BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF UGANDA
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Abstract
This article analyses the bureaucracy in Uganda with particular focus on the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial era. The analysis specifically dwells on the weberian model of bureaucracy dimensions. Overall, the article demonstrates that bureaucracy of the Post-colonial era has external players and is better managed and therefore impressive in comparison to the first two of pre-colonial and colonial periods. In spite of the overall impressive performance, the article shows that there are a number of limitations. These include: contentious legal and institutional framework, questionable independence of the bureaucracies, political interference, and logistics and infrastructure capacity limitations. The article identifies issues and areas that need further research and intervention in the context of the noted constraints in managing bureaucracies in Uganda.

Key words: Bureaucracy, Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial, Uganda

Introduction
Bureaucracy has demonstrably become one of the seriously embattled and questioned issues in the democratization agenda in many African countries. The OPM (Office of the Prime Minister) saga in Uganda serves as a good example. That saga is an addition to the apparently growing trend in Africa following re-introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. Bureaucracies in many African countries are associated with a number of conflicts. Some are linked to rules of the game and political maneuvers. Consequently the freeness and fairness of such bureaucracies have been questioned. Factors that have been unearthed as explanations for such bureaucratic drawbacks in Africa include, but not limited to: incompetent personnel (Wunsch 1990; Hyden 1999); unfair and undue utilization of state power and resources by incumbents and undue influence of donors (Brown 2001).

This article focuses on the issue of bureaucracy in Uganda. This is because bureaucracy has demonstrated to be one of the critical issues that determine the plight of governance.

Two important dimensions are important in bureaucracy. The first is the technical dimension which calls need for employing managerial and bureaucratic principles. The second is the political dimension which means that bureaucracy cannot be isolated from politics (who gets what, when, why and how). The article begins with a theoretical framework in regard to bureaucracy. This is followed by an analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial bureaucracies in Uganda. Finally, the article concludes by identifying main issues as well as further areas and food for thought for future researchers and management stakeholders.

Bureaucracy: Theoretical Framework.
Bureaucracy has become a solid field of study anchored on specific theoretical principles and codes of behavior. It is not the purpose of this section to give a comprehensive review of the various theoretical and behavioral underpinnings related to the birth, growth and development of
the bureaucratic field. Rather, the section seeks to isolate some key theoretical considerations and issues of management in general and bureaucracy in particular before embarking on the actual assessment of the bureaucracy in Uganda.

On the one hand, there are classical management theorists such as the famous Frederick Taylor with his Scientific Management thesis, Max Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, Max Weber whose ideas converge on the fact that it’s the environment that guarantees optimal rationality. What he essentially proposes is having in place structures, institutions and processes that would ensure maximum productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness. These end products, according to Weber, would entail non-elected, highly trained professional administrators and clerks hired on a full-time basis to perform administrative services and tasks. Bureaucratic organizations that are broken up into specialized departments or ministries, to each of which is assigned responsibility for pursuing a limited number of the government’s many official goals and policies — those falling within a single relatively narrow functional domain. The departments or ministries that are subdivided into divisions that are each assigned even more specialized responsibilities for accomplishing various portions or aspects of the department's overall tasks, and these divisions are in turn composed of multiple agencies or bureaus with even more minutely specialized functions (and their own subdivisions). Bureaucratic organizations that rely heavily on the principle of hierarchy and rank, which requires a clear, unambiguous chain of command through which “higher” officials supervise the “lower” officials, who of course supervise their own subordinate administrators within the various subdivisions and sub-subdivisions of the organization.

Bureaucratic organizations that are typically characterized by great attention to the precise and stable delineation of authority or jurisdiction among the various subdivisions and among the officials who comprise them, which is done mainly by requiring the organization's employees to operate strictly according to fixed procedures and detailed rules designed to routinize nearly all decision-making. Some of the most important of these rules and procedures may be specified in laws or decrees enacted by the higher “political” authorities that are empowered to set the official goals and general policies for the organization, but upper-level (and even medium-level) bureaucrats typically are delegated considerable discretionary powers for elaborating their own detailed rules and procedures. Because the incentive structures of bureaucratic organizations largely involve rewarding strict adherence to formal rules and punishing unauthorized departures from standard operating procedures (rather than focusing on measureable individual contributions toward actually attaining the organization's politically assigned goals), and as such, organizations tend to rely very heavily upon extensive written records and standardized forms, which serve primarily to document the fact that all decisions about individual “cases” were taken in accordance with approved guidelines and procedures rather than merely reflecting the personal preferences or subjective judgment of the individual bureaucrat involved.

