing between theory and praxis with refreshing innovations and novelities. Here is a Superior authority par excellence, who would not mind being born in a manger, accused of breaking a Sabbath, which He made, betrayed by the one, whom he called and fed, sentenced to death by the one whom he granted permission to participate in His authority, and derided, mocked and rejected by the mob that He healed, fed and set free from the infernal forces that held them bondage. These are part of the gem contained in the leadership paradigm of Emmanuel Christus.

He has brought a paradigm shift in the conception of sociopolitical authority and freedom. Obedience to God and His will, He has taught and demonstrated, are His food and therefore ought to be the food of all in authority. With God and His will as the focus of any authority, there can hardly be injustice, oppression, intimidation, suppression, marginalization, sectionalism, tribalism, nepotism, tyranny, subjugation and the like. A Divine-focused authority, just like Emmanuel Christus, is bound to be caring, loving, and sensitive to the plight of the led, sympathetic, altruistic, sincere, honest and truthful. A Divine-focused authority, with the theory and actions of Emmanuel Christus, should be able to provide for the unemployed, the less privileged and the helpless youthful citizens that are the future pride of the society.

In the main, Emmanuel Christus has taught and exemplified in his actions that love and service to humanity are the major virtues of those in authority of any kind. Service for Him is
sacrifice, the total self-giving of the authority or minister for the sake of the led or the common citizens. His love for humanity is expressed in His total service and His service is an expression of altruistic love for humanity. Emmanuel Christus’s definition of authority, thus, has nothing to do with all the spoils of power and the paraphernalia of present conception of authority that blinds it to the plights of the masses and the stresses and strains which are the hallmarks of contemporary sociopolitical existence.

Moreover, Emmanuel Christus is the truth that came to define the proper and true order of things in the sociopolitical and other spheres of existence. He has taught and demonstrated, in practice and actions, that He is the philosopher-educator qua tale. The assembling of His teachings throws more light to the proper order of things, “ab initio”, (from the beginning). No one single ideology or even a combination of all existing ideologies can satisfactorily proffer lasting solutions to sociopolitical quandaries. But Emmanuel Christus has in one fell swoop taught the necessary and sufficient truths that can liberate man from all sociopolitical and existential shackles and bondages. Emmanuel Christus is and remains the only paradigmatic sociopolitical leader in truth and essence.

END NOTES

(1) This definition of Sociopolitical is a modified adaptation from our work: “Iroegbu on Obacracy for Integral Sociopolitical True Existence” in INTEGRATIVE HUMANISM JOURNAL, cited below.

(2) St. Thomas Aquinas enlisted seven conditions for obedience to civil authorities which include:
(a) That the person to be obeyed must be a superior (or authority), while the person to obey is the inferior (or the subject).
(b) That obedience should proceed from the free choice of one’s own counsel.
(c) That the will of the superior is rationally prior to the will of the inferior (or subject), just as God’s will is “primus” (the first rule).
(d) That obedience is a praiseworthy and meritorious virtue, which should be pursued for its own sake especially by one’s own free will and volition.
(e) That the matter upon which obedience is demanded or expected is one in the area of the superior’s (or authority’s) specialty. In other words, the matter should be one concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs within the sphere of the authority’s (or superior’s) area of competence/specialty.
(f) That for the sake of order and stability in human affairs, subjects are under obligation of justice to obey their superior (authority).
(g) That for the sake of the maintenance of both human and Divine laws (which are necessary and obligatory in themselves), subjects are to obey their authority (superiors).

WORKS CITED


ARMING GENOCIDE IN DARFUR AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS QUESTION

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Abstract
Small arms afflict countries in conflict and those in peace. From the theatres of wars in Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo to the cities of Johannesburg, Nairobi, the great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa and the Niger Delta, they kill and maim people of all religion, social classes and ethnicities. The ongoing Darfur crisis in the Sudan is also another case of diffusing small arms and light weapons. In Africa, where over 100 million small arms exist, their effects are devastating. In a vicious cycle, they are both a cause and effect of violence. They do not only kill the innocent, they also maim, prolong conflicts, choke development and deepen poverty. This article discusses on the small arms and light weapons questions as it relates to the crisis in Darfur and South Africa by looking at the actors, background and issues of the conflicts, weapons types and their sources before and during the conflict and the use and Impact of small arms and light weapons in the selected countries and concludes that their presence has led to greater insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa as weapons availability aggravates and sustains armed conflict with deleterious consequences which is reflective of the problems associated with the law that has failed to match the continued influx and usages of these weapons.

Introduction
The central thrust of this article is to discuss the small arms and light weapons questions as it relates to the crisis in Darfur and South Africa and to conclude with recommendations. Small arms and light weapons are in a real sense weapons of “Mass destruction”.1 Small arms are weapons designed for personal use, while light weapons are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. Examples of small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles, sub machines guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, some types of grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems.2 They are widely durable, highly portable, easily...

1Although small arms are light, they cause massive and widespread death and injury, easy to use, conceal and maintain. They are the primary tools of violence in almost every conflict where the innocent suffer most.
concealed, and possess legitimate military, police and civilian users. Small arms and light weapons are used by both government forces (military and police) and non-state actors.

Since the end of the Cold War the world has come to a shocking realization that most of the injuries and deaths recorded in internecine conflicts are caused by small arms and light weapons but not by weapons of mass destruction. John Keegan a respected historian observed that:  

Nuclear weapons have since 9th of August 1945 killed no one. The 50,000,000 (fifty million) who have died in war since that date have for the most part, been killed by cheap, mass produced weapons and small caliber ammunitions, costing a little more than the transistor radios and dry cell batteries which have flooded the world in the same period. No one knows precisely how many small arms and light weapons are in circulation, but experts estimate that military style firearms may number about 500 million.

Death toll ranging from the use of small arms and light weapons outnumbered that of all other weapons systems. These weapons have irrevocably shaped the landscape of modern conflict and daily life. The excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms and light weapons have led to the emergence of groups of armed individuals, operating across and beyond state borders, rebel movements, private militias, terrorists, drug traffickers, arms dealers, etc.

Small arms and light weapons have particularly been devastating in Africa where machine guns, rifles, grenades, pistols and other small arms have killed and displaced many civilians across the continent especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Central and Eastern Africa, many lives have been lost through conflict and its related effects. The irregular warfare that has been common there in recent decades is well served by these kinds of weapons which are easily available and sometimes cost less than food items. In Southern Africa, civil and interstate conflicts drive demand for small arms and create a pool of weapons that can be used to commit violent crime as well as fuel conflict. These weapons have been used in deadly conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and other African countries. They are frequently recycled from country to country and their ownership is transferred amongst fighters, security forces and war profiteers.

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3 *Ibid.* Similarly major conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons cross the dividing line separating military and police forces from civilian population. There has been a dramatic increase in the number and size of private militias and security firms that are equipped with military type weapons.

4 These includes guerrillas, ethnic militias war lords, brigands and so engaged in low intensity conflicts.


6 *Ibid* at P. 5.

7 An estimated 8 million small arms that are circulating throughout Western Africa play a central role in fostering instability.

The easy availability, low cost and manageability of these weapons have made them weapons of choice in most conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the world today and have helped raised levels of armed violence even in areas of peace. These weapons are the leading contributors to the escalation of a culture of violence and to the militarization of the civil society. They are regarded as the most destabilizing conventional weapons.

Factors Responsible for the Proliferation and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons

There are some reasons which explain why small arms and light weapons are in such a high demand within Sub-Saharan Africa. They can pass for structural problems which exist due to lack of organizational skills, the necessary infrastructures and funds. This shows the complexity of the small arms and light weapons problem and the need for concerted international efforts to overcome it. These additional factors include:

Porous Borders

Africa is the second largest continent in the world and the second most populated as well. The size of some of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa creates the chronic problem of border security. Nigeria for instance has 770 kilometers of shared land border with the Republic of Benin, around 1,500 kilometers with the Republic of Niger, 1,700 kilometers with Cameroon, 90 kilometers with Chad and 850 kilometers of maritime border in the Atlantic Ocean. It would be hard therefore to find any state in the world capable of effectively controlling such extensive borders. Armed traffickers have therefore exploited these porous borders to smuggle into Nigeria for instance, such different and dangerous products as drugs and arms. Generally, border control in Sub-Saharan Africa is poor or inadequate, in particular because of the lack of technical infrastructure and human resources. The boundaries are very tortuous. For example, some borders follow a river back as in Senegal to Mauritania or the bottom of a valley in a Senegal to Mali. The nature of the terrain has a considerable influence on the effectiveness of border controls. Open plains and Plateau, for instance, are more accessible than marshy areas or jungles. Similarly, desert and forest regions are extremely difficult to monitor, as are steep


10 Ibid.

11 During the first week of August 1999, Nigerian Customs intercepted six nationals of a West African Country in a canoe in Lagos with 75,000 rounds of ammunition and bags containing rifles. Recent hands by the customs service included 10,000 magazines in Ikeja on the 31st of December, 2001 as well as almost equally large hauls in Seme Border Station in February 2002 and at Jabido/Budo in Kwara State in March 2002. The Nigerian Police also intercepted traffickers in Alabata, near Abeokuta, seizing 26,500 cartridges hidden in 106 boxes. The part of Warri in the Niger Delta is also regarded as a center for arms smuggling and illegal trading. The trafficker operate from ships lying it anchor on the high seas, using faster small boast for transfers. These figures represent only a tiny sample of the total number of arms and ammunition which enter Nigeria and circulate illegally.


13 Ibid.

14 See for instance Guinea, Lower Casamanca, Liberia, Cote Divoire, etc.
slopes.\textsuperscript{15} West Africa border are extremely long and as a result border surveillance is costly and difficult.\textsuperscript{16}

The dilapidation of border control point is compounded by the lurk worm attitude of the security services personnel. They are generally poorly paid and feel isolated or abandoned without proper working tools or proper protection for example against attacks by criminals and cross-border traffickers. This ugly situation not only generates corruption but also encourages the agents therein to be prone to the commission of crimes. Security agents can be observed hiring out their weapons to criminals to enable them engage in law breaking in neighboring countries. The booty in their shared out between the criminals and the owner of the weapon is clearly defined proportions. The criminals operate in villages and individual houses, using information relayed to them by their accomplices in the security forces and the military. In the event of “problems” these cross border criminals generally receive “cover” and protection from a police accomplice.\textsuperscript{17} Interestingly, all the three largest Sub-Saharan countries namely, Sudan,\textsuperscript{18} the Democratic Republic of Congo\textsuperscript{19} and Chad\textsuperscript{20} have been experiencing an armed conflict for long.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, the sizes of their borders and their porous nature makes it easy for weapons of varying degrees to be smuggled thus inflaming and prolonging violence.