While most other social scientific students of bureaucracy have recognized the historical importance of bureaucratic organizational techniques in creating the powerful, centralized nation-states (and other very large organizations such as modern business corporations and labor unions) that predominate in the industrialized world of the 20th century, it is fair to say that they have
generally been considerably less one-sidedly approving of bureaucracy than Weber was. Despite their many advantages for dealing efficiently and effectively with routine, recurring problems in a fairly stable and predictable environment, bureaucratic methods also have their dark side. Hired and promoted largely on the basis of educational credentials and seniority within the organization and protected by civil service personnel practices designed to provide a high degree of job security, bureaucratic officials tend to be very well insulated from responsibility for the external consequences of their decisions and actions as long as they stay formally within prescribed procedures. Such sociologists as Robert K. Merton and Michel Crozier have shown that pressures on officials to conform to fixed rules and detailed procedures, when added to the narrow responsibilities of highly specialized agencies for pursuing only a select few of the many objectives that government has set, quite regularly leads bureaucrats to become defensive, rigid, and completely unresponsive to the urgent individual needs and concerns of the private citizens and outside organizations with which they come into professional contact. (“That's not my department. I cannot help you.”). Because the salaries and promotion prospects of officials working in large bureaucracies seldom depend upon measurable success or efficiency by the organization in achieving its larger goals (which are often especially difficult to measure in government agencies and other non-profit oriented organizations that lack a clear “bottom line”) and because any departure from established routines always requires permission from remote higher levels of the hierarchy, large bureaucratic organizations tend to be very slow and cumbersome in making important policy decisions (the “buck-passing” phenomenon) and are especially dull-witted in recognizing and responding to the consequences of major changes in economic, social and technological conditions and circumstances outside the organization itself. In other words, individual officials working under bureaucratic incentive systems frequently find it to be in their own best interests to adhere rigidly to internal rules and formalities in a ritualistic fashion, behaving as if “proper procedure” were more important than the larger goals for serving their clients or the general public that they are supposedly designed to accomplish (the “red tape” phenomenon).

Given the above two managerial camps I wish to point out that successful, effective and efficient management of bureaucracies need to embrace the core bureaucratic principles as elaborated above as well as the human relations aspects such as motivation, creativity, and leadership. Embracing this combination, however, is not enough when it comes to bureaucratic issues related to politics. Given the fact that bureaucrats cannot be separated from the political Pandora box; it is important that bureaucrats consider the political environment (political considerations) under which they operate. This, among other things, entails assessing the laws and frameworks. Specific issues of interest would include: the constitution and other laws; authority, structure, scope and responsibilities of the different management bodies; resource capacity of the Public bodies (material, human, technical, financial); administration of the logistics issues; the competence and autonomy of the different public bodies and related state agencies; as well as monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Pre-colonial Bureaucracy

Two broad patterns of bureaucracies emerged in this era, one being of stateless societies, mostly in the north and eastern parts of the country, while state rule characterized most of the interlaccustrine region. Bureaucratic organization in the stateless societies depended on whether they engaged in pastoralism or agricultural production for their subsistence. For the nomadic Karamojong, the family was their main unit for social organization (Mamdani, 1976). On the other hand, agricultural stateless societies in northern Uganda centered their bureaucracy on the clan system. These were essentially poor, egalitarian and classless societies, with no organized social appropriation. A minimum level of social cohesion was maintained through various cultural rites enhanced through the institution of gift giving (Mamdani, 1976). Their bureaucratic organization relied on generational lines, with power being exercised through a council of elders, while their clan heads and chiefs, were elected by their fellow elders (Burke, 1964, Mamdani, 1976).