\textbf{Ineffective Internal Security}

For a long time, peace was critically considered as the absence of war or armed conflict and international or internal security as synonymous with the absence of a military threat. Hence peace meant first and foremost that weapons were silent. If there was no armed confrontation, then peace was considered to prevail.\textsuperscript{22} Security is therefore the absence of danger and the feeling of a civilian peace of mind. In Sub-Saharan Africa, citizens because of the “self defence reflex” feel a strong need to acquire arms in order to protect themselves, and their properties from armed violence. This mostly occurs in areas where there is lack of confidence in security forces, under staffing or sometimes arising from the inability of security agencies to carry out their duties effectively.

Most conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa result from mismanagement by those at the helm of African states and the exclusion of the population from participation in the nation building process. This provides easy justification for the discontented people to take up arms at will. In fact, the exclusion of a great majority of the population from active participation in nation building process, and the epidemic poverty that beset Sub-Saharan African offer an ideal breeding

\textsuperscript{15} Surveillance of the Senegal – Ghana border, for example is easier than on the border between Senegal and Guinea (Conakry), in the foothills of the Futa Jallon Massif.

\textsuperscript{16} The extreme sparseness of the road network in the sub-region can be managed from a glance at an administrative map of West Africa States or a highway map. Surfaced roads are rare and seldom give access to borders. International roads are few and far between and are in a particular deplorable state. Border region are thus hard to reach and links between states are unreliable. Deficiencies of this type are conducive to all kinds of shady deals.

\textsuperscript{17} Fall H, “\textit{Border Controls and Cross Border crime in West Africa}”, op cit. P. 87.

\textsuperscript{18} The Continents overall largest in terms of land mass.

\textsuperscript{19} The 3\textsuperscript{rd} overall largest in terms of land mass.

\textsuperscript{20} The 5\textsuperscript{th} overall largest in terms of land mass.

\textsuperscript{21} See CIA Facebook data.

ground for taking up arms and arm race. In sub-Saharan Africa, there are tendencies where police fail to respond to distress calls at scenes of crime either due to lack of personnel or out of fear because of the sophistication of armed group weapons or for logistic reasons. Civilians are therefore left with no choice but to arm themselves which eventually lead to unlawful possession of arms on the basis of self defense reflex.²³

Corruption
The vicious circle of low salaries and corruption²⁴ in sub-Saharan Africa creates an ideal breeding ground for the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons amongst the civilian population. Custom officers are often bribed by weapons dealers while ex-soldiers, police security forces are known to have sold government weapons to criminals.²⁵ Greed or wanton desire to make more money to augment low income is some logical explanations for this unwholesome attitude leading to corrupt practices.

Customs and Traditions
Customs been a mirror of accepted usage²⁶ affects the weapons in circulation. In many cultures across the African continent, weapons are used for traditional rites and ceremonies. Others form part of various costumes. While the Fulani’s in Northern Nigeria and certain traditional communities carry swords, sticks and arrows, the communities of traditional hunters who live in the west and east of Nigeria carry cutlasses and shotguns.²⁷ Some communities use dynamites and other modern explosives on these occasions. In the North and West provinces of Cameroon for instance, there is a traditional rite of gun-firing at events such as at the traditional burial of local dignitaries. There are mostly locally made so called Dane guns, operating with gun powder. Projectiles like metal pellets can be inserted into their muzzle making them very lethal.²⁸

²³ Yakubu J. G, “Cooperation among armed forces and security forces in combating the proliferation of small arms” op cit, P. 58.
²⁴ Ibid at P. 57.
²⁵ Anyissi S. (et al), Combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, Handbook for the training of armed forces and security forces, op cit, P. 68.
²⁶ See Okonkwo Vs Okagbue (1994) 9 NWLR (PT 368) P. 301 at 345 where custom was defined as a particular way of behavior which because it has long been established among members of a social group or tribe can develop and acquire the force of law or right. A custom was equally defined in section 2(1) of the Evidence Act as a rule which in a particular District has from long usage obtained the force of law. See Taiwo Vs Dosumu (1965) 1 ANLR 399 At 402; Nsirim Vs Nsirim (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt 418) 144 At 164; Ibrahim Vs Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt 474) 513 At 565; Omonude Vs Ibru & Ors (1979) 6 UILR Pt 1, 94 At 124.
²⁷ Anyissi S. (et al), Combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, Handbook for the training of armed forces and security forces, op cit, P. 68.
²⁸ For the sake of prestige, they have now turned to the use of a wide range of more modern equipment like shotguns, revolvers, semi-automatic pistols and even high caliber rifles. There may be guns laws limiting such open use, but they are hardly respected and can easily be circumvented. This culture attached to weapons is particularly rife in rural communities, where conservation cultural practices and traditional rituals still enjoy plenty of respect.
Experience shows that, it will be extremely difficult for the armed forces and security forces to combat this sort of proliferation effectively.29

Arming Genocide in Darfur and South Africa: The Small Arms and Light Weapons Question
Because this article seeks to address the ever burning issue of armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and for the purposes of arriving at a clear conclusion, selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were made where conflicts are ongoing and where they have ended. These selected countries include, Contemporary Darfur crisis in Sudan and South Africa.

The Darfur Crisis
The individual case of the complex, protracted intra state wars in Sudan clearly exemplifies the terrible hazards of the global small arms market.
In Sudan, the genocidal campaigns of the Sudanese government against native Muslims living in the newly discovered oil field lands of Darfur has been actively pursued through government – assisted militias, primarily the Janjaweed.

The Darfur crisis officially hit the headlines of the international scene in February 2003 and according to reports, not less than 200,000 people have been killed while about two and a half million people were forced to flee from their homes.30 In 2008, death toll including people killed directly in fighting and deaths from diseases or malnutrition was put at 300,000 as a result of the conflict.31 The United States government has officially described this ongoing conflict as genocide,32 re-echoing what some scholars term as the first genocide of the 21st century,33 while the United Nations officials and human rights organizations have described it as ethnic cleansing. The Darfur crisis has developed into what is widely considered to be the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.34

While Sudan’s population is impoverished and has been victimized by its two decades of civil war, and although Sudan is one of the 38 heavily indebted poor countries eligible for favorable borrowing terms, Sudan’s also sitting on major oil resources – a resource that could possibly deliver economic stability and domestic freedom to the people of Sudan, but instead, oil production is back rolling, the governments pursuit of genocide against its own people through the purchase of small arms and other weapons, a political economic decision founded in abuse of

33Third World Quarterly Vol. 28 No. 1 2007, P.97.
34Unlike the case of Rwanda a community largely dependent on agriculture with hardly any natural resources and where fighting was primarily along the lines of ethnic power struggle, natural resources and environmental degradation play a major role in the conflict thus aggravating humanitarian concern.
one part of its population for the benefit of a relative few. The main foreign direct investors on Sudan are companies from China, Malaysia and India.  

The Main Actors

There are internal and external actors in the Darfur crisis. The internal actors on the one hand include the Sudanese government and its proxy forces, the so called Janjaweed militias. The Janjaweed is an Arabic colloquialism in the region for “a man or devil on a horse”. They are to Khartoum, what the interahamne were to the genocidal Hutu government. The two main rebel groups in Sudan are the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which themselves are divided into several splitter groups under different leaders.

On the external side, because certain powers are interested in national resources, the conflict is sustained by their actions. The main countries involved are China and Russia. In the African context, actors like Chad and Eritrea are interested in tribal unity while Egypt and countries of the Arab League wish to maintain Arab Unity. Russia and China are amongst others the major weapon suppliers of Khartoum.

The Background of the Conflict

The conflict between African tribal groups particularly the FUR, Zanghawa and the Massaleit and the government had been summering behind the scenes for a very long time. Storm clouds had been gathering over Darfur for the past twenty years before it formally busted in an explosion of violence. Because all Darfurians are Muslims, the conflict has no religious infiltrations. Despite the fact that Darfur was assimilated to a Sudanese public economic and cultural entity in January 1917, the British Colonial masters of Sudan completely ignored it. They ruled by proxy through traditional chiefs and did their possible best to remain uninvolved by tolerating the idiosyncrasies of the latter as long as they did not commit gross crimes and as long as they perceived peace. After independence, the situation did not improve much. The plight of Darfur was further aggravated by natural disasters in the form of drought. As the rains failed to fall in the North and desertification extended, massive groups of Arabs-Nomads as well as semi-automatic weapons flocked into the area. A new political ideology spread in Darfur namely Arab supremacy. Tensions arose between the nomads and the traditional Darfurians farmers who sometimes tried to ward them off by building fences or even burning the grass. Some scholars argued that the acts of violence which ensued as a result of the practice were rather due to different perception in reality. For the farmers, the grass was bad weeds while the nomads saw it as the last resort for their herds on their grazing land of the south.

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38 Ibid at P. 49.
The Major drought of 1990 made things worse for Darfur but Khartoum did not care much. In 1991, the SPLA from Southern Sudan came to the rescue of rebel South Darfurian but were beaten by Sudanese army. In 1990, a Kalashnikov could be purchased at a market place in Darfur as far as 40USD. A popular jingle of the time run thus; “The Kalash brings cash, without a Kalash, you are a trash”.

From the above, the ingredients were solely coming together. Though Sudan had become at least theoretically a Federal Republic in 1991, Khartoum kept on juggling with governorship candidates and state borders at will. In 1991, the Federal Minister of Interior decided to completely renew the structure of the administrative districts in all nine federal states apart from Khartoum, while Khartoum appointed governors, they were expected to be financially autonomous. Between 1996 and 1998, a guerilla movement developed in Darfur which carried out sporadic attacks against the government, but were quelled down by the military in 1999 living behind 2,000 people death, resettling 100,000 and forcing many to escape to Chad.

In 2001, the Furs, Zaghawas and the Masalits, all black tribes of Southern Darfur, began organizing what became the Sudanese Liberation Army. In October, 2002, the Janjaweed militias, who enjoyed impunity in addition to receiving arms and support from Khartoum, landed a massive attack on Southern Darfur against Fur civilians. The stage was set for fighting which is still ongoing today.