In the state governed societies, it was the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda that dominated. Historical and environmental factors had led to their having evolved differing governance systems. Bunyoro had a long historical tradition (Southall, R, 1972). However it suffices to note here that it was the migrating Chwezi pastoralists that created its state system. They enforced their hegemony over their more numerous agricultural subjects due to better social cohesion and military organisation, while the ability to implant their religious values amongst these people ensured their legitimacy. Their main weakness resulted from the social gap that existed between them and their subjects. This led to the development of a caste system. A weakness, inter alia, that facilitated their being supplanted by a Luo invasion from the north around 550 years ago.

The Luo's established the Babiito dynasty. Their numerical inferiority, and having established their rule through coercion, conditioned their legitimizing their rule through socially integrating with both the Chwezi [Huuma) and their agricultural subjects. They also adopted their subjects cultural, language and religious beliefs. The efficacy of these policies led to their King [Omukama) being accepted as the religious head of this kingdom. This narrowed but did not eradicate the social gap based on the caste system they had inherited.

Apart from the caste system, two domestic and foreign factors, led to the sapping of Bunyoro's energies. It had extensive extra-territorial responsibilities, as many satellite states sought its protection. Also its local governance system accorded its territorial chiefs, many of whom were from the nobility, extensive powers. This led to insubordination to the central authorities and regional infighting which contained "all the elements of institutionalized chaos (Karugire, 1980).

The evolution of Buganda's governance patterns was determined by three factors. (1) The emergence of a settled agricultural society, whose leaders evolved policies that attempted to mediate the disputes that characterized such societies.(ii) Its initial heads were territorially scattered hierarchically ordered clan heads (Bataka) who served a dual political and religious function within their specific clans. (iii) These were later subjugated by the hegemonic institution of the Kingship (Kabaka), about 550 years ago, which had to formulate policies that consolidated
its role, and contained and accommodated the contesting power interests of the numerous Bataka and society at large (Low, 1971).

The Kabaka, unlike the Bataka, opted to govern over the whole, and no single differentiated clan entities, and for this function to be legitimized a number of institutional and administrative mechanisms were evolved. To begin with, in this patriarchal society, the reigning Kabaka was made to identify with the clan of his mother. This factor, in a polygamous situation, in addition to the fact that he did not chose his successor (this was a role fulfilled by leading chiefs), ensured that in theory all clans could obtain a Kabaka. Hence, broadly legitimizing this institution. Secondly, the Kabakas made themselves the overall clan heads (Sabataka) and hence became the final arbiters in intra and inter clan disputes. None the less, the Bataka still had a lot of political and religious muscle, within their clans. Consequently, a system of hierarchically ordered appointed chiefs (Bakungu), selected primarily on merit and loyalty to the throne, were created to contain the Bataka and to effects local governance.

Their tenure of office depended on the Kabaka's discretion and they emerged from any social background (including many capable non Baganda) so long as they fulfilled the required criteria. This created a highly competitive and socially dynamic system, geared towards gaining public office. Members of the royal clan were usually marginalized in these selections; this was normally justified on the grounds that it was beneath their status. The real reason being that due to their symbolic value, they could easily create their own autonomous political entities. Societies that failed to evolve this mechanism either completely disintegrated as the kingdom of Mpororo, or experienced succession as did Bunyoro (Karugire, 1980).

At the head of these Bakungu was an appointed Chief Minister (Katikiro), who administered Buganda's day to day governance, alongside an elaborate bureaucracy at the royal court which facilitated this process (Kaggwa, 1953). To hinder the Bakungu's breaking away from the centre, they were conditioned to attend regular meetings at the kingdom's consultative body (Lukiiko). The Lukiiko served a key purpose of mediating the disputes of this ruling class. To further check the Bakungu and Bataka, a standing army (Ekitongole ekijasi) headed by a general (Myaasi) was created, under Walugembe Mutesa 1 (1859-84), with a parallel power structure of captains (Batongole) appointed regionally alongside the Bakungu. However, the Bataka retained the privileged right to see the Kabaka at short notice, and to second young men who were to receive training for public office, which in essence meant that their views were accommodated at the centre (Apter, 1961).