Weapons, types and their sources, before and during the conflicts

The Janjaweed of Sudan were able to carry out their progression of mass terror, murder and intentional starvation by virtue of their wealth of small arms and light weapons provision in the form of Kalashnikov (a.k.a AK-47) assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and jeep-mounted machines guns despite the United Nations adoption in 2001 of Article 16 of the United Nation International Law Commissions Article on Responsibility of State for internationally wrongful Acts. This agreement is binding as all states forbid any assistance of another state in the commission of any international wrongful act. The Janjaweed’s atrocities clearly surpass international definition of “international wrongful act” and the Sudanese government claim to be uninvolved and opposed to the arbitrary and indiscriminate killing, disappearances, systematic rape and torture flies in the face of heavily documented evidence of the government supply of and government troop’s participation in the atrocities.

In 1994, the European Union joined in an arms embargo against all non-governmental entities in Sudan in order to promote lasting peace and reconciliation within Sudan, but the World’s weapons industry has continued to sell arms to the Sudanese government without restriction. The world’s communities of weapons exporters have continued to feed small arms into Sudan fuelling the Darfur genocide. In March 2004, the United Nations Security Council...

Furthermore, small arms shipments to other East African Countries from the USA, and Germany, amongst others is center to bolster Sudan’s stockpile of weapons. It is estimated that 85% of the personal assault weapons in Africa originate from the five countries of the UN Security Council; the USA, The UK, Russia, China and France.\footnote{Africa News: “Small Arms Boom in East Africa” May 7, 2007 available at \url{http://www.checkpointonline.ch/checkpoint/I2/J2-0006-Africasmallarmsboom.html}. Last visited on 25/10/2011.} Principal exporters of small arms to Sudan appear to be Iran, China, France, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and the UK.\footnote{Amnesty International; “Sudan Arms Trade fuelling Human Rights Abuses in Darfur” available at \url{http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFR541422004}. Last visited on 10/12/2011.}

Sudan shares very long and porous border with countries ridden by long-standing armed conflicts like Chad, Eritrea, Congo DRC, Uganda, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. This makes it excellent breeding grounds and a pivotal part for the illicit arms trade. In the 80’s, Sudan was a leading beneficiary of US military and economic aid in Africa but after it fell out of US favor in early 90’s, it turned to China, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate and other EU countries for weapons. The table below shows official SALW supplies to the Sudanese government from the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value in USD</th>
<th>Weapons Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>286,000:00</td>
<td>Supporting/hunting shotguns, sporting/hunting rifles, pistols/accessories revolvers/pistols, shotguns barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>72,000:00</td>
<td>Sporting/hunting shotguns, shotguns cartridges, small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50,000:00</td>
<td>AIF gun pellets/lead shot/parts of shotguns cartridges, parts/accessories of shotguns/rifles, shotguns cartridges, small arms ammunition, sporting/hunting shotguns, sporting/hunting rifles, pistols/revolvers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>35,856</td>
<td>Sporting/hunting shotguns and shotguns cartridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>16,125</td>
<td>Pistols/Revolvers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>26,000:00</td>
<td>Sporting/hunting shotguns, part/accessories, small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 2006, Khartoum’s acquisition of SALW had run from three million USD in 2003, to 55 million USD. Weapons of Chinese origin have been discovered in former Sudanese government weapons catches in 1997, two years before Sudan started exporting oil. The table below illustrates this fact.
Table 2: Chinese weapons discovered in Sudanese government cache in 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm type rifles W-85 machine guns; 12.7mm type W-77 machine guns; 12.7mm type 54 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm howitzers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm type 55-1 automatic anti-aircraft guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62mm ammunition for type 56 (AK-47) AKM assault rifles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm ammunition for type 53 light machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm type 54 machine guns ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm HE-T high explosives shells for type 55 antiaircraft guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm HE mortar shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm HEAT projectile type 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85mm rounds for type 56 field guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm HE rocket type 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm D-30 HE projected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (SIB 2007)

According to UN sources, the Janjaweed’s on other part received regular weapons and communication supplies from senior civilian authorities at the local level in addition to weapons supplied by air from Khartoum. 47

The Use and Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Crisis of Darfur

The availability of small arms and light weapons among the civilians population might not be the sole cause of insecurity in Sudan, but it has certainly acerbated the violence. The conflict in Darfur has been fought largely on the basis of small arms and light weapons that have proliferated the region. The inability or unwillingness of the Swiss, paragon’s organizations, to regulate their own export of weapons demonstrates the degree to which the weapons market in Darfur is out of control. While Sudan’s population is improvised and has been victimized by its two decades of civil war, and although Sudan is one of the 38 “Heavily indebted poor countries eligible for favorable borrowing terms, Sudan is also sitting on major oil reserves – a resource that could possibly deliver economic stability and domestic freedom to the people of Sudan, but instead oil production is back rolling the government’s pursuit of genocide against its own people through the purchase of small arms, a political economic decision founded on abuse of one part of its population for the benefit of a relative few. The use of small arms and light weapons in Sudan have led to proxy wars been fought. 48 The Geneva based small arms survey estimated that in 2007, between 1.9 and 3.2 million firearms were in circulation in Southern Sudan, two thirds of which were in civilian hands. 49

Local dealers admit that too many guns are now in possession of civilians especially pastoralists. Militia groups have been armed who routinely sport their time looting cattle in pastoralist communities rather than fighting the opposite side. Civilians reacted by acquiring firearms and organizing militia-like formations to defend and protect them properly and according to researchers, this has led to illicit growth of small arms in Sudan, while stockpile in neighboring countries and sale of small arms by demobilized SPLA soldiers continue to bolster community-based arsenals.\(^{50}\)

The use and impact of the use of SALW in Darfur is not only limited to acts directly linked with armed conflict but also in serious gender related issues and human right abuses like rape. Rape has become the new weapon of intimidation and punishment of the local Darfurian population and the Janjaweed militia men have routinely perpetrated it. Between October 2004 and the first half of February 2005, Medicines Sans Frontieres (MSF), reportedly treated close to 500 rape victims in Darfur.\(^{51}\) According to MSF, 81% of the rape victims treated said their rapist were militia members or soldiers who used their weapons to carry out the assault.

**The South African Conflicts**

The Republic of South Africa after the abhorrent apartheid regime and their polices of racial segregation, is regarded as the epitome of democracy in Africa and an example for many other countries to emulate. Not only in South Africa, Africa’s best democracy today, it is an economic success story on the continent and beyond. It enjoys a stable economy and houses the 17\(^{th}\) largest stock exchange market worldwide.\(^{52}\) Though not presently experiencing armed conflict, armed banditry through the use of small arms and light weapons are rife be it at home, work place and in traffic regardless of the time of the day. A report in crime stated that 84% of all criminal activities in Johannesburg which has been dubbed as one of the most insecure place in the world were carried out with a weapon.\(^{53}\)

In May 2008, more than 50 foreigners from other African countries were killed in South Africa by angry South Africans in an unprecedented spread of Xenophobia\(^{54}\) since the collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s. Xenophobia still became a wild fire in Alexandria South Africa in

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\(^{50}\) Lewis M, *Skirting the law: Sudan’s Post CPA Arms flow*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of international studies (2009), Pp, 54 -56.


\(^{54}\) The More recent history of South African Xenophobia can be traced to the transition from apartheid to a democratic government in 1994; the freedom felt within South Africa came with the ideology that the country must be protected from “outsiders”. In light of South African History, it is reasonable that the country needed to put its citizens first in time for transformation and change. However the closed door migration policies sluggish development and increase in poverty and irregularity have provided a breeding ground for Xenophobia.
May 2008 and rapidly spread nationwide. In the following days and months, over 70 migrants were killed and tens and thousands were expelled from their homes and communities by South Africans. Foreign – owned businesses were destroyed. While foreign-national businesses constitute almost 25% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in South Africa, the South African government has made a move to assist in compensation or further assistance for businesses that were destroyed during the attacks.  

The Background of Insecurity in South Africa

Small Arms Survey considers South Africa with 30 firearms homicides per 100,000, the hardest hit by gun violence. The prevalence of small arms in the country and their use in violent crime is so endemic that though it is generally described as a peaceful country, it is exhibiting ‘war like’ symptoms. Gun culture has become a way of life in South Africa. An estimate of 25 people are short dead every day in a country where according to some estimates, there are about 3.7 million legally owned guns and about the same number of illicit small firearms in private hands. The majority of privately owned guns are acquired for security reasons since many people do not feel safe. Oxfam states that almost a third of all South African families have been affected by gun violence. This definitely paints a very gloomy picture of the sense of insecurity prevalent in the South African Society.

Weapons, types, and their sources before and during crisis in South Africa

The commonest small arms and light weapons used in South Africa include: pistols, (Tokarev TT-33, Walther P38, Baretta 92, Moninco, C2 (range), Walther (range), Colt, Revolvers (Rossi, Taurus, Smith and Western, Arminius) riffsles, sub-machine guns and machines guns (AK-47, R4, FN FAL 7.62, R5, Heckler and Koch) Shotguns (12 gauge Baikal, 12 gauge Stevens, 12 gauge Pietro Beretta) and homemade firearms and replica firearms enhanced to work as lethal firearms. The large amount of small arms and light weapons in South Africa comes from various sources. Suffice to state however that South Africa has also a vibrant weapons industry (ARMSCOR) which deals with a variety of small arms and light weapons and other conventional weapons which includes but not limited to ammunition, bombs, howitzers, mortars, armored vehicles and electronic equipment. Unlike Nigeria’s only licensed weapons producers, DICON,

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ARMSCOR operates professionally for the local and international markets. In the fight against pressure groups for democracy and civil rights in the 1980’s, the apartheid regime openly provided arms to civilians and counter-insurgents groups.61 These arms which were distributed back then have not been completely recollected and today cannot be accounted for. The conclusion is that some of them have now found their way back into the black market and are used in the perpetration of crimes.

Post-apartheid South Africa has over the last 10 years been one of the greatest importers of conventional weapons including Small Arms and Light weapons in sub-Saharan Africa. This notwithstanding, there seems to be general consensus of the fact that theft or loss of firearms from state – controlled arsenals, from defence or part service members, from civilian and of course smuggling, are the major source of illicit weapons in South Africa. In the 90’s large quantity of guns were smuggled into South Africa from war thrown zones in Mozambique, Congo DRC and Angola.62 Some of these weapons constitute part of the weapons the apartheid regime had supplied to help thwart freedom and democratic movements in neighboring Southern African countries between 1976 and 1986.