These measures hindered the development of the caste system that characterised the other major kingdoms here, and made Buganda the most socially dynamic and powerful Kingdom in this region by the mid 18th century. However, although the Kabaka was the undisputed political head, he was never Buganda's religious leader (unlike for instance the Omukama in Bunyoro). The resultant contest between this institution and that of the Bataka, to control the ideological terrain in Buganda, led to the politicisation of the Middle Eastern religions in Buganda, and later on Uganda. For the Kabaka allowed for the introduction of Islam and later on Christianity with the political intention of eroding the Bataka's religious hold on the population. In turn it was the Bakungu (who were highly competitive and astute political animals), whose duties revolved around their being at the royal palace (the Lubiri), that became the first converts.
Colonial Bureaucracy

Indirect Rule: This was a combination of the weberian model and other management styles effected between 1900 and the late 1940's. Indirect Rule involved the utilizing of local traditional rulers and institutions and cultural norms to legitimize colonialism by linking it to the past. It depended on a de-centralised framework and created an alliance between the Colonial administration, British business and the traditional rulers. The emphasis was on maintaining these principles, while it was argued that their application "may and should vary with customs, the traditions, and the prejudices of each unit" (Lugard, 1893).

Indirect Rule relied on the cooperation of legitimate indigenous elites and institutions for its efficacy. To enable this, the British employed coercion, exploited the differences between local competing elites, and marginalized those leaders who opposed colonial rule. Most of the collaborating elites, within the state led societies, had been men who had served in meritorious roles in the old order. That is, people who were accustomed to serve for the powers that be so long as they gained from their service (Low, 1973). In Buganda these happened to be Bakungu and military commanders, as for instance generals Semei Kakungulu and Apollo Kagwa. In Bunyoro they were mainly members of the abasusura, headed by their overall commanders, Rwabudongo and Byabachwezi. In Nkore they were led by Nuwa Mbaguta, a person who did not originate from Nkore, but had managed to obtain high office due to his outstanding political and military skills (Steinhart, 1977).

The political skills of these people, and their linkage to the old order created a semblance of continuity, and conditioned a measure of legitimacy, or at least compliance. This was enhanced through the skillful manipulation by the colonialists of the local institutions while at the same time maintaining a low physical presence, to the effect that most people never interacted with British administrators during the governance process. It was through the co-opted elites that they received their rules of compliance. Consequently, when the marginalised sections in Buganda agitated in the 1920's, it was against these collaborators that they focused their anger, which accorded the British the leverage to act as arbiters.

With the segmentary societies of northern and eastern Uganda, problems did arise in finding indigenous leaders with a large following. Hence a situation arose where by "any person who dared enough to –meet the colonial official (Kabweyere, 1974)" was made a leader. These people tended to lack legitimacy, as hierarchial governance had been unknown in these societies. A problem compounded when the hierarchial and centralised Buganda governance system was imposed in these areas, moreover initially, with Baganda chiefs to effect it. Burke (1964) described this pattern as "an indirect style of indirect rule." Inevitably, these new "traditional authorities", relied heavily on the colonial state to extract compliance (Kabweyere, 1974). Compliance was also enabled through the establishment of political order, Pax Britannica, a situation that was best appreciated in Acholi, as it stopped Arab slave trading (Otuunu, 1987). The colonialists also introduced an elaborate value system that was based on Christianity and state regulated literacy skills and modern medical institutions. All of which conditioned compliance. Enormous material benefits were bestowed upon the collaborators. In Buganda, the Bakungu chiefs were given large tracts of land and a near carte blanche in relation to the running
of the Buganda state, the aim being to create stabilizing landed gentry (Low and Pratt, 1960). Elsewhere, collaborators also gained politically and materially (Steinhart, 1977).

The demise of indirect rule also had a foreign dimension. This related to the global decline in the competitiveness of the British economy (Mamdani, 1976). A situation that coincided with the additional pressures for change and eventually de-colonise that emerged in Britain’s colonies, the super powers and from within itself. This led to the formulation of Colonial Good Governance policies. Their overriding aim was to re-establish legitimate order through the creation of broader indigenous coalitions, and the expansion of Britain’s economy.

International and domestic political pressure led to Lord Hailey's report, "Native Administration and Political Development in Tropical Africa", in the 1940's, that provided the basis for Colonial Good Governance. This report criticised indirect rule's authoritarian institutions and advocated the introduction of democratic reforms within local governance, the gradual absorption of Africans in all sectors of government in addition to the implementing of social and economic development (Lee, 1967).

In 1940 the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was enacted. This provided the legal basis for the proposed reforms. Good government's implementation: This process was influenced by the devastating effect that World War. On top of this, during the cold war, the ideological rivalry between the superpowers was extended to almost all developing nations which led to the alignment of these countries with either of the ideological camps, the suppression of local political concerns, and most importantly, the subordination of political institutions to the bureaucratic apparatus. The superpowers often preferred a bureaucratic oligarchy based on rigid hierarchical structures and rule bound norms to a democratic political system that would involve popular voices and unpredictable changes (Shamsul, 1997).

Consequently, most within the petty bourgeoisie economically benefited from Colonial Good Governance, as even the civil servants were accessed to higher promotion with three of them being co-opted into the Executive Council. So as to further stifle disquiet, attempts were made to promote a system of democratic local governance which was to be controlled by the “responsible ... Growing class of educated men, *** (who) at the same time command the respect and support of the masses of the people (Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African Territories, 25.9.47). Hence the Local Government Ordinances of 1949 and 1955 were enacted. These provided corporate powers and responsibilities to the District Councils (DCs) in all the areas of Uganda except Buganda. The Governor was empowered to create DCs as well as a tier of advisory lower councils.

Post-Colonial Bureaucracy

For a polity to sustain its bureaucracy it’s based on legitimate order, the status quo has to reflect the interests of the governed. The leadership has to be coherent, create and respect institutional and administrative mechanisms that sustains this coherence, while at the same time transmits its values within society. Bureaucracy is linked to the redistribution of political and economic resources within society. To enable political order, these processes have to be legitimate, in addition to satisfying a broad array of social formations, within the context of development, that are necessary to maintain social cohesion. Since legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite for
bureaucracy, the bureaucratic class has to respect societal values and to obtain the consent of the governed.

Given the nature and departure of colonial rule, at its independence Uganda inherited neither a democratic society nor a pro-people state (Kabwegyere, 1993). Moreover, those controlling state power failed to respect Uganda's constitution and institutions and civil society, whilst they despised democratic values. Furthermore, these rulers lacked the capacity to govern, and yet paradoxically opted to stay in power at all costs. A legitimacy deficit emerged, and the resultant political normlessness and institution less arena (Huntington, 1972)

Within a context of a legitimacy deficit, the regime logically opted to centralize all powers so as to maintain control. This became manifest through the over centralizing of the 1967 constitution. It also allied more closely to the military and the end result was illegitimacy and a lack of grassroots initiative.

In addition, Uganda inherited the traditional model of public administration which, among other things, involved the idea of a career civil service (established within a service-wide uniformity of rules and regulation) with officers expected to make advancement from their enlistment to retirement. This traditional model of public administration, grounded in the theory of Max Weber, produced a civil service considered to be one of Uganda’s strongest colonial legacies. Yet, the structure and principle guiding the operation of the civil service virtually collapsed with the advent of the Ugandan project meant to replace the expatriates with their Ugandan counterparts. However, by 1986, it became obvious that the Ugandan bureaucracy, for instance, had short-circuited the full cycle of its establishment: it could not complete the required progression from birth to maturity.

In spite of the vision at independence which sought to attain a vision of transforming the Ugandan society and realizing the public good within the dynamics of a consciously induced and planned developmental agenda (backed formidably by the windfall revenue from the immense coffee and cotton resources in the 70s), it soon became obvious that the strategy for public sector investment and institutional expansion would jeopardize this vision. Thus, contrary to its original mandate, the civil service was staffed with managerial officers with unproven capacities.

Other dysfunctional issues were soon to manifest within the institutional framework of the Weberian bureaucratic system. The most obvious of these are (a) cultural unsuitability of the Weberian bureaucratic theory, and (b) the coordination of the public good within the directive principle of good leadership. In the first place, the adoption of the colonial bureaucratic system, like the other state apparatuses, was without a conscious effort at interrogating its socio-cultural appropriateness for the Ugandan context. It was expected that the bureaucracy would work seamlessly once the officers were exchanged. In the second, the failure of the Ugandan leadership since independence has proven that without a strong and focused political direction, the Ugandan bureaucracies would be eternally prostrate.