Today, with the ever growing and almost instable demand for small arms and light weapons on the South African black market, they are now returning. The greater part of illicit weapons in circulation comes from internal sources. 66 firearms were reported stolen at least an average everyday between 1995 and 2003.63 Many have however argued that the above does not represent the actual figure. According to the South African police service,64 3,856 firearms were lost, stolen or robbed from personnel on the 12 month leading up to the end of March 2007. The 2005/2006 report stated that 2,297 firearms went missing through the same manner.65 These weapons are unaccounted for and probably on the hands of criminals and the availability and alarming rise in the theft of firearms and firearms reported lost, exacerbated the incidence of violent crime.

South African police officers have equally been accused of selling some weapons frequently used in violent crimes such as R-5 assault rifles and hand guns to the highest bidders especially to fuel violence and opposition against the new ANC government by providing small arms caches to anti-ANC warlords on the Kwazulu/Natal province.66 Keegan67 state that an estimated 116 tons of firearms were supplied to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), prior to the demise of the apartheid system in 1994. By 2004, only 6 tons had been received. With more than 100 tons being unaccounted for, it can therefore only be assumed that they constitute part of the illicit weapons used in crime. Though the overwhelming majority of firearms used in South

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61 Ibid at P. 16.
63 Ibid at P. 2.1
66 Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Vol. 48, No. 8 of May 1995 P. 14
Africa are professionally manufactured, there is growing concern over homemade firearms and toy or replica weapons which have been clandestinely converted into lethal weapons.

The Use and Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South Africa
Small arms and light weapons play a pivotal role in fermenting violence and insecurity in South Africa and in turn have a dramatic consequence on every stratum of the South African society accounting the most frequent cause of non-natural deaths among the general population in South Africa leading to non-natural deaths of 15 to 21 year old males.68 Thence, in the 80’s and 90’s young South African men especially poor neighborhoods were brought up to embrace a militaristic version of manhood. For them, carrying a gun was considered a symbol of power, status and male affluence.69

The high mortality rate among young men as a result of the use of firearms ultimately affect the economic output of South Africans and put a major strain on the social balance of the country because South Africa is largely a patriarchal society where men earn more than women and are often the breadwinners of their families. Whether a gun is held in the private sphere legally or not, it exposes the inhabitants of the home to greater danger than where there are no guns. Their presence therefore play a vital role in increasing partner or acquaintance violence especially in domestic violence cause resulting in death of one of the spouses especially women. A report by IANSA states that every six hours, a woman is shot dead by her current or her former husband.70 This meant that four women are killed every day in South Africa just because people are allowed to keep guns in their homes. Partner and acquaintance violence accounts for more than 50% of all South African murders.71 Ironically, the gun which was acquired to bring about security turns out to be a death trap for those it is supposed to protect.

Guns also play a central role in South African gang culture. Thence apart from the high death incidence following acts of crime perpetrated against both armed/unarmed civilians and member of the armed corps, small arms and light weapons, certainly have exposed criminal, widely used in domestic and gender related crime, helped facilitate violence crime and this have contributed to greater insecurity in South Africa.

Conclusion
By virtue of small arms and light weapons easy availability, low cost and manageability, they have become the weapon of choice in most conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the world today and have consequently helped raised the level of armed violence even in areas of peace. These weapons are the leading contributors to the escalation of a culture of violence and to the militarization of the civil society. The negative impact of weapons in the escalation of violence, and crimes are indeed vivid as can be seen in the ongoing carnage in Darfur and the insecurity in South Africa to mention but few. This has led to greater insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa as weapons availability aggravates and sustains armed conflict with deleterious consequences which

is reflective of the problems associated with the law that has failed to match the continued influx and usages of these weapons.

It is thus recommended as follows:

1. Through the parliament, parliamentarians of Sub-Saharan African states should prevent the approval and or distribution of funds to national defence programmes which tend to facilitate the purchase or development of ammunition programmes that threaten the peace and security.

2. There should be the domestication of global and regional instruments to which states in Sub-Saharan Africa are parties to and for regional institutions to prioritize their objectives given scarce resources. If clear priorities are not set, these commitments run the risk of remaining empty promises.

3. There is the persistent and urgent need for disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, which would address the twin problems of poverty and small arms proliferation simultaneously. Instruments regulating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons should become legally binding instruments.

4. There must be positive developments projects on the ground and increase awareness raising activities to convince the leaders that a legally binding document will generate peace and promote development.

5. Complementing the above is the need to engage the civil society in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and this can be can be done through awareness raising policy aimed at: ensuring respect for the principle of accountability in the security sector against the culture of impunity where it exists, contribute to the manifestation of international political will and momentum so as to effectively support efforts to combat small arms, denouncing and combating the political, social and economic conditions that tend to generate greater demand for firearms, working for a reduction in demand for firearms through measures to consolidate democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law as well as economic growth, reducing the secrecy associated with decision making on weapons, organic discussions on small arms and combat public ignorance about security matters in general, ensuring that extensive publicity is given to the message against small arms, educate the media on the challenges of such weapons and the dynamic force that cause and sustain armed conflicts, securing the adoption of legislation in favor of disarmament and regulation of the circulation of firearms and bring the discussion of arms and security issues to the people, strengthening the ability of citizens to participate in political decision making relating to small arms and light weapons through: educating communities on the virtue of participatory democracy and democratic leadership, running awareness building programmes so as to replace the culture of violence by a culture of peace, educating communities about arms flows as the dynamic force that encourage armed conflict; and as helping the mass media to pass the message to the large public, organizing seminars and training workshops on peaceful conflict resolution and peace building for communities involved in armed conflicts, organizing training seminars for custom, police and investigation officials on natural and international rules governing the circulation of small arms. Non-governmental organizations can supervise public destructions of collected stock of weapons at the local level, under the control of all the stakeholders in order to reassure communities that weapon taken out of circulation will not fall once again into the hands of criminals.
BOOK REVIEW