This postcolonial condition of the Ugandan bureaucracies would however be a very dangerous one within the context of globalization and the diminishing relevance of the state system. The obituary of the state had been written and rewritten in global theories given the fact that most of the original spaces of the state had been taken over by supra-state organizations like Trans-national corporations and multilateral corporations. The irony of globalization, however,
was that the state was back in contention in spite of its predicted demise. But it would be a mistake to think of this redoubtable state in its Westphalian model. This was because most of the states that were weathering the global storm were states that had transformed themselves out of the Westphalian logic into a developmental and administrative capacity that possessed the capability to tap into the possibilities and potentialities of global developments. This was more crucial for the states in the third world, and especially in Africa, whose capacities for adaptation and transformation had been compromised by colonialism. Achieving a transformative capacity was not only relevant for global competitiveness, but also for the betterment of the citizens who needed the enabling public good to live a good life.

Re-forming the civil service became a necessary action given the failure of the Ugandan Civil Service to consolidate its hold on the tradition of public administration inherited from the British. The message of Public Administration and Civil Service Reforms in Uganda, therefore, could be regarded as being the attempt to offer a robust exploration of the problems, challenges of public administration and the problems and prospects of reform. Thus, on the face of it, public administration was usually taken to mean “the planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling of government operations.” This conception would very often direct and tend to limit attention to the institutions of public administration vis-à-vis their design, structure, managers and their capacity to do what they are designed to do.

Public Administration and Civil Service Reforms in Uganda was not only rich in pointing out the weaknesses of prevailing reform programmes in Uganda, but also came up with alternatives, where necessary, and ways of fixing the weaknesses identified. The tale of public service reforms in Uganda was not always a depressing one in that inefficiency, non-responsiveness, irresponsibility were not the traits that always defined public agencies in the country. The truth is that in quite a number of cases there had been some display of excellence on the part of some public agencies in the country (such as URA, KCCA, POLICE, UPDF). These agencies had, through innovation, achieved laudable feats. Some of the NPM-inspired practices — privatization, contracting out, performance planning and reporting, capacity building and decentralization — which had been at the heart of reforms and repositioning in some major African countries like Uganda. Uganda offers optimism that African bureaucracies possess the capacity to rise from their political and bureaucratic slumber to effectively and efficiently achieve what they have been created for.

This optimism is however tempered by political elements and context of public administration in Uganda. This political element concerns the issue of how political leaders are chosen and what they do with their mandate through the decisions they make. This element, as noted earlier, is very critical in defining the direction the bureaucracies can and shall take in tackling the implementation of the public good. It is this political element therefore that makes reform efforts more strategic in the direction of the policies of the government for the benefits of the governed.

Conclusion and Suggestions for future research
The foregoing analysis has shown that bureaucracy is an important variable in determining the successful conduct of governance in any country. This is particularly so in countries which are
transitioning to multiparty democracy. The article has marshaled evidence that bureaucracy has metamorphosed since independence. The extent to which the Ugandan bureaucracy has transformed is as function of the legal and institutional arrangements in place, the capacity (in terms of people and equipment) of the institutions charged with public management without forgetting the political environment, however. Out of all the factors outlined as being crucial to the successful achievement of reform, the most important is undoubtedly the need for a determined political will to carry through reforms, and the need to make reform efforts relevant to the context of governance. These factors are meant to challenge the Ugandan leadership on the need to move from the act of visioning to that of missioning in the effort to harness the best in global practices toward a better service delivery mechanism and eventually achieving the good life for the citizenry.

It should be realized that innovation in the public sector goes beyond identifying nagging problems confronting the public service and inventing ways of tackling the problems, or identifying best practices that best address the situation. More than this, innovation demands that laudable ideas be implemented by being converted to what will profit the innovator, and in the case of the public service, the citizens and other stakeholders.

Finally, insights into the strategies, ideas, and conditions — an institutional blueprint — for redirecting the focus of public service in Uganda, and for making the bureaucracy and the Ugandan state globally competitive and development oriented especially with regard to service delivery. This task of reinventing the Ugandan bureaucracies serves two significant purposes. One, it raises the Ugandan state to democratic and developmental significance in a world sold to democratic governance. Two, it gives the state the needed leeway to participate effectively in global conversation. This is because it is only a developmental and administrative state that possesses the requirements to escape the predicted demise of the state in global reckoning.

REFERENCES


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