Title of Book: Nonviolence in Political Theory
Author: Iain Atack.
Year of Publication: 2012
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Pages: 202pp
Price: $29.88
ISBN 9780748633784

Reviewer: Preya Bhattacharya
Manuscript ID: RCMSS/IJPCS/1410014

Though the recent years have witnessed an increase in the success of nonviolent protest movements, the theoretical assumptions of nonviolent political action has remained under-emphasized. Iain Atack in his book ‘Nonviolence in Political Theory’ tries to fill this void by explaining nonviolent political action in the realm of western political concepts like power, violence, state and international relations. In his own words, “instances of nonviolent political action are not simply spontaneous eruptions of popular sentiment” (pp. IV-V). In fact according to Atack, nonviolent political action can be explained with the help of Western political theory. In his book, “Nonviolence in Political Theory” Atack first analyses the writings of nonviolent theorists like Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Gene Sharp, then discusses the concepts of principled nonviolence, pragmatic nonviolence, civil resistance, transformative nonviolence and finally analyzes the role of state in legitimizing the use of violence both domestically as well as internationally. According to Atack, the ultimate aim of nonviolence is not only to achieve a society based on nonviolence domestically but also to create alternative forms of political organizations internationally that does not depend upon violence for justifying social order and control.

The book also deals with the question of state legitimacy and its power to use violence both at the domestic and in the international arena. Atack discusses the role of state through the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau who believed that states help to maintain nonviolence in society and protect people from both internal and external aggression. The social contract theorists also believed that states would help to maintain peace and social order through the rule of law. He also mentions the criticisms of social contract theory in the writings of Georges Sorrel and Frantz Fanon, who believed that states are “merely a device for preserving an unequal and unjust social and political order, both domestically and internationally”(p.59). This allows Atack to highlight the differences in the theory of nonviolence ranging from Tolstoy’s appeal for eliminating the institution of state, to Gandhi’s belief in “progressive substitution”. Atack defines progressive substitution as “finding functional alternatives to violence, as the ultimate sanction for maintaining social order within political communities as well as defending them from external threats” (p.186).

Tolstoy criticized the state on the grounds that states had the sole right to use violence. Hence, this role of the state reinforced social, economic inequality and also restricted individual
autonomy and freedom. According to Tolstoy for a successful nonviolent society it was very necessary to eliminate the institution of state. But, both Gandhi and Sharp believed in the concept of progressive substitution which focused on local forms of government or civilian-based defense but not towards the elimination of state. According to Atack, this leads to two different forms of nonviolent political action- civil resistance and transformative nonviolence. Civil resistance recognizes the fact that states have the right to use violence for self-defense and resistance to oppression. Transformative nonviolence on the other hand believes in the creation of new forms of social and political order that provides an alternative to the concept of institutionalized violence.

Atack also discusses the three important sources of power within a society: power over as “power from the government or ruling elite”, power with as “power that results when social groups or individuals cooperate with one another to achieve agreed goals” and consent as “power of subordinate social groups in maintaining both elites and the intermediate institutions of the state in power” (p.112). He also mentions Foucault and Gramsci’s criticisms regarding consent theory of power. Finally, he deals with the concept of pacifism and nonviolence, which according to him, though “sometimes seen to be synonymous, because they both oppose the use of violence to achieve particular political ends” are “logically distinct”(p.158). According to Atack, while pacifism ethically rejects the use of violence, nonviolence is looked upon as a pragmatic means for achieving a desired end.

This book plays a very important role in developing a theory of nonviolent political action. Within 188 pages, the author has covered a lot of themes in a clear and systematic way. By explaining nonviolence in terms of western concepts like state and power, he has been successful in creating a theoretical framework which would help current practitioners as well as academicians in understanding as well as applying nonviolence. By differentiating between the concepts of civil resistance and transformative nonviolence, Atack has also been able to explain how transformative nonviolence can help in the creation of political organizations internationally that does not depend upon violence for maintaining social order and control.

But the solutions of progressive substitution or abolition of the state system for ending violence both at the domestic and international arena, though theoretically sound appears to be utopian in reality. The author also does not consider intrastate security issues like terrorism, ethnic or religious war where violence is regarded as martyrdom and states might have to use force in return as well.

Atack also emphasizes the importance of international law and international organizations in solving interstate and intrastate conflicts peacefully. Though the author is very optimistic that an international society based on nonviolence will be able to exterminate war, the question remains whether the self-interest of the states concerned would allow such a society to be formed. Moreover, the existing international organizations are in most cases in the hands of powerful states and act according to their interests. Stricter international law can also be criticized on the grounds of affecting the internal sovereignty of states. A nonviolent international arena is possible only if all states are equal and if people in spite of their ethnic, religious, cultural or economic differences believe in the power of nonviolence. This might require more in-depth analysis than proposed by Atack in his book.

In spite of the above mentioned flaws, the book proves to be a must read for both undergraduate and graduate students who are focusing on the theory of nonviolence, civil protests, peace and war.